Article

From victimhood to peace activism: The potential role of personal loss and inclusive victim beliefs

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Abstract

Most of the literature on collective victimhood has focused on its negative consequences for conflict resolution. Only recently has the understanding emerged that collective victimhood can also play a role in reconciliation. The present research aimed to test this recent insight in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. A sample of 200 Israeli Jews who participated in the 2015 Israeli–Palestinian Memorial Day ceremony organized by the Combatants for Peace organization completed online questionnaires. In line with our predictions, personal victimization (i.e., losing a significant other due to the conflict) and inclusive victim perceptions (i.e., perceptions of a "common victim identity," namely, similarity between the ingroup's and the outgroup's suffering) predicted peace activism. However, perceptions of a common perpetrator identity failed to predict activism. These results were replicated in a sample of 106 Israeli Jews who participated in the 2016 ceremony. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Intergroup conflicts that involve direct forms of violence such as armed conflicts, human rights abuses, military occupation, terrorism, and genocide (Galtung, 1969) leave the members of the conflicting groups with a deep sense of victimization (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). The sense of victimization felt by group members can result from the direct experience of personal harm and loss due to the conflict. This would be the case, for example, for bereaved families who

lost loved ones in the Orlando terror attack in June 2016. Alternatively, victimization can be experienced indirectly or vicariously, through

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social-psychological identification with the victimized, as would be the case, for example, for Americans and members of the LGBTQ community who were not personally affected by this attack. This latter phenomenon is referred to in the literature as collective victimhood (see Vollhardt, 2015).

Research on the experience of collective victimhood has demonstrated its detrimental role in maintaining and escalating intergroup conflicts. Collective victimhood may lead to emotions such as anger and vengefulness, which increase aggressive tendencies towards the outgroup (e.g., Nawata & Yamaguchi, 2012). It might also reduce the collective guilt of group members due to their own aggressive acts (e.g., Penic, Elcheroth, & Spini, 2016; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008), providing them with a sense of moral licensing to distance themselves from or even harm outgroup members (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009). Finally, collective victimhood can reduce positive inclinations such as intergroup trust (e.g., Rotella, Richeson, Chiao, & Bean, 2012), forgiveness (e.g., Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008), and readiness to compromise (e.g., Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011), which substantially reduce the chances of reaching an agreement to resolve the conflict.

Without denying the detrimental effects of collective victimhood, a growing body of research suggests that, under certain circumstances (e.g., when a particular community experiences a large number of victims; Elcheroth, 2006), it may also have violence-reducing effects. Of direct relevance to the present study, Vollhardt (2015) has argued that the assumption that collective victimhood is *inevitably* destructive for intergroup relations is false, as under certain conditions collective victimhood can serve to promote peace activism and intergroup reconciliation. Specifically, most studies in the field have conceptualized collective victimhood in an exclusive manner, focusing on group members' perceptions of their ingroup's unique suffering and tendency to compete over the status of being the conflict's sole "true" victim (e.g., Noor et al., 2008). However, collective victimhood can be also conceptualized in an inclusive manner

that highlights the similarities across the ingroup and other victimized groups, including the outgroup that the ingroup is in conflict with. According to Vollhardt (2012), such *inclusive victim consciousness* should have positive consequences for intergroup relations—a possibility that received empirical support in various contexts of intergroup conflict including Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015), India (Vollhardt, Nair, & Tropp, 2016), and Northern Ireland (Cohrs, McNeill, & Vollhardt, 2015).

In the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in which the present study was conducted, Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor (2013, Study 1) experimentally induced Palestinians and Jews with a common victim identity, that is, the perception that one thing common to both groups is their experience of loss and suffering due to the conflict. This experimental manipulation was inspired by the Palestinian–Israeli organization, Bereaved Families for Peace, consisting of people who have lost close family members in the regional conflict, aiming to promote solidarity across group boundaries by sharing these losses. This common victim identity manipulation was expected to promote conciliatory tendencies for two reasons. First, it induces group members with a common, superordinate identity (instead of two separate identities), which has consistently been found to promote intergroup solidarity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Second, it addresses group members' pressing need for acknowledgement of their suffering, which has also been found to promote conciliatory tendencies (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Halabi, 2015). In line with this reasoning, the induction of a common victim identity was indeed successful in increasing Israeli Jews' and Palestinians' mutual forgiveness attitudes (Shnabel et al., 2013).

Conceptually consistent findings were obtained in a subsequent study (Shnabel et al., 2013, Study 2) that induced Palestinians and Israeli Jews with a common perpetrator identity—the perception that one thing common to both groups is their infliction of harm upon each other. This experimental manipulation was inspired by the Combatants for Peace movement that was established by Palestinians and Israelis

who played an active role in the cycle of violence and who decided to lay down their arms and promote a peaceful solution to the conflict. As expected, inducing Israeli Jews and Palestinians with a common perpetrator identity, which made them think about intergroup commonalities and reassured their agency (i.e., reminded them of their power and influence), successfully increased mutual forgiveness. Taken together, these studies suggest that highlighting the similarity between conflicting groups in terms of experiencing and causing suffering can have positive consequences for intergroup relations.

The Present Study

The goal of the present study was to test the notion—which has thus far not been examined in quantitative empirical research—that collective victimhood can be associated with peace activism. Understanding the link between victimhood and actual activism (rather than broad conciliatory attitudes, such as those examined by Shnabel et al., 2013) is theoretically and practically important, given the critical role of activism in facilitating social change (see Curtin & McGarty's [2016] claim that "without activists to organize them, collective acts such as campaigns of protest, are unlikely to take place," p. 228). For this purpose, we surveyed Israeli Jews who attended the 2015 Israeli–Palestinian Memorial Day ceremony organized by Combatants for Peace in collaboration with Palestinian–Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace. The ceremony was comprised of visual arts exhibitions, musical performances, speeches, and testimonies by Palestinians and Israelis who have lost family members in the conflict. It is considered to be one of the largest cultural events of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps and has become, since its establishemnt by Buma Inbar whose son was killed in the South Lebanon conflict in 1995, an important recruiting tool for new activists for the Combatants for Peace movement. The main goal of the ceremony is to acknowledge the pain and remember the victims of the violence on both sides. The ceremony also highlights that remembrance of the fallen is not

enough—people in both societies must also act to end the circle of bereavement by reaching peace (Combatants for Peace, n.d.).

Before specifying our research hypotheses, a word of clarification may be in order. In particular, the ceremony's attendees typically belong to the political left (i.e., "the Israeli peace camp"). The predictions specified next relate *solely to this population of peace supporters* (i.e., right-wingers are unlikely to be involved in peace activism, and it is likely that the psychological constructs associated with right-wingers' activism for causes other than peace are substantially different—an issue we will return to in the Discussion section).

The first prediction we examined was whether, consistent with Vollhardt's (2009) theorizing, inclusive victim perceptions (i.e., perceptions of a common victim identity) would predict peace activism. In addition, we examined two related variables. The first was corresponding perceptions pertaining to perpetration. Specifically, we measured perceptions of a common perpetrator identity (i.e., the belief that both groups inflict substantial harm upon each other). This belief, which acknowledges the suffering of both groups (see SimanTov-Nachlieli et al., 2015) and is associated with perceptions of a common superordinate identity (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), was previously found to predict intergroup forgiveness (Shnabel et al., 2013). Moreover, Shnabel et al. (2013) found perceptions of a common perpetrator identity to predict a heightened sense of ingroup's agency (i.e., competence and self-determination). Because agency is closely related to group efficacy (i.e., the belief that one's group can resolve its grievances through unified effort) that in turn predicts collective action (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999), we expected perceptions of a common perpetrator identity to predict peace activism.

The second variable was the personal loss of a significant other (e.g., a family member). Personal victimization typically leads to a rightward shift on the political spectrum, manifested in greater support for violence against the conflicting outgroup (for a review, see Canetti & Lindner, 2014). Nevertheless, one's direct experience of the unbearable costs of conflict can also lead to conflict

fatigue (Kelman, 2004) and increased motivation to stop the cycle of violence. As mentioned before, the wish to act toward ending the cycle of violence in response to bereavement is likely to occur among those who generally endorse a peace vision (i.e., who view peace as desirable and feasible; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Doosje, 2015), but not among those who believe in military solutions.

Importantly, due to their personal sacrifice for the ingroup's sake, people who experienced personal loss as a result of the conflict are seen by other members of their ingroup as having more legitimacy than others to communicate commonalities between the conflicting groups' victimization; therefore, they may be particularly effective in communicating this type of message (Vollhardt, 2015). As activism is influenced by one's sense of ability to make a change (e.g., van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), we hypothesized that personal victimization would drive people who generally endorse a peace vision to become active in promoting this cause.

To summarize, we expected bereavement to lead to peace activism for two reasons. First, because the first-hand experience of the costs of violence may increase motivation to stop it, and second, because their unique status in society makes the bereaved more effective than others (who do not have this status) in promoting their political agenda (and efficacy is known to predict activism). In addition to the contribution to society, peace activism can help the bereaved engage in sense-making about their suffering (see the shattered assumptions theory; Janoff-Bulman, 1992) and cope with the traumatic event. To illustrate, people who lost a first-degree relative and belonged to Palestinian–Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace reported fewer prolonged grief disorder symptoms than bereaved people who did not belong to this organization (Weder, Garcia-Nieto, & Canetti, 2010).

Method

Participants and Procedure

Two days after the 2015 memorial ceremony, an invitation to participate in an online survey about their experiences was sent to a mailing list of Combatants for Peace that includes 2,827 email addresses. Note that there are about 80 active Jewish members in the movement; hence, the vast majority of addresses do not belong to active members. That is, they may be described as *supporters* rather than *activists*. The distinction between the two terms was put forward by Curtin and McGarty (2016), who criticize much of the existing literature on activism for its failure

> [T]o differentiate activists (those who have ongoing commitments to a particular social movement, including building support, recruiting new members, and organizing a movement) from individuals who indicate support for a movement, or might occasionally show up to a protest or rally. (p. 235)

In line with Curtin and McGarty's observation, the responses to the item "I define myself as a peace activist" (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *very much*) were diverse, with 11% picking the value 1; 22.5% picking the value 2; 28% picking the value 3; 25% picking the value 4; and only 13.5% picking the value 5 (the corresponding numbers in the replication study were 13%, 25%, 31%, 19%, and 12%). It should be further clarified in this regard that memorial days are at the core of the Zionist ethos (see Ben-Amos & Bet-El, 1999); thus, participation in them should not in itself be viewed as a form of political activism.

Of the 845 addressees who opened the email, 274 clicked the link leading to the survey. A total of 200 Israeli Jewish attendees completed the online survey between 2 and 16 days after the ceremony. Sample size was not determined a priori, because we could not influence the number of respondents. In terms of demographic background, 116 participants were women, 78 were men, and six responded "other/don't want to answer"; their ages ranged from 16 to 88 years (M_{age} = 33.11, SD = 16.36); in terms of political orientation (1 = *radically rightist* to 7 = *radically leftist*), 19% defined themselves as "radically leftist," 77% as "leftist," 2.5% as "rather leftist," and the remaining 1.5% defined themselves as belonging to the "center" or "right" ($M_{political\ orientation}$ = 6.13,

SD = 0.53); also, 51.5% defined themselves as Zionist, 30% as non-Zionist, and the rest as "other" (e.g., "unsure" or "depends on the definition of Zionism"). In terms of place of birth, 88% were born in Israel. 52% indicated that they had previously participated in at least one Combatants for Peace activity (e.g., a lecture). Finally, 85% of the participants had completed full service (2 years for women; 3 years for men) in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

After completing some background questions (the full protocol is available upon request from the authors), participants completed a series of Likert scales (1 = *not at all* to 5 = *very much*). Items were either self-developed or adapted from Shnabel et al. (2013) to fit the present context. Two items assessed perceptions of a common victim identity (i.e., inclusive victimhood consciousness; e.g., "One thing common to Israelis and Palestinians is their experience of loss and suffering due to the conflict between them"; r = .50, p < .001; M = 4.45, SD = 0.69); two items assessed endorsement of a common perpetrator identity (e.g., "Israelis and Palestinians are similar in that they both inflict substantial harm and damage upon each other"; r = .68, p < .001; M = 3.77, SD = 1.07); four items assessed peace activism (e.g., "I define myself as a peace activist," "I often take part in activities [e.g., demonstrations, petitions, binational meetings] designed to change the political situation"; α = .91; M = 3.03, SD = 1.06). Participants also indicated whether they had lost a significant other in the conflict (i.e., personal victimization) and the relationship of this person to them (a sibling, a son/daughter, etc.).

For exploratory purposes, participants also completed four items that assessed attentiveness to the voice of bereaved families, M = 3.16, SD = 1.03, and the combatants, M = 2.60, SD = 1.02 (e.g., "As a society, when thinking about and planning our conduct with the Palestinians, we must pay greater attention to what our bereaved families/combatants have to say"). Participants also indicated their sense of collective efficacy, M = 3.05, SD = 0.89, and perceptions of the effectiveness of different courses

of action (focused demonstrations, M = 2.69, SD = 0.91; participation in dialogue groups, M = 3.94, SD = 0.91; activities intended to increase awareness of the Israeli public, M = 3.62, SD = 0.82; and activities intended to increase intergroup solidarity such as joint olive harvesting, M = 3.65, SD = 0.92). Results for the exploratory measures are available upon request.

Seventy participants (35%) reported having lost a significant other in the conflict. This relatively high proportion might stem from the fact that the event was co-organized by the Palestinian–Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace. In particular, 23 (11.5%) reported losing a relative, 32 (16%) reported losing a friend, and 15 (7.5%) reported losing someone else (e.g., a fellow combatant). Upon completion, participants provided demographic information and were thanked for their participation.

Results

Intercorrelations are presented in Table 1 (below the diagonal). To examine the unique effects of the variables of interest on peace activism, we controlled for participants' political orientation, age, and gender (put differently, we tested whether the effects of the five variables of interest persisted above and beyond political orientation and demographics). Thus, we conducted a two-step hierarchical regression analysis. In the first step, participants' political orientation, age, and gender (0 = female, 1 = male) were the predictors, and activism was the dependent variable. The obtained regression model was significant, $F(3, 196)$ = 13.24, p < .001, R^2 = .16. As seen in Table 2, peace activism was significantly predicted by a leftist political orientation, age (older participants reported a higher level of activism than younger participant), and gender (men reported a higher level of activism than women). In the second step, participants' personal victimization (0 = no personal victimization, 1 = loss of a significant other), inclusive victim perceptions (i.e., a common victim identity), and a common perpetrator identity were entered into the model. The obtained model was significant, $F(6, 193)$ = 9.18,

Table 1. Correlations between all measured variables.

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Age		.03	n/a	.27**	.15	.04	.16
Gender	.10		n/a	.13	−.00	−.14	.19*
Leftist political orientation	.02	−.08		n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Personal victimization	.25**	.09	−.08		.09	−.13	.33**
Inclusive victim perceptions	.07	−.11	−.16*	.06		.51**	.27**
A common perpetrator identity	.09	−.08	−.03	.05	.42**		.14
Peace activism	.22**	.22**	.28**	.20**	.07	−.05	

Note. Results for the first ($N = 200$) and replication ($N = 106$) studies appear below and above the diagonal, respectively.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$ (two-tailed).

Table 2. Effects of predictor variables on peace activism.

	B	SE	β	t	p	95% CIs
Age	.01	0.00	0.15	2.19	.030	[0.00, 0.01]
Gender	.48	0.14	0.22	3.37	.001	[0.21, 0.75]
Leftist political orientation	.66	0.13	0.33	5.11	.001	[0.34, 0.88]
Personal victimization	.37	0.15	0.17	2.52	.013	[0.05, 0.61]
Inclusive victim perceptions	.27	0.11	0.18	2.48	.014	[0.03, 0.49]
Common perpetrator identity	−.12	0.07	−0.12	−1.70	.091	[−0.26, 0.05]

Note. $N = 200$. Missing values were replaced with means.

$p < .001$, and provided a significant improvement over the first model, $F_{change}(3, 193) = 4.43$, $p = .005$, $\Delta R^2 = .05$; a post hoc analysis using the G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) revealed that the power of this test (for $\alpha = .05$) was 88%. As seen in Table 2, in line with expectations, personal victimization and inclusive victim perceptions significantly predicted peace activism. In contrast, perceptions of a common perpetrator identity failed to predict activism (and even tended to be negatively associated with it).

Replication Study

In light of current understanding of the importance of replication studies (e.g., Schmidt, 2009), we conducted a second survey following the 2016 memorial ceremony. After the exclusion of three participants who indicated that they had taken the survey in 2015, our sample included 106 Jewish participants. Of them, 61 were women, 44 were

men, and one checked "other/don't want to answer"; their ages ranged between 18 and 89 years ($M_{age} = 40.88$, $SD = 15.84$); 58% defined themselves as "Zionist," 17.5% as "non-Zionist," and the rest as "other" (e.g., "Zionist who supports the two-state solution"); 83% were born in Israel; 57% indicated that they had previously participated in at least one Combatants for Peace activity; 86% of the participants had completed full service in the IDF; lastly, 38% reported having lost a significant other in the conflict. The survey was identical to the one conducted in 2015 except for two changes requested by Combatants for Peace: first, participants' political orientation was not collected; second, the activism scale consisted of two (rather than four) items. Intercorrelations are presented in Table 1 (above the diagonal). In terms of descriptive statistics, on 5-point scales (see previous lines), for inclusive victim perceptions, $M = 4.56$, $SD = 0.66$; for endorsement of a common perpetrator identity, $M = 3.88$, $SD = 1.05$; and for peace activism, $M = 3.16$, $SD = 1.07$.

As in the original study, we conducted a two-step hierarchical regression analysis on peace activism (missing values were replaced with means). In the first step, participants' age and gender (0 = female, 1 = male) were the predictors, and activism was the dependent variable. The obtained regression model was significant, $F(2, 103) = 3.27$, $p = .042$, $R^2 = .06$. Peace activism was marginally predicted by gender (men tended to report a higher level of activism than women), $\beta = 0.18$, $p = .053$, but not by age, $\beta = 0.15$, $p = .118$. In the second step, participants' personal victimization, inclusive victim perceptions, and common perpetrator identity were entered into the model. The obtained model was significant, $F(5, 100) = 4.94$, $p < .001$, and provided a significant improvement over the first model, $F_{change}(3, 100) = 5.75$, $p = .001$, $\Delta R^2 = .13$ (a post hoc analysis revealed that the power of this test for $\alpha = .05$ was 95%). Note that the variance explained by the variables entered in Step 2 is substantially higher than the corresponding explained variance in the original study. This is likely because in the original study (unlike the replication study) political orientation was entered as a predictor Step 1 (and explained .078 of the variance). In line with the first study, personal victimization, $\beta = 0.28$, $p = .003$, and inclusive victim perceptions, $\beta = 0.19$, $p = .074$, significantly or marginally predicted peace activism, whereas perceptions of a common perpetrator identity did not, $\beta = 0.09$, $p = .371$.

Discussion

The present study found that personal victimization due to the conflict and inclusive victim perceptions predicted peace activism among leftist Israeli Jewish participants. These findings, which cannot be simply explained as reflecting people's general political orientation (or other relevant demographics such as age and gender), extend previous theorizing that, perhaps counterintuitively, collective victimhood can be associated with intergroup reconciliation in general (e.g., Vollhardt, 2012, 2015) and in the Israeli–Palestinian context in particular (Vollhardt, 2009).

Specifically, previous work (e.g., Noor et al., 2015) has focused on inclusive victim perceptions and their effects on conciliatory tendencies such as forgiveness. The present study is the first to examine, using a quantitative methodology, how these perceptions relate to actual peace activism, offering a potential integration between research on collective victimhood on the one hand, and collective action on the other. Our study is also the first to examine the effect of a related, yet conceptually different construct—personal victimization—which further extends our understanding of how the experience of victimhood can be enlisted to promote intergroup reconciliation.

Contrary to our predictions, the endorsement of a common perpetrator identity did not predict peace activism. This result might stem either from the immediate context in which the study was conducted (i.e., Memorial Day, which highlights loss and suffering rather than fighting and perpetration) or from the broader context of the conflict. As members of the stronger party in an asymmetrical conflict, Israelis may be particularly sensitive to their moral image (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). Because the victim's role is associated with superior morality (e.g., Noor et al., 2012), Israelis might be generally more prone to identifying with this social role (which addresses their need for a positive moral identity) than with the role of perpetrators. Alternatively, consistent with their leftist political orientation, participants in this study were reluctant to think of *both* groups as perpetrators, as they believed their ingroup to be the main one responsible for maintaining and resolving the conflict. Yet another possibility is that the absent influence of perpetration-related perceptions on peace activism may stem from the fact that the experience of perpetration is psychologically less profound than the experience of victimization (e.g., perpetrators find it easier to "move on" than victims; Baumeister, 1996) and was indeed found to exert less influence on people's behavior (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). Future research may examine whether inclusive victim perceptions serve as a better predictor of peace activism than the endorsement of

a common perpetrator identity in other contexts as well, such as among Palestinians (who as the weaker party in the conflict might feel a stronger need for power and a weaker need for morality than Israeli Jews; Shnabel & Noor, 2012).

One limitation of the present study stems from its correlative nature that limits our ability to infer causality. Thus, while based on theorizing and findings obtained in other contexts (e.g., Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015), we have suggested that inclusive victim perceptions lead to peace activism, the opposite is also possible. The possible direction of causality is one-sided, however, in the case of personal victimization (i.e., personal loss can lead to peace activism, but not the other way around). Hence, the finding that personal victimization predicted peace activism may be viewed as the strongest evidence the present study provides in support of the potential transformative role of conflict-related victimhood.

Another limitation of the present research is that the sample is almost exclusively comprised of people from the Israeli-Jewish political left; therefore, conclusions cannot be generalized to other sectors of Israeli society, such as those with right-wing political views. Indeed, previous research by Noor et al. (2015) found that inclusive victim perceptions predicted heightened levels of forgiveness and conciliatory attitudes towards Palestinians, even among centrists and rightists. However, it is unrealistic to expect these heightened conciliatory tendencies to translate into actual peace activism among people who do not view themselves as belonging to the "peace camp" (e.g., because they are less likely to be the target of recruitment attempts or to overcome the barriers to participation; see Klandermans & Oegema's [1987] discussion of steps towards engagement in social movements).

It should be clarified in this respect that the goal of the present study was to demonstrate that the *possibility* that personal or collective victimhood (if construed in an inclusive manner) may be associated with actual peace activism *is viable*. To achieve this goal, we purposely sampled peace supporters. It remains for future research to further test the generalizability of

our findings—as well as their possible binding conditions. Such future research needs to identify under exactly what circumstances collective and personal victimization facilitates or hinders peace activism (for the complexity of collective victimization, which "should not be treated as a uniform phenomenon," see Penic et al., 2016; see also Kremer-Sharon, Sharvit, & Eitam, 2015). It may be particularly intriguing to explore the role played by personal and collective victimization in promoting right-wing activism. For example, it is possible that as a "mirror image" of the processes found in the present research, personal victimization (i.e., bereavement) and *exclusive* victim perceptions (i.e., competitive victimhood) predict antipeace activism among rightists.

In conclusion, this study adds one more piece of evidence supporting the emerging understanding that collective victimhood, when construed in an inclusive manner, can be a stepping-stone to various positive outcomes, including peace activism. This understanding has practical and theoretical implications. One concrete implication regards the production of the Israeli–Palestinian Memorial Day ceremony. Since the establishment of this ceremony in 2006, it has been coordinated and produced by Combatants for Peace. The Palestinian–Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace organization has officially joined the ceremony's steering committee only in 2015. The results of the present study suggest that collaboration that puts greater emphasis on the voice of bereaved families in both groups may be highly beneficial in making this ceremony an effective platform for promoting peace activism.

Another practical implication is that interventions designed to promote peace, such as dialogue groups between members of adversarial groups (e.g., Jews and Palestinians; Maoz & Bar-On, 2002) within educational settings, can benefit from fostering inclusive victim perceptions. Admittedly, in terms of effect size, these perceptions seem to have a relatively weak influence on actual activism. This is perhaps not surprising given the barriers in the process of translating attitudes into actions (see, e.g., Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Still, they may counter conflicting

group members' tendencies to compete over the victim status. Such competition often interferes with the ability to reach constructive intergroup dialogue that ultimately facilitates activism (see Sonnenschein's [2008] analysis of how communication between Palestinians and Jews gets "stuck" due to group members' engagement in competitive victimhood).

Theoretically, our findings are consistent with previous research about the lessons Israeli Jews draw from the Holocaust (Klar, Schori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013). This research reveals that another lesson, aside from "never be a victim again," is to never let the ingroup become a victimizer or a passive bystander. Collective victimhood, thus, is not inevitably detrimental—it can also promote intergroup solidarity not only towards unrelated groups, but even towards a conflicting outgroup. Recognizing this potential, which has been largely neglected in the literature on collective victimhood (Vollhardt, 2015), may be viewed as a first step. The next step should be developing interventions that actualize this potential. The Palestinian–Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace or similar organizations across the world such as Peace People in Northern Ireland (an organization comprised of Protestant and Catholic women who jointly demonstrate against the violence affecting their communities; http://www.peacepeople.com/), provide inspiring real-life examples for the actualization of this potential.

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