דניאל הנדלר

Maritime operations rely on the Automatic Identification System (AIS), an open broadcast protocol whose unauthenticated, self-reported messages are easily abused. This survey provides an AIS-first, security-focused synthesis of AIS cybersecurity research. It makes three main contributions. First, it explains AIS protocol mechanics and uses them to derive the main security weaknesses that arise from open VHF broadcast, self-reported data, lack of built-in authentication and replay protection, and GNSS dependence. Second, it organizes AIS threats and mitigations into a unified taxonomy that links attack vectors, technical effects, operational impacts, and security measures across the prevent–detect–respond–recover lifecycle. Third, it assesses practical defenses, including authentication proposals, endpoint and network hardening, behavior-aware analytics, cross-sensor validation, and governance measures. The survey shows that existing work is strongest on anomaly detection and AIS data analytics, whereas standards-compatible authentication, scalable key management, backward-compatible deployment, trust-aware display integration, and operational validation remain open challenges. Consequently, AIS security is likely to require layered, staged, and standards-compatible mitigations rather than a single technical fix. By bringing together cybersecurity, maritime operations, and data-science perspectives, the survey provides practical guidance for securing AIS-based systems and highlights open problems for future standardization and implementation.