Daniel Berend

Senior Academic

Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem

Daniel Berend, Luba Sapir

Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1/2. We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m ≳ 3 is preferable to a random single expert.

Publication language English
Pages 83-92
Journal Social Choice and Welfare
Volume 24
Issue number 1
Publication status Published - 01.02.2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Access to Document
10.1007/s00355-003-0293-z
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Link to publication in Scopus