Prof. Aner Sela

Office Address: 

Department of Economics
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
P.O. Box 653
Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel

 

Tel:

+972-8-647-2309

Fax:

+972-8-647-2941

E-Mail:

anersela@bgu.ac.il

 

Research Interests | General Information | Publications | Working Papers

 

Research Interests

·    Economic Theory

·    Game Theory

·    Auction Theory

·    Contest Theory

·    Sports Economics

 

General Information

2013 - 2015

Chair, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

2012 - 2013

Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Exeter.

 

2009 - present

Professor, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

2007 - 2009

Chair, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

2005 - 2009

Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

2005 - 2006

Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Bonn.

2001 - 2005

Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

1998 - 2001

Lecturer, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

1997 - 1998

Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim.

1996 - 1997

Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Bonn.

1996

Ph.D Economics, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology.

1992

M.Sc. Economics, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology.

 

 1990

 B.Sc. Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology.

 

Publications

·       Monderer Dov, Sela Aner, “A 2x2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property,” Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 1996, 144-148.

·       Monderer Dov, Samet Dov, Sela Aner, “Belief Affirming in Learning Processes,” Journal of Economic Theory, 73, 1997, 438-458.

·       Schlag Karl, Sela Aner, “You Play (an action) Only Once,” Economics Letters, 3, 1998, 299-303.

·       Hon-Snir, Monderer Dov, Sela Aner, “A Learning Approach to Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 82, 1998, 65-88.

·       Herreiner Dorothea, Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in Coordination Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 1999, 189-197.

·       Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in ’One-Against-all’ Multi-Player Games,” Economic Theory, 14, 1999, 635-651.

·       Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in 2x3 Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 31, 2000, 152-162.

·       Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,” American Economic Review, 91, 2001, 542-558.

·       Ezra Einy, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, “Dominant Strategies, Superior Information, and Winner’s Curse in Second-Price Auctions,” International Journal of Game Theory, 30(3), 2001, 405-412.

·       Fibich Gadi, Gavious Arieh, Sela Aner, “Low and High Types in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions,” Economics Letters, 75, 2002, 283-287.

·       Ezra Einy, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, “Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 37, 2002, 247-258.

·       Kaplan Todd, Luski Israel, Sela Aner, Wettstein David, “All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards,” Journal of Industrial Economics, L(4), 2002, 417-430.

·       Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(3), 2003, 1-13.

·       Gavious Arieh, Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,” RAND Journal of Economics, 33(4), 2003, 709-722.

·       Fibich Gadi, Gavious Arieh, Sela Aner, “Revenue Equivalence in Asymmetric Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 115, 2004, 309-321.

·       Cohen Chen, Sela Aner, “Manipulations in Contests” Economics Letters, 86, 2005, 135-139.

·       Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “Contest Architecture,” Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), 2006, 70-97.

·       Fibich Gadi, Gavious Arieh, Sela Aner, “All-Pay Auctions with Risk-Averse Players,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 4, 2006, 583-599.

·       Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen, “Contests for Status,” Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 2007, 338-363.

·       Cohen Chen, Sela Aner, "Contests with Ties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7, 2007, Iss. 1. Article 43.

·       Cohen Chen, Sela Aner, "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," European Journal of Political Economics, 24, 2008, 123-132.

·       Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen, "Competing Auctions with Endogenous Quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 141, 2008, 1-27.

·       Cohen Chen, Kaplan Todd, Sela Aner, “Optimal Rewards in Contests,” RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 2008, 434-451.

·       Hoppe Heidrun, Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, "The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals", Review of Economic Studies, 76(1), 2009, 253-281.

·       Kaplan Todd, Sela Aner, "Effective Contests," Economics Letters, 106, 2010, 38-41.

·       Sela Aner, "Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," Economics letters, 112(1), 2011, 67-70.

·       Groh Christian, Moldovanu benny, Sela Aner, Sunde Uwe, “Optimal Seeding in Elimination Tournaments,” Economic Theory, 49, 2012, 59-80.

·       Sela Aner, "Sequential Two-Prize Contests," Economic Theory, 51(2), 2012, 383-395.

·       Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen, "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Economic Inquiry 50(2), 2012, 453-462.

·       Aloni Elad, Sela Aner, "The Assortative Matching Scheme in a Survival Battle," Economics Letters 117, 2012, 272-275.

·       Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, “Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 22(4), 2013, 713-727.

·       Sela Aner, Erez Eyal, “Dynamic Contests with Resource Constraints,” Social Choice and Welfare 41(4), 2013, 863-882.

·       Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, “Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints,” Social Choice and Welfare, 42(1), 2014, 215-243.

·       Segev Ella, Sela Aner, "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50(1), 2014, 251-261.

·       Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, “Caps in Sequential Contests,” Economic Inquiry, 52(2), 2014, 608-617.

·       Segev Ella, Sela Aner," Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions," European Economic Review, 70, 2014, 371-382.

·       Segev Ella, Sela Aner, "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts," Social Choice and Welfare, 43(4), 2014, 893-923.

·       Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner, "All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, 88, 2014, 130-134.

·       Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin, "Equilibrium Existence in Tullock Contests with Incomplete Information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 61, 2015, 241-245.

·       Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps," International Journal of Game Theory, 45(1), 2016, 63-88.

·       Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information," International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 2017, 79-102.

·       Krumer Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare 48(3), 2017, 633-658.

·       Sela Aner, "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning," Review of Economic Design 21(4), 2017, 253-272.

·       Krumer Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "Round-Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 119(4), 2017, 1167-1200.

·       Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner, " Prebidding First-Price Auctions with and without Head Starts," Mathematical Social Sciences, 91, 2018, 51-55.

·       Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner, "Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 27(2), 2018, 315-325.

·       Iluz Asaf, Sela Aner, " Sequential Contests with First and Secondary Prizes," Economics Letters, 171, 2018, 6-9.

·       Aiche Avishay, Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin, "Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantage," Economics Letters, 172, 2018, 34-36.

·       Cohen Noam, Maor Guy, Sela Aner, "Two-Stage Elimination Contests with Optimal Head Starts," Review of Economic Design, 22, 2018, 177-192.

·       Cohen Chen, Levi Ofer, Sela Aner, "All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Effort Constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, 97, 2019, 18-23.

·       Levi-Tsedek Netanel, Sela Aner, "Sequential (One-Against-All) Contests," Economics Letters, 175, 2019, 9-11.

·       Aiche Avishay, Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin, "Information in Tullock Contests," Theory and Decision, 86(3-4), 2019, 303-323.

·       Nissim Netanel, Sela Aner, "The Third Place Game," Journal of Sports Economics, 21(1), 2020, 64-86.

·       Krumer Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "The Optimal Design of Round-Robin Tournaments with Three Players," Journal of Scheduling, 23, 2020, 379-396.

·       Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner, "Contests with Insurance," Review of Economic Design, 24, 2020, 1-22.

·       Sela Aner, Tsahi Oz, "On the Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," Social Choice and Welfare, 55, 2020, 255-273.

·       Cohen Din, Sela Aner, “Common-Value Group Contests with Asymmetric Information,” Economics Letters, 192, 2020, 109164.

·       Einy Ezra, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, “Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests,” Economic Theory Bulletin, 8, 2020, 333-345.

·       Sela Aner, “Optimal Allocations of Prizes and Punishments in Tullock Contests,” International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 2020, 749-771.

·       Alshech Shahar, Sela Aner, “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Two-Stage Contests,” Economics Letters, forthcoming.

·       Sela Aner, “Reverse Contests,” Operations Research Letters, forthcoming.