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Office Address: Department of
Economics |
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Tel: |
+972-8-647-2309 |
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Fax: |
+972-8-647-2941 |
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E-Mail: |
Research Interests | General Information | Publications | Working
Papers
·
Economic
Theory
·
Game Theory
·
Auction
Theory
·
Contest
Theory
·
Sports
Economics
2013 - 2015 |
Chair, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. |
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2012 - 2013 |
Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Exeter. |
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2009 - present |
Professor, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. |
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2007 - 2009 |
Chair, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. |
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2005 - 2009 |
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. |
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2005 - 2006 |
Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, University of Bonn. |
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2001 - 2005 |
Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. |
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1998 - 2001 |
Lecturer, Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. |
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1997 - 1998 |
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim. |
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1996 - 1997 |
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Bonn. |
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1996 |
Ph.D Economics, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. |
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1992 |
M.Sc. Economics, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology. |
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B.Sc. Mathematics,
Faculty of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology.
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· Monderer Dov, Sela Aner, “A 2x2 Game
without the Fictitious Play Property,” Games and Economic Behavior, 14,
1996, 144-148.
· Monderer Dov, Samet
Dov, Sela Aner, “Belief Affirming in Learning Processes,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 73, 1997, 438-458.
· Schlag
Karl, Sela Aner, “You Play (an action) Only Once,” Economics Letters, 3,
1998, 299-303.
· Hon-Snir,
Monderer Dov, Sela Aner, “A Learning Approach to Auctions,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 82, 1998, 65-88.
· Herreiner
Dorothea, Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in Coordination Games,” International
Journal of Game Theory, 28, 1999, 189-197.
· Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in
’One-Against-all’ Multi-Player Games,” Economic Theory, 14, 1999,
635-651.
· Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in 2x3
Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 31, 2000, 152-162.
· Moldovanu
Benny, Sela Aner, “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,” American
Economic Review, 91, 2001, 542-558.
· Ezra Einy,
Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram,
Sela Aner, “Dominant Strategies, Superior Information, and Winner’s Curse in
Second-Price Auctions,” International Journal of Game Theory, 30(3),
2001, 405-412.
· Fibich Gadi, Gavious
Arieh, Sela Aner, “Low and High Types in Asymmetric
First-Price Auctions,” Economics Letters, 75, 2002, 283-287.
· Ezra Einy,
Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram,
Sela Aner, “Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential
Information,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 37, 2002, 247-258.
· Kaplan Todd, Luski
Israel, Sela Aner, Wettstein David, “All-Pay Auctions
with Variable Rewards,” Journal of Industrial Economics, L(4), 2002, 417-430.
· Moldovanu Benny,
Sela Aner, “Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors,” International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 21(3), 2003, 1-13.
· Gavious Arieh, Moldovanu Benny, Sela
Aner, “Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,” RAND Journal of Economics,
33(4), 2003, 709-722.
· Fibich Gadi, Gavious
Arieh, Sela Aner, “Revenue Equivalence in Asymmetric
Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 115, 2004, 309-321.
· Cohen Chen, Sela Aner,
“Manipulations in Contests” Economics Letters, 86, 2005, 135-139.
· Moldovanu Benny,
Sela Aner, “Contest Architecture,” Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1),
2006, 70-97.
· Fibich Gadi, Gavious
Arieh, Sela Aner, “All-Pay Auctions with Risk-Averse
Players,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 4, 2006, 583-599.
· Moldovanu
Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen, “Contests for Status,”
Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 2007, 338-363.
· Cohen Chen, Sela Aner,
"Contests with Ties," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol.
7, 2007, Iss. 1. Article 43.
· Cohen Chen, Sela Aner,
"Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," European
Journal of Political Economics, 24, 2008, 123-132.
· Moldovanu
Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen, "Competing
Auctions with Endogenous Quantities," Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 141, 2008, 1-27.
· Cohen Chen, Kaplan Todd, Sela Aner,
“Optimal Rewards in Contests,” RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 2008,
434-451.
· Hoppe Heidrun,
Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, "The Theory of
Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals", Review of Economic
Studies, 76(1), 2009, 253-281.
· Kaplan Todd, Sela Aner,
"Effective Contests," Economics Letters, 106, 2010, 38-41.
· Sela Aner,
"Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," Economics letters, 112(1),
2011, 67-70.
· Groh Christian, Moldovanu
benny, Sela Aner, Sunde Uwe, “Optimal Seeding in
Elimination Tournaments,” Economic Theory, 49, 2012, 59-80.
· Sela Aner, "Sequential
Two-Prize Contests," Economic Theory, 51(2), 2012, 383-395.
· Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen,
"Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Economic
Inquiry 50(2), 2012, 453-462.
· Aloni Elad, Sela Aner, "The
Assortative Matching Scheme in a Survival Battle," Economics Letters
117, 2012, 272-275.
· Megidish Reut, Sela Aner,
“Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints,” Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy 22(4), 2013, 713-727.
· Sela Aner, Erez Eyal, “Dynamic Contests with Resource Constraints,” Social
Choice and Welfare 41(4), 2013, 863-882.
· Megidish Reut, Sela Aner,
“Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints,” Social Choice and
Welfare, 42(1), 2014, 215-243.
· Segev Ella, Sela Aner, "Sequential All-Pay Auctions
with Noisy Outputs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50(1),
2014, 251-261.
·
Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, “Caps in
Sequential Contests,” Economic Inquiry, 52(2), 2014, 608-617.
· Segev Ella, Sela Aner," Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay
Auctions," European Economic Review, 70, 2014, 371-382.
· Segev Ella, Sela Aner, "Sequential All-Pay Auctions
with Head Starts," Social Choice and Welfare, 43(4), 2014, 893-923.
· Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner,
"All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes," Games and
Economic Behavior, 88, 2014, 130-134.
· Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno
Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin,
"Equilibrium Existence in Tullock Contests with
Incomplete Information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 61,
2015, 241-245.
· Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions
with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps," International Journal of
Game Theory, 45(1), 2016, 63-88.
· Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions
with Asymmetric Information," International Journal of Game Theory,
46, 2017, 79-102.
· Krumer Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "First-Mover Advantage in Round-Robin
Tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare 48(3), 2017, 633-658.
· Sela Aner,
"Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning," Review
of Economic Design 21(4), 2017, 253-272.
· Krumer Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "Round-Robin Tournaments with a
Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 119(4), 2017,
1167-1200.
· Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner, " Prebidding First-Price Auctions with and without Head
Starts," Mathematical Social Sciences, 91, 2018, 51-55.
· Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner,
"Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete Information," Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy, 27(2), 2018, 315-325.
· Iluz Asaf, Sela Aner, " Sequential Contests with
First and Secondary Prizes," Economics Letters, 171, 2018, 6-9.
· Aiche Avishay, Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz
Binyamin, "Tullock Contests Reward Information
Advantage," Economics Letters, 172, 2018, 34-36.
· Cohen Noam, Maor Guy, Sela Aner, "Two-Stage Elimination Contests
with Optimal Head Starts," Review of Economic Design, 22, 2018,
177-192.
· Cohen Chen, Levi Ofer, Sela Aner, "All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric
Effort Constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, 97, 2019, 18-23.
· Levi-Tsedek Netanel, Sela Aner,
"Sequential (One-Against-All) Contests," Economics Letters,
175, 2019, 9-11.
· Aiche Avishay, Einy Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz
Binyamin, "Information in Tullock
Contests," Theory and Decision, 86(3-4), 2019, 303-323.
· Nissim Netanel, Sela Aner, "The Third Place Game," Journal
of Sports Economics, 21(1), 2020, 64-86.
· Krumer
Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela
Aner, "The Optimal Design of Round-Robin Tournaments with Three
Players," Journal of Scheduling, 23, 2020, 379-396.
· Minchuk Yizhaq, Sela Aner, "Contests with Insurance," Review
of Economic Design, 24,
2020, 1-22.
· Sela Aner,
Tsahi Oz, "On the Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Best-of-Three All-Pay
Auctions," Social Choice and Welfare, 55,
2020, 255-273.
· Cohen Din, Sela
Aner, “Common-Value Group Contests with Asymmetric Information,” Economics
Letters, 192, 2020,
109164.
· Einy
Ezra, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, “Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian
Equilibria in Tullock Contests,” Economic Theory Bulletin, 8, 2020, 333-345.
· Sela Aner,
“Optimal Allocations of Prizes and Punishments
in Tullock Contests,”
International Journal of Game Theory, 49, 2020, 749-771.
· Alshech
Shahar, Sela Aner, “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Two-Stage Contests,” Economics Letters, 203, 2021, 109850.
· Sela Aner,
“Reverse Contests,” Operations Research Letters, 49(3), 2021, 439-441.
·
Sela Aner, “Effort Allocations in
Elimination Tournaments,” Economics Letters, forthcoming.