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The Geography and Political Context of Human Rights Education: Israel as a Case Study

NEVE GORDON

Studies have shown that human rights education (HRE) can help promote democracy and social progress by empowering individuals and groups and pushing governments to fulfill their obligations towards residents. Assuming that such assessments are accurate, I argue that the successful application of human rights education requires much more than what is generally discussed in the scholarly literature: adjustments to curriculum, additional resources, and adequate teacher training programs. Using Israel as a case study, I show that despite government investment in human rights education, the majority of Jewish youth still do not believe that Palestinian citizens of Israel should enjoy equal rights. This, I maintain, is because other forces, both structural and subjective, always hinder the individual and institutional internalization of HRE’s basic precepts. Next, I describe the almost complete segregation among Jews and Palestinians in the educational system as well as the centrality of a hyper-ethno-nationalist ideology, and argue that the specific spatial and political context within which the educational process takes place helps determine to what extent human rights education is successful in promoting the values and practices associated with tolerance, respect, and protection of rights. I conclude by offering an example of an alternative desegregated pedagogical model that tries to provide meaningful human rights education.

Studies have shown that human rights education can contribute significantly to social cohesion, integration, and stability, while helping to promote democracy and social progress by empowering individuals and groups and pushing governments to fulfill their obligations towards people living under their jurisdiction. Existing research also suggests that rights education encourages respect for peace and nonviolent conflict resolution and can contribute to positive social transformation by empowering children and youth. Insofar as human rights education has such a positive impact, then it should be considered a true asset and something that governments around the world should adopt, espouse and implement. In the following pages, I assume that such assessments are accurate but argue that the successful application of human rights education requires much more than what is generally assumed in the

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Using Israel as a case study, I show that over the past years the Ministry of Education and a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have invested considerable resources in human rights education (HRE), and that HRE has been incorporated into the required curriculum and has even become part of the matriculation exam in civic studies. I proceed to examine a series of public opinion polls, showing that the majority of Jewish youth in Israel do not believe that Palestinian citizens of Israel should enjoy equal rights. The gap between the values imparted as part of HRE and the actual attitudes of Jewish youth can be explained, I suggest, by the fact that HRE never occurs in a vacuum and that there are always other forces that operate against it, hindering, as it were, the individual and institutional internalization of HRE’s most basic precepts. More specifically, I claim that the discrepancy between the investment in HRE and the prevailing views among Jewish youths can—at least partially—be explained by the almost total segregation among Jews and Palestinians in the school system and by the centrality of a hyper-ethno-nationalist ideology among Jewish students (and the Jewish public at large). This suggests, in turn, that the specific spatial and political context within which the educational process takes place helps determine the extent to which HRE actually promotes the values and practices associated with tolerance, respect, well-being, and protection of rights. Insofar as this is the case, then, the enhancement of human rights education is also contingent upon how the population is organized across space as well as upon the ability to circumscribe particularist ideologies that compete with the universal principles informing rights education. Accordingly, the recommendations of those who wish to promote HRE must address these issues as well and not limit themselves to matters involving curriculum, resources, and training. The findings, I contend, are relevant well beyond the case study. Segregation as well as the dominancy of a particularist ideology are indeed pronounced in Israel, but ultimately the Israeli case exemplifies a certain situation that exists in all liberal democracies.

By way of conclusion, I provide an example of an alternative model, a desegregated Jewish-Arab school, in which children are taught both the dominant ideology and narrative and also competing narratives that present the views of the minority group. Studies of such schools both in Israel and elsewhere suggest that educational institutions of this kind are conducive to providing more meaningful HRE.

**Education and Human Rights**

When reflecting on the relationship between human rights and education, we tend to think of two major issues: education itself as a human right and teaching about human rights.¹ The notion of education as a human right involves, first and foremost, the availability and accessibility of education, where availability refers to the existence of free and compulsory education for all children and accessibility refers to the elimination of different forms of discrimination that hinder access to education.² Clearly, a great deal still needs to be done before this right is fully secured. According to UNESCO’s 2010 Global Monitoring Report (Education for All [EFA] Global Monitoring Report Team 2010), in 2007, at least 72 million children could not exercise their right to education due to rising levels of poverty, unemployment of their parents, and discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, language, and disability. Around 54% of these children are girls. In sub-Saharan Africa, almost 12 million girls will probably never enroll in any kind of educational institution. Moreover, millions of children who enroll in schools drop out without having acquired basic skills. In the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Guatemala, fewer than...
half of all third-grade students have more than very basic reading skills (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team 2010: 1). The right to education is accordingly an unfulfilled promise for millions of children worldwide. And, as the Global Monitoring Report reveals, the geographic distribution of this right across the globe is uneven: in some regions, such as Europe and North America, the right to education is enjoyed by most children, while in other regions, like Africa and Central America, large portions of the population are unable to exercise this right (EFA Global Monitoring Report Team 2010: 138–185).

In this article, however, I will not discuss education as a human right and will focus, instead, on the issue of teaching human rights. More specifically, my primary objective is to examine some of the conditions that either enable or hinder meaningful HRE. One way to begin approaching this topic is by inquiring about the millions of children who do enjoy the right to education and to ask whether they are exposed to HRE. Felisa Tibbitts, the director and cofounder of Human Rights Education Associates (HREA), points out that over the past two decades the term “human rights education” has managed to penetrate the language of ministries of education, educational nonprofit organizations, human rights groups, and teachers, as well as intergovernmental agencies such as the United Nations and regional agencies like the Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organization of American States, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations. UNESCO developed a World Plan of Action for HRE, which was adopted in 1993 by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, while the United Nations declared 1995–2004 the decade for human rights education and called on the international community to create an equal partnership between governments, NGOs, and international organizations in order to advance HRE. 

Theoretically, at least, the importance of these developments cannot be overstated. Insofar as HRE is made up of two major components—transferring knowledge about human rights to children and teaching young people about advocacy and strategies that can help bring about the social change needed to guarantee and enhance the protection of rights (Delors et al. 1996; Tibbitts 2002)—there is a firm connection between the right to education and education about human rights. As a vehicle for social change, HRE is crucial for advancing the right to education (and, of course, other rights as well), but in order to be exposed to HRE, one already needs to enjoy the right to education; this, in turn, underscores the straightforward fact that without the right to education there is no HRE. This connection leads Sabine Hornberg (2002) to maintain that HRE should be an integral part of global education, while Anja Mihr and Hans Peter Schmitz (2007) convincingly argue that a greater emphasis on HRE can strengthen local support for international human rights standards and may lead to societal mobilization beyond the narrow nongovernmental sector.

A recent UNICEF report makes a much broader claim, asserting that HRE can contribute significantly to numerous aspects of social life. It encourages social cohesion, integration, and stability, while promoting democracy and social progress by empowering individuals and groups, pushing governments to fulfill their obligations towards the people living under their jurisdiction. HRE builds respect for peace and nonviolent conflict resolution and facilitates positive social transformation by empowering children. It even creates and improves economic development by helping overcome discrimination against girls, children with disabilities, working children, children in rural communities, as well as minority and indigenous children, all of whom can widen the economic base of society and thus strengthen a country’s economic capability (United Nations Children’s Fund 2007: 12–13). Provided that this is an accurate assessment, it seems clear that HRE can be a
real asset and something that governments around the world should readily incorporate, espouse, and implement.

Unfortunately, and despite the growing interest in HRE, most governments have actually failed to pick up the gauntlet. Mihr and Schmitz point out that at “the end of the HRE decade results were politely described by the UN as a ‘catalyst in eliciting a response from the governments, though much more needed to be done.’ The shortcomings were evident. Most of the work done by NGOs was short-term and had not begun to affect the way human rights were promoted in educational systems around the world” (2007: 989). This finding was also corroborated by Adam Stone, who examined HRE in the United States, and found that “neither the federal government nor any of the state governments have articulated comprehensive public policies on HRE. Rather, virtually all of the work that has been done in the HRE field in the United States has been done by individual teachers and parents and by nongovernmental organizations working without government mandates” (Stone: 541–542). Mihr and Schmitz add that, although 60% of human rights organizations ranked education as their highest priority, these organizations tended to equate education with raising general public awareness, which, the two authors persuasively claim, is a “narrow” and “instrumental” understanding of HRE (2007: 990).

Mihr and Schmitz thus underscore two major challenges for those who firmly believe in the importance of HRE. The first involves convincing more governments and ministries of education to adopt human rights as part of the standard curriculum in public schools. The second has to do with persuading the nongovernmental sector that a much broader approach to rights education is needed. Stone offers a series of concrete suggestions about how to enhance HRE (while he discusses the United States, most of his suggestions are pertinent to other countries as well), which include seeking comprehensive policy statements from Education Ministries, supporting teacher training in HRE, working for HRE in state testing standards, lobbying for local HRE pilot programs, and more (2002: 550–557). The point is to build on the extensive work that has already been carried out over the past two decades by UNICEF, UNESCO, HREA, and numerous other organizations and to use the array of human rights teaching resources that they have developed as the groundwork for the provision, standardization, and integration of HRE in the public schools (Tomasevski 2004).4

While the adoption of HRE curriculums in hundreds of thousands of schools in the United States and around the globe would be an extraordinary achievement, my assumption is that a change in curriculum and the allocation of more resources to HRE is an insufficient condition for advancing HRE. Although the international documents, learning manuals, and academic literature about HRE are extremely impressive and helpful for those seeking to develop and enrich HRE and thus to promote tolerance, respect, and the protection of rights, one topic that has been insufficiently emphasized is the geography of HRE and the political context in which HRE takes place. By geography of HRE, I do not mean an examination of where HRE is deployed—although, this is surely an important issue—but rather how the organization of space within a certain locale affects HRE. By political context, I mean the dominant ideologies and narratives that circulate and are taught within a given locale and are, at times, at odds with the universal assumptions of HRE. In other words, I claim that in order to enhance its effectiveness HRE must be contextualized, and the geographic, political, historical, social, cultural, and economic factors in which the learning process takes place must be analyzed and taken into consideration. My hypothesis is that the organization of local space as well as the dominant political ideologies circulating within it can and do engender conflicts with the universal pretensions of human rights. Hence, if we are to understand the underlying factors that inhibit or facilitate HRE, we need to examine the
relationship between HRE and the spaces in which it is applied as well as the ideologies with which it inevitably contends.

**What Is HRE?**

Before discussing the geography of HRE, it is important to provide a brief outline of what HRE actually means. Following the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), which adopted the *World Plan of Action on Education for Human Rights and Democracy* (1993) and which called upon states to include human rights as a subject in the curricula of all learning institutions in formal and nonformal education, numerous international documents, manuals, and reports relating to HRE have been published by different institutions and organizations. These include the *Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy* (UNESCO 1995), the *Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education 1995–2004* (UNHCHR 1998), and Amnesty International’s *Human Rights Education Strategy* (1996). More recently, one finds the *Dakar Framework for Action* (2000), the *Plan of Action of the World Programme for Human Rights Education, First and Second Phase* (2006 and 2010, respectively), and the *Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education* (2010).

Although it is obvious from these documents that HRE is heterogeneous and diverse (Hornberg 2002), one can identify some core ingredients that are conceived to be necessary for HRE. These include acquaintance with the main international human rights treaties and instruments, familiarity with the key historical events leading to the creation of a human rights regime, as well as the people, organizations, and institutions which were involved in the creation of this regime. Also crucial is an understanding of the rights and duties that emerge from the human rights treaties and the responsibilities they place on individuals, the community, and society at large. Finally, students need to acquire knowledge about violations and rights-abusive policies as well as about the major actors struggling to protect human rights and the strategies they deploy (Lohrenscheit 2002; Tarrow 1987).

The World Program for Human Rights Education (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] 2005) draws a distinction among three different levels of learning human rights: the cognitive level, which emphasizes knowledge and information about human rights standards; the emotional awareness level aims to engender feelings of responsibility when there are human rights violations; and the active level, which strives to transform the knowledge and emotions into rights-protecting action. Along similar lines, Claudia Lohrenscheit claims that one can draw a distinction between learning *about* human rights and learning *for* human rights. The first includes acquiring knowledge of the history of human rights, familiarity with key documents, instruments, and actors and even acquaintance with the major controversies relating to human rights. The second emphasizes respect, responsibility, and solidarity and entails a certain level of empowerment, since it deals with strategies and ways of participating in the transformation of society—from one that violates rights into one that respects and promotes human rights. Lohrenscheit adds that “besides the direct contents of teaching and learning *about* and *for* human rights, indirect components are also important. These include the learning environment and the existing structures and hierarchies in the organizational framework that makes learning possible” (2002: 177–178, emphasis in original). It is precisely this kind of understanding that I would like to develop in the following pages, for it entails taking into account the geography of HRE and the political context in which such education takes place.
Geography and Human Rights

Human rights are linked, both discursively and practically, to spatial and territorial contexts, not only because rights are always exercised in space or because struggles over space can be struggles over rights, and vice versa, but because rights are often about access to space or place (Blomley and Pratt 2001; Mitchell 2003). The relationship between space and human rights is actually two directional. On the one hand, rights help shape our understanding of place, since space is frequently defined by struggles over rights in particular locales, such as occupied and colonial space or polluted space, etc. On the other hand, our conception of space (as in private and public space) frequently determines access to rights and may even help determine what constitutes rights. Rights can change their signification according to the space in which they manifest themselves so that the codification of a physical attack—for example, as terrorism, resistance, or domestic abuse—depends, inter alia, on the space in which it occurs. Thus, there is a geography to rights claims insofar as space often renders it legitimate or illegitimate to press claims—one is seen to be in the right and to be able to claim rights only in particular places precisely because the lived geographies of people often determine whether, how, and in what way they exercise formal human rights (Blomley and Bakan 1992; Chouinard 2001).

This line of thinking accords well with the current understanding of how geography shapes our lives. Basing her claims on the insights of Henri Lefebvre (1991), Edward Soja (1996), and Doreen Massey (1994), Melanie McAlister maintains that “geographies shape human understanding of the world ethically and politically as well as cognitively” (2005: 4). This is no doubt the case with respect to HRE. Tibbitts reveals that in different societies HRE has taken on different forms and shapes, noting that in developing countries, human rights education is often linked with economic and community development and women’s rights, while in posttotalitarian or postauthoritarian countries, human rights education is commonly associated with the development of civil society and the infrastructures related to the rule of law and protection of individual and minority rights. In older democracies, she continues, human rights education is often conjoined favorably with the national power structure but geared towards reform in specific areas, such as penal reform, economic rights, and refugee issues (2002: 160). Thus, the social space in which HRE takes place helps determine its content.

Not surprisingly, then, the pertinent documents consistently insist that any kind of human rights education must be sensitive to the environment in which it takes place; in other words, the curriculum needs to take into account the issues that are relevant to the specific society in which it is applied (World Program for Human Rights Education, Second Phase, Clause 22). This, I would argue, reveals a constitutive tension between the universal pretensions of human rights and the particular context to which it refers (more about this below). Moreover, the documents not only underscore the importance of being aware of the local political context but also highlight that the environment within which the educational process takes place is crucial. There is, accordingly, recognition and a registering of the fact that human rights, which have universal pretensions, must always be informed by the particular (World Program for Human Rights Education, First Phase, Appendix).

Insofar as this is the case, then we must take into account space and its organization when we think of HRE, if only because space is one of the prime sites through which ideological and political contexts are negotiated. Tibbetts underscores the significance of what one might call “regional space” and the crucial role it plays in shaping HRE in local settings so as to make it relevant to the pupils. I would like to argue that “local space” is just as relevant to HRE and that the ways local spaces tend to be organized and the
political ideologies circulating within these spaces may either be conducive to or hinder the implementation of meaningful HRE. Thus, if we want HRE to have a long-lasting impact, we must expand our recommendations beyond issues relating to government policy about and investment in application of HRE and include recommendations about how to change the political context and organization of space.

More specifically, within liberal democratic countries that promote HRE and declare their respect for human rights there are often other ideologies and forces that create specific spatial and political conditions that hinder attempts to implement HRE, such as racism, class inequalities, etc. My claim is that these conditions impede meaningful HRE, and therefore they too need to be addressed if we are to succeed in providing children with rights education. In the next few pages, I will illustrate this claim by examining the Israeli education system. Israel is a good case study because, on the one hand, it has made a concerted effort to provide HRE while at the same time pronounced particularist ideologies and political forces, which help shape the organization of space, circulate widely within its society. One of the most striking spatial repercussions of these ideologies and forces is the engendering of segregation in the school system (not unlike the segregation in inner-city schools in the United States, immigrant schools on the outskirts of Paris, etc.), which has, I will claim, a detrimental impact on HRE. On the other hand, Israel’s segregation, while perhaps more noticeable than the segregation in other liberal societies, actually exemplifies a situation that exists in almost all democracies, and therefore the claims are relevant well beyond the particular case study.

Israel as a Case Study

Demography

In 2010, there were approximately 7.5 million citizens living in Israel (excluding the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights), of whom 5.7 million were Jewish, 1.5 million were Palestinian citizens of Israel, and about 300,000 did not belong to either group (Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010). Of these, about 1,700,000 Jews and 678,000 Palestinians were under the age of 17 (Jabareen and Agbaria 2011). Thus, the Palestinian citizens comprise about 20% of the citizenry and over 25% of all school children. Unlike the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the Palestinian citizens vote and pay taxes, and like their Jewish counterparts they have Israeli IDs and passports.7

Civic and Human Rights Education

In Israeli schools, HRE is currently considered to be an integral module within civic education. In 1976, civic education became a required subject in Jewish high schools, and, a few years later, in the Arab schools as well; but at the time HRE was still not included in the curriculum. In the mid-1990s, a governmental decision was made to rewrite civic textbooks and to teach the exact same text (Being Citizens in Israel) in all schools (Pinson 2005). This textbook includes a chapter on human rights, which is also included in the material high school pupils need to know for their matriculation exams. Following the new millennium, the Ministry of Education decided to invest considerable resources in civic education and teacher training programs. The Ministry’s initiative has borne fruit. According to a study carried out in 2007–2008, which sampled 142 schools (constituting
5% of the population), 96% of elementary schools, 86% of junior high schools, and 100% of high schools teach civic education for at least two hours each week.

Furthermore, 70% of all schools claim to carry out some kind of civic education activity, either on their own or together with an NGO. Many of the elementary schools (36%) focus on environmental issues. In junior high schools, pupils participate in school activities relating to multiculturalism (30%), Jewish-Arab relationships (23%), HRE (20%), and dialogue between religious and secular populations. In high schools, civic activities relating to multiculturalism (41%) and Jewish-Arab relations (18%) are the most common. Simultaneously, numerous NGOs have been working with teachers and pupils at literally hundreds of schools. Of the NGOs that are active in the field, 24% focus on democracy and HRE, 19% focus on Jewish-Arab relations, 13% on active citizenship, and 3% on tolerance (Barak and Ofarim 2009). It is, accordingly, apparent that civic education and indeed HRE have managed to penetrate the Israeli school system and pupils of different ages are being exposed to “rights talk” and a universal world view at different levels of their education. The question that interests me here, however, involves the factors impeding the influence of HRE on the attitudes of young people. But before examining some of these factors, I briefly survey the attitudes of youth towards equal rights.

Views of Jewish Youth About the Palestinian Minority

What are the views of Jewish youth towards the Palestinian citizens of Israel? According to a February 2010 poll, which sampled 536 youth between the ages of fifteen and eighteen, 66% of Jewish youth said they are willing to have an Arab friend of the same age and gender, but only 50% think that Arab citizens of Israel should have equal rights. Among Jewish youth, 56% believe that Arab citizens of Israel should be prohibited from being elected to the legislature, and 22% do not think that “death to the Arabs” is a racist slogan and therefore illegitimate. The relation of Jewish youth to other minorities is different, with 86% claiming that their attitude towards Jewish immigrants from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union is positive: 81% would have no trouble being in a classroom with Ethiopian Jews and 84% want immigrants from the former Soviet Union to be in their classroom. In another poll, carried out by the Israel Democracy Institute in 2004, the results are similar. Only one third of Israeli Jewish youth opposed the idea that the state should encourage the emigration of Arab citizens from Israel. Less than half (46%) of Jewish youth (born in Israel) believe that Arabs should receive equal rights, while only 28% believe that Arab political parties should be allowed to join the government (Arian et al. 2004).

While these polls reveal that most Jewish youth do not believe that Palestinian citizens should enjoy equal rights, it is important to note that the youth are in many ways mirroring views prevalent among the general population. Consider a March 2010 poll, also carried out by the Israel Democracy Institute, this time among adults. According to this poll, 53% of Jews believe that the state should encourage the emigration of Arab citizens from Israel, and 55% believe that Jewish towns and villages should be allocated more resources than their Arab counterparts. Examining the extent of secular Jewish Israelis’ tolerance for neighbors who are “other” (immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), ultra-Orthodox Jews, former settlers, homosexual couples, migrant workers, Arabs, mentally retarded individuals, Ethiopian immigrants, mentally ill individuals in community treatment settings) reveals that the neighborly relationship considered most troubling is the one with Arabs (46%), followed by people who are mentally ill and migrant workers (both 39%). Hence, the youth’s views are a reflection (although slightly more extreme) of the pervasive views among Jewish adults.
Table 1
Opinions Regarding Equality for Minorities (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do you support or oppose each of the following:</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab parties (including Arab ministers) joining the government (support)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full equality of rights between Jewish and Arab citizens (support)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement of a Jewish majority should be required on decisions fateful to the country, such as returning territories (oppose)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should encourage Arab emigration from the country (oppose) [Jews only]</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to note that there is some fluctuation of opinion regarding the provision of equal rights to the Palestinian minority over the 8-year period 2003–2010 (Table 1), but the pattern remains constant. The results of these polls are extremely troubling, even as, at times, the wording the pollsters used is in itself disturbing and can have a detrimental impact on the respondents’ views. The reason I introduce these polls in the article is not, however, in order to analyze the attitudes of the Jewish respondents or to determine the different causes for their antipathies towards Palestinian citizens of Israel and the weight each cause carries, but because these polls can tell us something important about the limitations of HRE.

HRE, as I have shown, is widely offered in the Israeli education system, and while it could very well be that if it were not part of the curriculum the attitudes of Israeli Jews towards the Palestinian citizens would have been even more disturbing, still the fact is that most Jewish youth believe that a large minority group within the country should not receive equal rights. The polls accordingly underscore that HRE is an insufficient condition for engendering awareness of the importance of equality and human rights. This is because HRE never occurs in a vacuum and there are always other forces, both structural and subjective,
that operate against it, obstructing the individual and institutional internalization of its fundamental precepts. The challenge, then, is to identify and understand what the major forces are that obstruct the successful application of HRE in Israel. There are, to be sure, numerous forces and, in the following pages, I will concentrate on the dominant national ideology and the role of geography.

**Ethno-National Ideology**

One issue that becomes apparent from these polls is the dominance of an ethno-nationalist ideology, which considers ethnicity to be a more important category than citizenship. Oren Yiftachel explains that

Ethno-nationalism, as a set of ideas and practices, constitutes one of the most powerful forces to have shaped the world’s political geography in general and that of Israel/Palestine in particular. Ethno-nationalism is a political movement which struggles to achieve or preserve ethnic statehood. It fuses two principles of political order: the post-Westphalian division of the world into sovereign states, and the principle of ethnic self-determination. … The dominance of the ethno-national concept generates forms of ethnic territoriality which view control over state territory and its defense as central to the survival of the group in question, often based on selective and highly strategic historical, cultural, or religious interpretations. … [T]he application of this principle has been a major bone of contention in the struggle between Jews and Palestinians and in the formation of the Israeli ethnocracy, which attempted to Judaize the land in the name of Jewish self-determination. (Yiftachel 1999: 366)

Yiftachel goes on to show that ethnic identity rather than territorial citizenship is the primary logic according to which Israel operates. He argues that this logic underlies government policies and is clearly seen when examining the distribution of the population across space, the allocation of resources among the two major ethnic groups, and the participation (or lack thereof) of Palestinians in decision-making processes (Yiftachel 2006). The polls cited above demonstrate that ethno-nationalism also shapes the world view of the majority population, including the views of children, and that the civic education programs, which have received a major boost in the past several years, do not appear to have had an impact on children’s attitudes towards the equal rights of the Palestinian minority in Israel. Put differently, the significance of equal rights and minority rights has not been internalized by the majority of the population, in part because the particularistic (ethnic) perspective is much more powerful than the universal (human rights) one (Maoz and Ellis 2001).

Considering that schools are not islands but an integral part of society, it is therefore very unlikely that a single HRE class can alter dominant perspectives circulating in society. Moreover, the perspective provided by HRE has to compete with numerous subjects within the school curriculum that not only receive many more weekly hours but also serve as vehicles and reinforcers of the dominant ideology. This includes such subjects as history, Bible, literature, and geography.

**HRE as an Outlier**

Ami Pedahzur points out that during the first three decades following Israel’s establishment, civic education was subordinated to the needs of an ethno-national agenda and was therefore
marginalized both in terms of instruction hours allocated and in terms of the contents disseminated among students. Since the late 1980s and 1990s, Israel’s education leadership has begun recognizing the repercussions stemming from the absence of education programs that highlight democratic and universal values and, as mentioned above, decided to promote such an agenda. Pedhazur goes on to show that this agenda collided with what he refers to as “the strong non-liberal character of the state” and argues that ultimately the democratic and human rights elements within the curriculum were overshadowed by its ethno-national orientation (2001: 413; see also Pinson 2005).

Majid Al-Haj corroborates Pedahzur’s claims. Examining the history textbooks which were produced after the signing of the Oslo peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and which were introduced into all junior and senior high schools in 1999, Al-Haj reveals that while endeavoring to present a more open and complex perspective on the Israeli-Arab conflict, the new textbooks, like the old ones, still offer a Zionist narrative that aims to safeguard national values and crystallize the collective memory of Jewish pupils on an ethno-national basis. This narrative is presented as exclusive, leaving no room for dealing with the legitimacy of the Palestinian narrative. In this sense, even the new curriculum fails to make the transition towards multicultural education (Al Haj 2005; see also Al Haj 2002). For instance, the existing history textbooks adopt the Zionist historical narrative, erasing all trace of the Palestinian Nakba (Arabic for “catastrophe,” referring to the events of 1948, when approximately 750,000 Palestinians out of a population of 900,000 either fled or were expelled from their homes). Furthermore, these textbooks emphasize the significance of the Land of Israel for Jews and attempt to prove that the State of Israel could only have been created in historical Palestine, while simultaneously portraying the connection between the Arabs and Palestine as purely incidental. Along similar lines, the study of literature in the Palestinian schools is oriented toward Zionist portrayals of Israel and is conspicuously lacking in any patriotic or nationalistic Palestinian sentiments (Al Haj 2002; Lowrance 2005).

It is, no doubt, a truism that public schools in modern liberal democracies inculcate their students with the dominant national world view. In the United States, for example, children still recite the pledge of allegiance and in France children sing “La Marseillaise.” But while the public schools in these democracies are today more willing to provide students with a multicultural curriculum that includes the historical narratives of those who have been oppressed and marginalized over the centuries, Israel is arguably becoming less tolerant of any pedagogy that challenges the dominant Zionist national narrative (Rottenberg and Gordon 2009). Towards the end of 2010, for example, it was reported that the Palestinian Ministry of Education in the Occupied Territories approved the use of a history textbook entitled Learning the Historical Narrative of the Other that outlines the central narratives of both Palestinians and the Zionist movement, marking the first time that the accepted Israeli position is being presented to schoolchildren in the West Bank. The same textbook, which is the result of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Swedish collaboration to promote coexistence through education, was used in the past by Israeli schools but was recently banned from use by the Israeli Education Ministry (Kashti 2010a). According to the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, one Israeli principal decided to use the book despite the ban and was consequently invited to a “clarification meeting” with the head of the Education Ministry’s pedagogical secretariat. While the Ministry said the meeting was “cordial,” other sources noted that the atmosphere of the discussion, along with the decisions reached, were “difficult and very troubling” (Kashti 2010b).

What emerges from reading the different studies about the Israeli curriculum is that it leaves very little room for multicultural education, which provides the condition of
possibility for a more egalitarian civil education and is consequently necessary for HRE. The different documents pertaining to HRE recognize the significance of multiculturalism, since they underscore the importance of fostering “respect for and appreciation of differences, and opposition to discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, physical or mental condition, and on other bases” (UNGA 2010: 6). The assumption is that education which encourages respect for the other is key for nurturing social cohesion and empowering people to become active participants in social transformation. Thus, it is not only that HRE is still a relatively small element within the overall curriculum but also that the other components making up the curriculum undermine the human rights perspective which is based on a universal as opposed to particularist approach. All of which suggest that when we want to scrutinize HRE within a specific setting it is not enough to examine what and how human rights are being taught. Rather, we must contextualize HRE and assess it in relation to the existing curriculum and to dominant narratives and world views. HRE is, in other words, relational and should not be analyzed as an isolated discipline because this will only result in a skewed assessment. The relational character of HRE indicates that in addition to the other contents making up the curriculum, it is also crucial to examine the organization of space and its impact on the universal suppositions of human rights (Gordon 2006).

**Segregation in Israeli Schools**

Dominant narratives and ideologies are not the only variables that influence beliefs and attitudes; the organization of space is also crucial. While the way space is organized is deeply implicated in existing power relations, space simultaneously produces certain social relations. As Lefebvre’s famously argued, social relations are always constituted relative to space (1991). In Israel, the ethno-nationalist ideology has determined the organization of space, so that the two ethnic groups are almost completely separated, and the distribution of the population across space helps sustain the ethno-national logic, which is inimical to HRE and to perceiving the other through the universal lens of human rights (Kimmerling 2001; Shafir and Peled 2002). The distribution of the population across space has dictated, in turn, the segregation in Israeli schools along ethnic and religious lines (Human Rights Watch 2001). Except for a handful of “mixed cities,” the 1,180 settlements in Israel—farming communities, villages, towns, and cities—are ethnically divided; they are either Jewish or Palestinian. In other words, the segregation in the schools is a direct reflection of the more general separation in space and determines that Jewish and Palestinian pupils do not meet or get to know each other as they grow up. This segregation, it is important to underscore, is not a result of legislation. There are no Jim Crow laws prohibiting Palestinians from studying with Jews.  

There are, however, several “mixed cities” in which Jews and Palestinians live together. “Live together” is not a precise phrase, since in most of these cities the two ethnic groups live in separate neighborhoods, not unlike the segregation between the rich and the poor or immigrants and natives in other Western liberal democracies. Thus, here, too segregation is the rule. Nonetheless, in terms of physical distance, they live in very close proximity to one another. As Table 2 indicates, there are close to 1.25 million Jews and 375,000 Palestinians living in mixed cities.  

Of these about 400,000 are children ages kindergarten through 12. Even though the two ethnic groups tend to be separated according to neighborhoods within the cities, hypothetically these children could study together. Yet, they do not. Thus, today, out of a population of about 1.9 million children studying in Israeli schools and kindergartens, less than 750 Jewish and 750 Palestinian children attend some kind of
Table 2
Mixed Cities in Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Palestinians</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>772,982</td>
<td>484,700</td>
<td>62.71%</td>
<td>275,900</td>
<td>35.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Aviv/Jaffa</td>
<td>403,738</td>
<td>369,800</td>
<td>91.59%</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>265,635</td>
<td>214,900</td>
<td>80.90%</td>
<td>26,500</td>
<td>9.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>46,336</td>
<td>30,300</td>
<td>65.39%</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>29.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lod</td>
<td>69,828</td>
<td>46,500</td>
<td>66.59%</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>26.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth Elite</td>
<td>40,831</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>72.25%</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>15.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rammleh</td>
<td>65,794</td>
<td>49,400</td>
<td>75.08%</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>20.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’alot Tarshicha</td>
<td>20,616</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>70.33%</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>18.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,685,760</td>
<td>1,239,600</td>
<td>73.53%</td>
<td>374,100</td>
<td>22.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


multicultural binational educational framework. While I will return to these schools later, here it is important to underscore that in addition to the emphasis of ethno-nationalism within the curriculum, Jewish and Palestinian children only rarely meet, a fact that has far-reaching implications for HRE.

Much of the current research dealing with the effects of segregation on children corroborates Gordon Allport’s (1954) claim that in segregated societies there is less opportunity to build trust and forge cross-ethnic identities and interests, and, therefore, ethnic intolerance is more prevalent and more pronounced. Structural models accordingly reveal that prejudices are not due to primordial hatreds but are to a large degree a function of opportunities for contact, which stem, in turn, from demographic circumstances and the organization of space (Massey et al. 1999). And yet, it has also been shown that several necessary conditions must be in place for contact to work—including regularity, balance of ratio, symmetry, institutional support, etc.—and that everyday contact between groups bears little resemblance to this ideal world (Hayes et al. 2007). Indeed, scholars “working in places such as Israel, Northern Ireland, South Africa and the United States have repeatedly noted how wider power structures—embedded within the historical, political, and economic organization of society—make conditions such as equality of status and cooperative interdependence either difficult to implement or applicable only within a narrow range of settings” (Dixon et al. 2005: 700). This does not mean that one should give up on contact, as some scholars intimate. Research on ethnic segregation suggests that concentration of similarly identified people increases ethnic solidarity, prejudices, and conflict (Medrano 1994). A study about the effects of ethnic segregation in Bosnia and Croatia finds, for example, that ethnic diversity decreases ethnic prejudices while ethnic economic inequality increases ethnic prejudices (Kunovich and Hodson 2002). Prejudice, in turn, creates an environment that threatens basic human rights. In the United States, it is has been shown, for instance, that prejudice and intolerance “establish a culture of conformity that seems to constrain individual political liberty in many important ways” (Gibson 1992: 338).

Similar concerns relating to the impact of segregation in society need to be extended to schools. While not directly related to our topic, research reveals that there is a relationship between higher “performing” education systems and low levels of segregation (Gorard and Smith 2004). More pertinent, a study of integrated schools in Northern Ireland, which
examined mixed Catholic and Protestant schools, proposes that integration positively impacts out-group attitudes. The research suggests that integrated education holds great potential both for building social cohesion and for promoting forgiveness and reconciliation (McGlynn et al. 2004). A different study of Israeli schools shows that essentialist beliefs about social groups—which provide cognitively fertile foundations for the emergence of negative attitudes towards out-groups—are alleviated when there is interethnic contact in a school setting. This is true especially among majority children. The study thus suggests that contact mitigates children’s essentialist bias towards ethnicity and does so by making children aware of, rather than blind to, ethnic categories (Deeb et al. 2011). Hence, spatial proximity and meaningful contact in space creates the conditions for the promotion of education for human rights, which includes emotional awareness and feelings of responsibility towards the human rights of the other.

**Integrated Multicultural Schools**

The intolerance among youth (and adults) is not merely inimical to HRE, but, as mentioned, it also suggests that the introduction of HRE into the curriculum is an insufficient condition for ensuring that the principles informing universal human rights are actually internalized, promoted, and advocated. Having discussed some of the factors impeding the internalization of HRE in Israel, I will briefly conclude the case study by considering an alternative educational model that is more conducive to HRE. While education for human rights is based, I believe, first and foremost on tolerant thinking and respect for the other, creating this kind of empathy is no easy task (Rorty 1999). This is one of the major objectives of the five Jewish-Arab multicultural schools currently operating in Israel.

As mentioned above there are currently no more than 1,500 students studying in these five schools, of which only two are K–12 and the other three are kindergarten through elementary school (Bekerman 2009; Beckerman and Horenczyk 2004). Since 2006, I have played a part in creating the fifth and newest of these schools, called Hagar: Jewish-Arab Education for Equality. I will therefore focus on Hagar in order to discuss the vision as well as some of challenges confronting this educational model. Hagar is located in the city of Beer-Sheva, which is in the Negev, Israel’s southern region. This region is home to about 700,000 people, 25% of whom are Palestinian citizens, mostly Bedouins. Hagar is the only nonsegregated school in the Negev, and it is a public school supported by the Ministry of Education. Its uniqueness stems from the fact that it has created a venue in which Jewish and Palestinian children not only mix (each ethnic group makes up 50% of the student body) but learn together in a bilingual atmosphere of mutual respect.

In 2011–2012, 200 children, from nursery through fourth grade (it is a growing school), attended this bilingual school, whose commitment to equality informs its educational agenda. To ensure that Hebrew and Arabic are awarded equal status, two teachers, one Jewish and the other Arab, are present in every classroom. There is not supposed to be any translation in the classroom. The Palestinian teacher speaks in Arabic and the Jewish teacher speaks in Hebrew. It is well known that language can be both a bridge and a barrier, and Hagar attempts to use language as a bridge. But language is only one aspect of our pedagogical endeavor. Within this bilingual space Hagar encourages direct contact with the heritage, customs, and historical narrative of the different ethnic groups. The teachers aim to promote tolerance, while being sensitive to nurture the personal identity of each child and each tradition.

By the age of two, children are already celebrating the holidays and memorial days of both people. On Israeli Independence Day, for example, Hagar emphasizes the notion
of independence and its relation to responsibility. On Nakba Day and Holocaust Day, the
school emphasizes the idea of loss and suffering and accentuates the importance of empathy
and that everyone has experienced some kind of injury and grief. The idea is that by the
time the children are old enough to learn that there are two conflicting national narratives,
both of which will be taught in the higher grades, they already have the necessary emotional
and intellectual tools to deal with conflict through dialogue. Hagar’s objective, though, is
not only to bring together Jews and Palestinians, to teach both languages, and to broaden
the existing historical script but also to create a pedagogy that fits the school’s agenda.
Indeed, the school’s pedagogical team believes that it is not enough to offer both narratives
to the children and maybe even to try to create a third narrative but also to alter the basic
pedagogical method: from frontal teaching to project-based and meaningful learning, in
which students are active participants in the learning process. In order to learn simple math,
for instance, the children create a neighborhood and carry out the transactions. They learn
to work together in groups as partners and to create or re-create a community. Finally, the
school has itself created a community. It is not only that Jewish and Palestinian families
regularly get together after school on an individual basis, but every two months the families
have an organized outing, which includes a field trip and a picnic. About 150 Jews and
Palestinians join these outings, and it is now being claimed that “the community has a
school, rather than a school that has a community.”

To be sure, Hagar’s goals are only partially met. For instance, Hebrew is the hegemonic
language in Israel and despite ongoing efforts to create a balance between Hebrew and
Arabic in the school, Hebrew remains dominant. A Palestinian child who does not speak
Hebrew when entering the school masters the language within a number of months, but at
the moment it takes several years for a Jewish child to learn Arabic because the language
outside the school is Hebrew, and the child’s family, Jewish teacher, and Jewish friends do
not speak Arabic. Moreover, Arabic is also perceived among the children and in society
at large as a language that has less social capital than Hebrew, so that, even in the school,
Hebrew remains dominant (Rotem 2010). There are numerous other obstacles, such as the
unwitting reproduction of gender stereotypes in the school and how to contend with some
of the requirements of the Ministry of Education, which emphasize a hyper-nationalist
message.

Nonetheless, research carried out in Israel’s Jewish-Arab bilingual schools by Inas
Deeb and Gil Diesendruck suggests that intergroup contact mitigates prejudices. The
two scholars found that the essentialist beliefs towards ethnicity diminish among young
children—especially those from the majority group—who attend these schools. The find-
ings revealed that the decline in essentialism was accompanied by an increased awareness
towards ethnic category membership. Thus, in these schools ethnicity becomes a more
pronounced category of identification but its signification changes from an essentialist
category to a socially constituted one, which undercuts biases and prejudices (Deeb and
Diesendruck 2011). Along similar lines, a study carried out in the United States already
in the 1970s suggests that interethnic groups of children produced “substantially more
cross-ethnic helping behavior, promoted greater relative respect and liking for Mexican-
American classmates among white students, and elicited more frequent friendship choices
for Mexican-Americans by whites” (Weigel et al. 1975). A recent study carried out in
Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Texas reveals that “promise of contact is even greater than
Allport (1954) originally conceived, because we have conclusively demonstrated that con-
tact effects generalize from experience with one out-group to attitudes toward other out-
groups. This secondary transfer effect could thus have the most far-reaching implications
for the importance of intergroup contact” (Tausch et al. 2010: 299).
Conclusion

In Israel, a self-declared Jewish State, the need for desegregated schools like Hagar might appear obvious to those implementing HRE, and yet most Israelis are unwilling to send their children to desegregated schools. This is unfortunate because within a segregated, highly ideological context, meaningful human rights education, particularly education for human rights, is destined to have little impact. One can probably still offer excellent education about human rights, but it is much more difficult to provide the emotional and active elements essential for HRE, which include empathy for the other, thinking critically about dominant and essentialist world views, and the ability to approach issues and processes from more than one standpoint. Of course the desegregated schools cannot be a replacement for HRE, but they do serve as its necessary groundwork and condition of possibility.

The 2010 Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education appears to have recognized this point. The charter notes that “An essential element of all education for democratic citizenship and human rights education is the promotion of social cohesion and intercultural dialogue and the valuing of diversity and equality, including gender equality; to this end, it is essential to develop knowledge, personal and social skills and understanding that reduce conflict, increase appreciation and understanding of the differences between faith and ethnic groups, build mutual respect for human dignity and shared values, encourage dialogue and promote non-violence in the resolution of problems and disputes” (Clause 5 F). The Israeli case study reveals that this prescription is crucial, and that one cannot ignore the organization of the population across space or dominant ideologies if one is to enhance HRE, since meaningful human rights education is always relational.

While in Israel ethnic segregation is apparent for all to see, it is crucial to recognize that different forms of segregation prevail in most liberal democracies, while particularistic ideologies often dominate the public realm. Thus, the findings here are relevant well beyond the specific Israeli case. By looking at local spaces across the globe and by contextualizing HRE, we will be able to show up the “contradictions” and the failures of liberal democracies in providing the conditions for HRE. But, as the Hagar school reveals, this very same local space can also be transformed into sites that help create a more democratic and tolerant society that is much more conducive to HRE.

Notes

1. Volker Lenhart and Kaisa Savolainen (2002) mention three other issues—human rights in education; education and training of professionals confronted with human rights issues; and educational and social work aspects of the rights of the child—which in my opinion are all a subgroup of the second major issue.

2. The right to education is included in several international documents and declarations of the United Nations and other regional or supranational organizations, the most important of which are the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).


4. HREA has an annotated bibliography of resources involving HRE online at http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=323. Another resource is the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library online at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/.

5. According to the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on May 11, 2010 at the 120th Session) human rights education means “education, training, awareness raising, information, practices and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and developing their attitudes and behavior, to empower learners to contribute to the building and defense of a universal culture of human rights in society, with a view to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Council of Europe Charter 2010).

6. The World Program for Human Rights Education (UNGA 2005) maintains that HRE needs to encompass (1) Knowledge and skills—learning about human rights and mechanisms for their protection, as well as acquiring skills to apply them in daily life, (2) Values, attitudes, and behavior—developing values and reinforcing attitudes and behavior which uphold human rights, and (3) Action—taking action to defend and promote human rights.

7. This does not include the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem, who have residency but not full citizenship and therefore do not have Israeli passports.

8. The state, official Israeli institutions, and most of the Jewish public refer to the Palestinian citizens, using the more generic word Arab, but the Palestinians prefer to be identified as Palestinians.

9. The poll was carried out by carried out by Maagar Mochot for the School of Education at Tel-Aviv University. The results can be found online at http://www.maagar-mochot.co.il/home/artdetails.aspx?mCatID=14283&artID=9450 and http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3861092,00.html.

10. These are the categories used in the poll and I quote them verbatim, even though I find some of them offensive and believe that polls deploying such terms can have a negative impact on the respondents.

11. The Arab public seems to be even less tolerant than the Jewish public when it comes to living as neighbors with people who are “other.” In this case, the most undesirable types of neighbors are homosexual couples (70%), ultra-Orthodox Jews (67%), and former settlers (65%). The most “tolerable” neighbors, in the view of Arab respondents, are foreign workers (48%) (Arian et al. 2010).

12. For more on segregation that is not induced by laws, consult David Harvey (2008). It is also well documented that the resources available to the Jewish schools are much greater than those provided to the Palestinian schools. Palestinian citizens of Israel enjoy the right to education, but they are, nonetheless, discriminated against. In a study carried out by Daphna Golan-Agnon with the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, “all school principals in Israel had to reveal the budgets they have, not including teachers’ salaries. We found that for each Jewish student, schools have an average of NIS 4,935 a year (approximately US$1,097), and for each Palestinian-Israeli student, NIS 862 (US$191). In the south, for each Palestinian-Israeli child, there are some NIS 270 (US$60) compared to children of Jewish settlers in the West Bank, for whom there are some NIS 6,906 per year (US$1,535). Even though the resource gap has decreased in recent years, in comparison to their Jewish counterparts, Palestinian elementary schools, for example, have about 20% more children in every classroom. There is an 18% gap in the average number of teaching...
hours per child in favor of the Jewish population, in both elementary and secondary schools. In terms of pedagogical infrastructure, one important variable is the educational level of the teachers. There are 5% more academically trained teachers in the Jewish population than among Arabs. It is difficult to determine the precise gap between Jews and Palestinians in terms of per capita expenditure for education, since published figures range from 500% more resources allocated to Jews to 20% more for Jews. Yet, even if one accepts the lowest figures, the gap is still substantial. Given the vast inequality in resources, it is not very surprising that Palestinian students have the highest dropout rates—7% as compared to 4% Jewish dropout—and lowest achievement levels in the country. The percentage of university students in the 20–34 age group is 9.0% in the Jewish population—almost three times the 3.3% in the Arab population” (Golan-Agnon 2006).

13. There are a number of other Jewish cities which are home to Palestinian citizens, like Beer-Sheva that has approximately 2,500 Palestinians out of a population of 190,000. Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010 online at http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnatonenew_site.htm.

14. There are Palestinian children who study in Jewish schools, but the curriculum in these schools is not attuned to the history of the Palestinians, their language, culture, traditions, etc. There are no available figures, but one could estimate that several hundred Palestinian children study in Jewish schools.

15. Interview with Hagit Damri, Executive Director of Hagar, May 3, 2011.

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