
Daniel Berend
Senior Academic
Monotonicity in Condorcet Jury Theorem
Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1/2. We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a random subcommittee of size m ≳ 3 is preferable to a random single expert.
| Publication language | English |
| Pages | 83-92 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 01.02.2005 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics