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The Lab for Social Decision-Making & Risk

Prof. Yoella Bereby-Meyer

Underestimating Honesty in Distributive Negotiations

Misjudging Counterparts’ Motivations

Shira Garber, Simone Moran, Boaz Keysar, Yoella Bereby-Meyer

Negotiators often face two dilemmas: whether to be honest and whether to believe their counterpart is honest. We propose a discrepancy in how negotiators approach these dilemmas, leading to an expected versus actual honesty gap. When deciding whether to be honest, negotiators are influenced not only by self-interest but also by moral identity concerns, which promote honesty. However, when deciding whether counterparts are honest, negotiators assume they are primarily motivated by self-interest and thus overestimate their dishonesty. Five studies examining online secondhand market negotiations found buyers often underestimated sellers’ honesty, and this was accounted for by their misperceptions of sellers’ motivations. While sellers tended to be honest because of moral identity concerns, buyers expected them to be driven primarily by self-interest. The actual-expected honesty gap was particularly prevalent when sellers’ moral identity concerns were situationally activated, and altering buyers’ perceptions of sellers’ motivations reduced the gap. Findings further suggest potential targeted interventions to foster trust.

Publication language English
Journal Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

Keywords

deception
guilt
honesty
negotiation
social judgment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Psychology
Access to Document
10.1177/01461672261468054
Other files and links
Link to publication in Scopus