

דילמות חברתיות (1421122)

מרצה: ד"ר רועי זולטן

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כללי:

הקורס יעסוק במצבים בהם טובת החברים בקבוצה עומדת בניגוד לטובת הכלל, עם דגש על מחקרים ניסויים בטובין ציבוריים ודילמת האסיר. בדילמה חברתית, כל אחד מחברי הקבוצה תמיד יכול לקבל תשלום גבוה יותר אם אינו תורם לקבוצה, אבל מעדיף שכולם יתרמו על פני מצב שבו כולם פועלים על פי האינטרסים האישיים שלהם ואינם תורמים. במהלך הקורס נדון בגורמים המשפיעים על אנשים לתרום. הנושאים המרכזיים בהם נתמקד יהיו השפעות של תקשורת, תחרות בין קבוצות וענישה על נכונות לתרום.

מבנה הקורס:

נדון בכיתה במאמרים המופיעים ברשימת הקריאה. בחלק מהשיעורים נערוך ניסויים.

הבחינה תתבסס על החומר שיועבר בהרצאות.

דרישות הקורס:

- הקורס מיועד לתלמידי שנה ג' בכלכלה.
- אין חובת נוכחות.

שיטת חישוב הציון:

עבודה 50% ובחינה 50%. את העבודה יש להגיש עד מועד א' של הבחינה. עד 10% בונוס על פי ביצוע בניסויים.

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