Dr. Rea Golan
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
My Life Before BGU
I earned a bachelor's degree in mathematics and philosophy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I then pursued a master’s and a doctorate in philosophy, also at the Hebrew University, followed by postdoctoral research at the University of Pittsburgh and the Free University of Berlin.
Why BGU?
Apart from the high standard of research, it was because of the atmosphere and collegiality among the department members. In my view, this is the most congenial department in Israel, if not beyond.
My Research:
My research focuses on the foundations of logic. First and foremost, logic is the study of the validity of inferences. Inferences consist of premises and conclusions, and my aim is to characterize when a conclusion follows from its premises and to uncover the meaning of this derivation.
Consider the inference where the premise is "It’s raining" and the conclusion is "The streets are wet." We tend to think this inference is valid: if the premise is true, the conclusion must necessarily also be true. But what does this necessity mean? Should we think of it descriptively, as related to the structure of the world, or should we primarily understand it in normative terms, such as justification (for example, that it is reasonable to believe the conclusion based on the premise)? And how are these two aspects, the descriptive and the normative, connected?
I aim to answer these questions through a phenomenological analysis of the concept of inference, relying on the various ways we perceive the objects dealt with in the premises and conclusions of different inferences – such as "rain" and "wet streets" in the example above. In brief, I argue that our perception of rain implicitly assumes an expectation that the streets will be wet. This expectation is inherently normative – it might not be fulfilled – but it is an integral part of how we perceive rain and is grounded in that perception. Consequently, I contend that the validity of the inference rests on this expectation, which must therefore be understood in normative terms. At the same time, this expectation is ultimately based on our perception of the world. Thus, my proposal bridges the gap between the descriptive and normative aspects of inferences.
An insight from my research:
Sometimes phenomena that seem self-evident at first glance turn out to be highly complex and unintuitive when studied rigorously.
