
The Lab for Social Decision-Making & Risk
Prof. Yoella Bereby-Meyer
Fairness in bargaining
We consider new three player games to test existing models of fairness. Our games consist of a proposer who offers an allocation of $10 between two players, either himself and the responder or the responder and a third party. In each case, the responder either accepts or rejects this allocation. In case of a rejection, the player who was not part of the initial division (the third party and the proposer, respectively) receives a rejection payoff (of $0, $5 or $10, depending on the game). Our results cast some doubt on existing fairness theories.
| Publication language | English |
| Pages | 173-186 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 01.02.2005 |
Keywords
Bargaining
Fairness
Ultimatum game
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Economics and Econometrics
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management