The Locative Syntax
of Experiencers

by

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Experiencers are special. In the eyes of a non-linguist, this statement may seem too obvious to merit discussion. Being the primary species of experiencers ourselves, it is hardly surprising that we assign a privileged status to the category of sentient entities capable of mental life. Whether a given entity in our environment is an experiencer or not has vast consequences for our perception and behavior; anyone who has ever had the unsettling experience of walking around a wax museum can testify to that.

But experiencers are not just cognitively special; they are linguistically special. Both in the eyes of a linguist and a non-linguist, this ought to be a remarkable fact. Why should the cognitive significance of experiencers have any consequences for the grammar? After all, there are countless other cognitive categories of equal or greater significance, that leave no mark in the grammar. Consider the categories of solids, visibles, rigids, edibles, artifacts, tools, moral values, social institutions, etc. Each of these categories is fundamental to our daily dealings with the world, indeed indispensable. Yet as far as we know, there are no languages that contain grammatical principles of the following forms:

(1)
   a. If an NP denotes an artifact, it is opaque to extraction.
   b. An edible NP must be doubled by a clitic.
   c. An NP denoting a solid object cannot be anaphorically bound.

Therefore, the fact that experiencers do figure in such principles – as we will shortly see – is extremely surprising, even on the (tendentious) view that cognitive primacy has causal effects on the grammar. Notice that this view, in itself, is not self-evident. If the grammar of human language is a natural object, immune to deliberate design, then it should display no more conformity to human concerns than the heavens do. Substituting “natural selection” for “deliberate design” does not take us much further. Beyond the trivial usefulness of language as a communication system, one can hardly argue for the adaptive value of particular grammatical mechanisms; did hominids whose grammar contained tone spreading, wh-islands, or psych effects have a reproductive advantage on those who did not? Yet the brute fact is that languages do exhibit such phenomena, and in particular – experiencers are grammatically special. If this fact can be traced neither to their cognitive significance (why not other significant categories?) nor to the relevance of this significance to the grammar (why should it be relevant?) – then it remains a tantalizing puzzle.

How are experiencers grammatically special? Well, this is the subject matter of this monograph. In just about any language where psych(ological)-verbs have been studied in any

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1 I concede that astrologers might not be impressed with this argument, or even find it self-defeating.
depth, some special properties of these verbs have emerged. Consider a handful of examples (all of which are discussed in detail below):

Example 1: In Greek, clitic doubling of accusative objects is optional; strangely, accusative doubling becomes obligatory in just one case – when the object is an experiencer:

(2)  a. O Jannis (tin) ghnorise tin Maria se ena party.
    The John (cl.ACC) met the Mary in a party
    ‘John met (her) Mary at a party’

    b. Ta epipla ?*(ton) enohlun ton Petro.
    the furniture bother ?*(cl.ACC) the Peter
    ‘The furniture bothers Peter’

Example 2: In many languages, an object anaphor can (and sometimes must) be bound by the local subject; indeed, this is the canonical binding configuration. Such binding fails in a particular kind of psych constructions:

(3)  a. John & Mary resemble each other.
    b. ?* John & Mary concern each other.

Notice that both verbs in (3) are stative, and in fact, both are unaccusative (e.g., no passive exists). Yet for some reason, the experiencer anaphor cannot be bound by the subject.

Example 3: A well-studied rule of Russian grammar is the Genitive of Negation rule, which shifts the case of direct objects to genitive under clausemate negation. The rule optionally applies to all accusative objects (modulo certain restrictions that are orthogonal to the present discussion) – except for experiencers:

(4)  a. Ja ne našel tzvety/tzvetov.
    I not found flowers.ACC/GEN
    'I didn't find (the) flowers'

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2 A psych-verb is any verb that carries psychological entailments w.r.t. one of its arguments (the experiencer). A psychological entailment involves an individual being in a certain mental state. Thus, frighten is a psych verb since Mary frightened Bill entails that Bill is in a certain mental state (i.e., fright); whereas invite is not a psych verb, since Mary invited Bill carries no entailments as to Mary's or Bill's state of mind (although it does entail that both are human).
Example 4: Relativization of direct objects in Hebrew can optionally leave a resumptive pronoun in the extraction site, although a gap is slightly preferred. Strikingly, the resumptive pronoun becomes obligatory when the object is an experiencer:

(5) a. ze ha-iš₁ še-ha-ma'amar te'er (?oto₁).
   this the-man that-the-article described (?him)
   ‘This is the man that the article described'

b. ze ha-iš₁ še-ha-ma'amar hid'ig *(oto₁).
   this the-man that-the-article worried *(him)
   ‘This is the man that the article worried'

Example 5: In many languages, the only possible controller for a non-finite adjunct is the matrix subject. A systematic exception to this generalization are object experiencers, which unlike all other objects, can control adjuncts. The French example below illustrates a minimal contrast between a goal and an experiencer dative (control options are disambiguated by participial gender agreement in the adjunct):

(6) a. [PRO₁/₂ remis(*e) sur pied], son mari₁ s'adresse à Yolande₂.
   re-put on foot, her husband addressed to Yolande
   'Once recovered, her husband addressed Yolande'

b. [PRO₁/₂ remis(e) sur pied], son mari₁ manque à Yolande₂.
   re-put on foot, her husband misses to Yolande
   'Once recovered, Yolande misses her husband'

These are just a few of what I call "psych effects" – specific syntactic properties associated with experiencers. As the examples above suggest, we will be mostly concerned with object experiencers (ObjExp), accusative or dative. The non-experiencer argument – sometimes called stimulus, trigger of emotion, causer or target/subject matter – will be simply called "theme", unless finer distinctions become relevant.

I follow Belletti & Rizzi's (1988) tripartite classification of psych verbs:
(7) a. **Class I**: Nominative experiencer, accusative theme.
    *John loves Mary.*

    b. **Class II**: Nominative theme, accusative experiencer.
    *The show amused Bill.*

    b. **Class III**: Nominative theme, dative experiencer.
    *The idea appealed to Julie.*

An important distinction exists between stative and eventive ObjExp verbs. All class III verbs are stative; consequently, they can never be used agentively. Most class II verbs are ambiguous between the two readings:

(8) a. *The solution is occurring to Mary right now.*

    b. Bob (*deliberately) mattered to his boss.

(9) a. The noise is scaring Mary right now.

    b. John embarrassed Maggie (on purpose/unintentionally).

We will see that the ambiguity in (9b) is grammatical rather than pragmatic: Universally, psych effects are only associated with the non-agentive reading. ³


The analysis to be developed in this monograph has been inspired by many precursors, and incorporates some of their insights. Its novelty mainly consists in the attempt to synthesize various ideas, previously unrelated and sometimes underdeveloped, into one coherent theory. This will involve a thorough investigation of available crosslinguistic data, as well as an analysis of novel data from several languages.

The basic intuition that I will pursue is very simple. It can be stated as follows:

³ Class I verbs break into individual-level and stage-level predicates (*love* vs. *worry*); the latter are often associated with incohatative or reflexive morphology, and can be coerced into agentive interpretation (for recent treatments, see Pesetsky 1995, Reinhart 2001, 2002, Pyllkkänen 2000). I will not dwell on class I verbs in this monograph.
(10) Experiencers are mental locations, i.e., locatives.

To the extent that this thesis is grammatically, and not just metaphorically, real, two major consequences follow:

(11) a. All object experiencers are oblique (or dative).
    b. Experiencers undergo "locative inversion".

Since non-subject locatives are normally introduced by a preposition, so must object experiencers, if (10) is true. The non-trivial case that falls under (11a) is experiencers in class II, which are bare nominals. If (11a) is correct, this is but an appearance; strictly speaking, there are no bare object experiencers, only oblique ones. Hence, what looks like a bare object experiencer must be the object of a null preposition. This proposal expands on the idea of Hermon (1985) and Belletti & Rizzi (1988), that the accusative case on object experiencers is inherent. I will argue that the consequences of this simple idea are far-reaching, and go well beyond what those authors had suspected. Indeed, there is overwhelming crosslinguistic evidence for (11a), when properly interpreted. Much of this evidence has not been taken as such, and instead has generated a plethora of theoretical proposals. Sections 2-6 of this monograph demonstrate that the simplest idea, in this domain, is actually the right one.

Perhaps more surprising is the claim in (11b), yet again, it should be expected if (10) is true. I will argue that the common phenomenon of quirky experiencers is but an instance of locative inversion. More controversially, I will argue that even object experiencers are quirky, in the sense that they too undergo raising to the subject position, only at LF, explaining their peculiar scopal properties. Sections 7-9 explore the consequences of this idea.

In fact, this is the whole story; nothing more controversial than (11) will show up along the way. The complexity of the theoretical argument will result from the intricate interactions of the claims in (11) with various components of the grammar. A methodological benefit is the demonstration of the explanatory efficacy of very simple assumptions across a broad range of crosslinguistic data; the low ratio of theory to facts is a significant argument in favor of the present analysis.

Before we turn to the empirical discussion, it would be useful to have in mind a concrete structural representation for the constructions under study. Naturally, every bit of that structure will be discussed and justified in the sections to follow. Limiting myself to the VP-structure at the moment, and following the extensive discussion in Pesetsky (1995) and Iwata (1995), I assume that class II verbs are transitive, projecting a light v and an external argument, the Causer.\footnote{As mentioned above, this is a simplification; stative class II verbs are unaccusative, a point to which we return.} The null preposition, introducing the experiencer, is termed $\emptyset_v$. I also follow the standard assumption that class III verbs are unaccusative (Perlmuter 1983, Belletti
The "theme" argument of these verbs is not a Causer but rather a Target/Subject Matter, T/SM (Pesetsky 1995). In languages where the dative marker is not an independent preposition, class III experiencers are also governed by $\emptyset_\psi$, which assigns dative case.

\[12\]

(a) Class II Verbs

```
vP
  └── DP
    └── v'
      └── Causer
         └── v
              └── VP
                   └── V
                        └── PP
                              └── $\emptyset_\psi$
                                └── DP
                                    └── Experiencer
```

(b) Class III Verbs

```
VP
  └── PP
    └── V'
      └── P_DAT
          └── DP
               └── V
                    └── DP
                         └── Experiencer
                              └── T/SM
```

2 The Obliqueness of Experiencers

2.1 Experiencers as Mental Locations

Exactly how mental experiences are conceptualized is a fascinating topic, albeit one which we have no direct access to. Evidence bearing on this question must be indirect, and it so happens that most of it is linguistic. Thus, it is a common research strategy to seek clues as to the nature of thought and conceptual structure in the linguistic forms in which they are encoded.
This strategy rests on the assumption that language is transparent to thought, or at least not entirely opaque.

However, there is no reason to grant such an assumption prior to empirical inquiry into specific domains. To take a trivial example, it is common to assume that logical reasoning employs some form of predicate calculus, where predicates are applied to arguments in a systematic fashion. Yet as is well-known, predication relations are not transparently “read off” linguistic surface structures; very often, the logical predicate does not correspond to a unique syntactic predicate (e.g., complex predicates), nor is the argument syntactically isolable (e.g., incorporated pronouns, traces). The point is simple but worth stressing: Language is perhaps the most powerful vehicle of thought, but a vehicle is not necessarily a mirror, and linguistic insights into the nature of the conceptual system must be argued for on a case by case basis.

Bearing these cautionary notes in mind, I would nevertheless like to suggest that the linguistic encoding of mental experiences is potentially informative as to their conceptual representation. The argument will be strictly linguistic, hence subject to the above limitations. However, to the extent that we come up with general, universal principles that structure the linguistic expression of psychological predicates, it is legitimate to ask why these particular principles obtain and not others. Let us briefly review some pertinent proposals.

That cognitive relations can be, and in fact are, conceptualized as extended spatial relations is an idea whose appeal has been recognized in various contexts. Discussions of this parallelism are often informed by the way language encodes psychological relations and experiencers. The basic intuition is that it is very natural to conceive of experiencers as mental locations – containers or destinations of mental states/effects. Jackendoff (1990: 300, fn. 4) suggests that (13a) is conceptually represented as (13b), which roughly reads as (13c):

(13) a. X frightens Y.
    b. [CS’ ([X]ε, [INCH [BE ([FEAR ([α])], [AT [Y]])]])]
    c. X causes fear of X to come to be in Y.

In this decomposition, the mental state itself is "extracted" from the verb and stands as a co-argument of the experiencer. Importantly, the latter is the object of a (conceptual analogue of a) preposition, which locates the mental state within it.⁵ Along similar lines, Bouchard (1995) maintains that psychological relations are modelled on the spatial relation of contact. Like Jackendoff, Bouchard assumes that the mental state is an independent semantic argument, which he terms psy-chose: “...in mental space, the psy-chose is somehow put in contact with the argument it affects. This argument must be an entity capable of hosting the emotion or

⁵ See Baker (1997) for a similar proposal. Iwata (1995) adopts a “reversed” representation, where the experiencer is located within the mental state. Notice that for Jackendoff, the target of fear is identified with its cause. That this is not conceptually necessary has been shown by Pesetsky (1987, 1995).
feeling that the psy-chose refers to” (p.272). Unlike Jackendoff, however, Bouchard makes the more radical claim that the psy-chose is also a syntactic argument. It may stand on its own, as in periphrastic psych constructions (14a), or be incorporated into the verb, as in standard ObjExp verbs (14b):

(14) a. Cela a éveillé en Pierre une rage terrible.
   ‘That awoke in Pierre a terrible rage’

   b. Cela a enragé Pierre.
   ‘That enraged Pierre’

(French: Bouchard 1995: 275, ex. 35a,c)

Notice that the syntactic question is logically independent of the semantic question. While it is quite possible that at some conceptual level, psych verbs are decomposed into an “action” light verb plus a mental state (psy-chose), it does not follow automatically that this decomposition goes all the way down to syntax. In fact, one may still argue, as I will below, that the locative preposition is syntactically active even when the experiencer appears to be a bare nominal, whereas the mental state is syntactically active only when visible, namely, in periphrastic constructions. Bouchard’s syntactic decomposition (also adopted by Arad 1998, 2000) cannot be motivated on semantic grounds alone.6

In what follows I will leave the cognitive-conceptual questions in the background, restricting my conclusions to the “interface” level – the level where general concepts are given a grammatical mould. Hopefully, an insightful linkage is within the reach of future research.

2.1.1 Subject-Experiencer Verbs

Arad (1998) argues explicitly that stative SubjExp verbs denote locative relations. The experiencer is either conceived as the "stuff" contained in the mental state or the container in which the mental state resides:

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6 There is in fact evidence that periphrastic and synthetic psych constructions differ in some semantic aspects that cannot be attributed to the single factor of incorporation. In non-agentive contexts, periphrastic forms are telic whereas synthetic forms are not:

i. The movie horrified / enraged Mary for/*in 15 minutes.

ii. The movie filled Mary with horror / awoke rage in Mary in/*for 15 minutes.

Simple N-to-V incorporation does not predict such aspectual shifts.
(15) a. Nina is in love (with Paul).
b. There is in me a great admiration for painters.

(Arad 1998: 228, ex. 83)

It is the latter option – the experiencer as location – that is of major concern here. As can be seen in the sample below, this option is extremely common and productive across languages. Frequently, as in Hebrew, French and Navajo below, one finds periphrastic constructions constructed with the verbs *be*/*have*, a psych noun and an experiencer-location:

(16) a. yeš be-Gil eyva gdola klapey soxney bituax.
   there-is in-Gil rancor great toward agents-of insurance
   'Gil has a great rancor toward insurance agents'

   b. yeš be-tox Rina tšuka amitit le-omanut.
      there-is inside Rina passion real to-art
      'Inside Rina there is a real passion for art'

(17) a. Paul a peur de Marie.
   Paul has fear of Marie
   ‘Paul is afraid of Marie’

   b. Il ne pouvait plus contenir sa rage.
      he not could more to-contain his rage
      ‘He could no longer contain his rage’

   (Bouchard 1995: 266, ex. 13a,g)

(18) a. shil hóóyéé.
   with-me, became fear
   ‘I am terrified’

   b. shil yá’át’ééh.
      with me, it is good
      ‘I like it’

   (Jelinek & Willie 1996, ex. 36, 37)

It is particularly telling that in some languages, subject experiencer verbs almost exclusively take this locative form. In Irish and Scottish Gaelic, nominative experiencers hardly exist; one
finds instead oblique experiencers, introduced by locative prepositions (significantly, the same is true of ObjExp verbs, to which we turn below):

(19) a. Tà fuath do Y ag X.
is hatred to Y at X
'X hates Y'

b. Tà eagla roimh Y ar X.
is fear before Y on X
'X is afraid of Y'

(McCloskey & Sells 1988, ex. 76a, 77a)

(20) a. Is toil leam filmichean.
COP.Pres pleasure with-me films
'I like films / films are pleasing to me'

b. Tha gaol aig Catriona air Padraig.
Be.Pres love at Catriona on Padraig
'Catriona loves Padraig'

(G. Ramchand, p.c.)

Some researchers have proposed that SubjExp verbs are always constructed with an abstract preposition, even in languages where no direct evidence for this is available (Hale & Keyser 1999, Doron 2003). Although I think this position is tendentious (see fn. 10), I do believe that at some grammatically relevant level of lexical semantics, subject experiencers are indeed associated with (mental) locations. This may reflect a general linking principle (see Kuno 1971, Clark 1978, Fernandez-Soriano 1999):

(21) The canonical grammatical realization of location is subject or oblique.

Within LFG, this generalization is captured by the assumption that locatives are intrinsically classified as [-o] (non-objective), and unspecified for [r]. Subsequent classification as [-r] (non-restricted) or [+r] (restricted) yield the grammatical functions of subject [-r, -o] or oblique [+r, -o], respectively (Bresnan & Kanerva 1989).7

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7 Object locatives as in We loaded the wagon with hay do not necessarily invalidate (21). The locative here may be (i) an applied object, i.e., an underlying oblique which is promoted by P-incorporation, or (ii) a subject of a small clause. Both options are covered by (21). Notice that PP experiencers, as in (16)-(20), tend to occur in constructions headed by a psych noun, rather than a verb. Below I suggest that in verbal contexts, the experiencer is often introduced by a null preposition. It seems that null prepositions are restricted to such contexts, independently of psych constructions; compare the amusement *(of) the crowd and the promise *(to)
Subject experiencers exhibit semantic parallels with locations even in languages like English, where they always take the nominative (non-oblique) form. Speas (1990) draws attention to the fact that subject experiencers introduce a path, either as a goal or a source, unlike nonexperiencer subjects:

(22) a. I got angry but it went away.
   b. ?? I laughed but it went away.

(23) a. I tried to remember his name, but it wouldn’t come to me.
   b. ?? I tried to write his name, but it wouldn’t come to me.8

[Speas 1990, ex. 3,7]

This, according to Speas, is evidence that the difference between the dative experiencer subjects of South Asian languages (e.g., Malayalam) and the nominative experiencer subjects of English is strictly syntactic; conceptually, both language types treat experiencers as locations.

South Asian languages, indeed, provide ample evidence for the tight connection between experiencers and goals/locations (Verma & Mohanan 1990). In Marathi, an Indo-Aryan language, the dative marker which occurs with experiencers alternates with locative postpositions in other contexts. According to Pandharipande (1990), experiencers in this language are nothing but locatives marked [+animate]. Mohanan & Mohanan (1990) claim that the source of the dative case on certain subject experiencers in Malayalam is precisely their being classified as thematic goals. Frequently, these dative subjects cooccur with the light verb ‘come’, highlighting their directional interpretation:9

(24) a. baalan baalakaye werutεtεnεu.
   boy.NOM girl.ACC hate-PAST
   ‘The boy hated the girl’

   b. baalanø baaliKayooţa weruppwεwanεnεu.
   boy.DAT girl.COM hatred-NOM come.PAST
   ‘The boy felt hatred for the girl’

   (Lit: To the boy came hatred for the girl)

Mary of a new pair of shoes. The reverse, of course, is not true; psych verbs may also occur with overt PP experiencers (It dawned on Bill that he was being exploited). See also (38) below.

8 Speas notes that this example is only acceptable if it refers to the memory of his name, not the ability to write it, strengthening the point of the contrast.

9 An anonymous reviewer adds that in Greek, class III experiencers alternate between dative case (nondistinct from genitive in modern Greek) and the locative preposition se.
The underlying locative character of subject experiencer sometimes emerges in unexpected contexts. In Hebrew, there exists a paradigm of adjectival passives, *beynoni pa’ul*, which expresses the original (verbal) external argument in a *by*-phrase. Consider the following non-psych examples:

(25) a. ha-sefer arux al-yedey orex mikco’i.
the-book edited by editor professional
‘The book is edited by a professional editor’

b. ha-šetax kavuš al-yedey cava zar.
the-area occupied by army foreign
‘The area is occupied by a foreign army’

Not always can the original external argument be expressed in this way; being lexically derived, adjectival passives may idiosyncratically fail to take a *by*-phrase (see Doron 2000, from which the present examples are drawn). Crucially, though, in the latter cases, no alternative preposition can save the sentence:

(26) a. * ha-xalon šavur al-yedey/me-/be-/al pirxaxim.
the-window broken by/from/in/on rogues
‘The window is broken by rogues’

b. * ha-degel karu’a al-yedey/me-/be-/al mafginim.
the-flag torn by/from/in/on demonstrators
‘The flag is torn by demonstrators’

There is one case, however, in which the preposition *al-yedey* ‘by’ is supplanted by a different preposition: Subject experiencer verbs. In the *beynoni pa’ul* of these verbs, the original external argument – the experiencer – surfaces with the locative preposition *al* ‘on’ (27a). This is particularly striking since the verbal passive and the passive process nominal select the standard *by*-phrase (27b,c):

(27) a. ha-šir ha-ze a’huv/mu’adaf al/*al-yedey harbe ma’azinim.
the-song the-this loved/hated on/*by many listeners
‘This song is loved/hated(Adj) by many listeners’
b. ha-šir ha-ze ne’ehav/hu’adaf al-yedey/*al harbe ma’azinim.
the-song the-this was-loved/was-preferred by/*on many listeners
‘This song is loved/preferred(V) by many listeners’

c. ahavat/ha’adafat ha-šir ha-ze al-yedey/*al harbe ma’azinim.
love/preference the-song the-this by/*on many listeners
‘The love/preference for this song by many listeners’

Moreover, the same preposition shows up with these verbs in a different context – lexical causativization. Normally, when transitive verbs are lexically causativized in Hebrew, two alternations are available: i) The original subject becomes accusative, and the original object becomes oblique (or, in some verbs, a second accusative); ii) The original subject becomes dative, and the original object remains accusative. The two options are illustrated in (28a,b) and (28c,d), respectively:

(28) a. Rina lavša xulca.
    Rina wore shirt
    ‘Rina wore a shirt’

    b. Gil hilbiš et Rina be-xulca.
        Gil dress acc. Rina in-shirt
        ‘Gil dressed Rina with a shirt’

    c. Rina katva mixtav.
        Rina wrote letter
        ‘Rina wrote a letter’

    d. Gil hixtiv le-Rina et ha-mixtav.
        Gil dictated to-Rina acc. the-letter
        ‘Gil dictated the letter to Rina’

Subject experiencer transitives – and as far as I know, only them – display a third alternation: The original object remains accusative, and the original subject – the experiencer – becomes oblique, again with the preposition al ‘on’:

    Gil hated/like acc. the-school
    ‘Gil hated/liked school’
b. Rina hisni’a/xibeva al Gil et beyt-ha-sefer.
    Rina caused-to-hate/like on Gil acc. the-school
    ‘Rina made Gil hate/like school’

The fact that the two phenomena discussed above single out subject experiencers from all other subjects, and furthermore, do so with the aid of a locative preposition, can be no accident. I trace it the inherently locative nature of experiencers, even when occurring as bare nominals in subject positions.10

2.2.2 Object-Experiencer Verbs

The locative character of experiencers becomes eminently clear when we turn our attention to object experiencers. Indeed, the entire first half of this monograph is an attempt to establish this striking property across as many languages as possible. In this section, I limit myself to languages where the obliqueness of experiencers is morphologically overt.

Crosslinguistically, we find the following picture:

(30) a. In many languages, object experiencers can be oblique.
    b. In some languages, object experiencers must be oblique.

Consider first (30a). It has been noted in the past that psychological predicates can be expressed periphrastically, with a light verb selecting a mental-state nominal followed by a preposition, which introduces the experiencer:

(31) a. ha-seret hipil paxad al Gil.
    the-movie dropped fear on Gil
    ‘The movie frightened Gil’

    b. ha-mar’e orer be-Gil hitragšut raba.
    the-sight evoked in-Gil excitement a-lot
    ‘The sight excited Gil very much’

(Hebrew)

10 For compelling arguments that locatives can be projected as external arguments, see Fernandez-Soriano (1999). Doron (2003), discussing the Hebrew facts, concludes (more radically) that an abstract locative preposition is involved even in SubjExp verbs. That move, motivated by uniformity considerations, is problematic. First, in most languages there is no overt evidence for a null prepositional head in SubjExp verbs (as opposed to ObjExp verbs, where the evidence for such a head is compelling). Second, a null P should assign inherent case, so one would expect it to override the structural nominative case of the experiencer.
(32) a. Jean donne du soucis à Marie.
Jean gives some worry to Marie
‘Jean worries Marie’

b. Il y a en Pierre un profond mépris de l’argent.
there is in Pierre a deep contempt of money
‘There is in Pierre a deep contempt of money’

(Japanese: Bouchard 1995: 266, ex. 13c,d)

Jelinek & Willie (1996) observe that experiencers in Navajo surface either as subjects or prepositional objects, in line with (21). In particular, there are no direct object experiencers in the language. The oblique cases are of two types: i) Comitative stative verbs, which take a pleonastic subject and introduce the experiencer with the postposition –l ‘with’ (see (18) above); ii) Causative verbs, occurring with various prepositions. The latter type is illustrated below:

(33) a. shá hóóchįįđ.
1s-for HO-3-cause become nasty
‘He made me mad (lit., He made “things” become nasty for me)

b. shiyaa hodeexiz.
1s-under HO-3-caused to spin
‘He startled me’

(Jelinek & Willie 1996, ex. 48, 50)

Jelinek & Willie attribute the lack of accusative experiencers in Navajo to the requirement in that language that direct objects be “affected”. Yet that seems doubtful for the causative cases, where the experiencer is clearly affected by the theme/causer argument.11 Rather, Navajo grammar appears to map notional locations only to their canonical grammatical realizations – subjects and obliques. Since experiencers are encoded as mental locations, they too are found only in these grammatical functions.

Spanish is another language where the prepositional character of experiencers is marked overtly. According to Franco (1990), the distinction between classes II and III in Spanish is morphologically blurred; some dialects mark all object experiencers as dative. However, "there are some dialects of Spanish, especially from the Southern Cone of Latin America and

11 Jelinek & Willie recognize the problem, arguing that although “the experiencer of a psychological state is certainly affected by that experience, his internal state need not be the result of a volitional act on the part of an agent” (p.32). Yet whether or not an object is affected does not seem to depend, in the general case, on the volitionality of the subject; and indeed, non-experiencer direct objects are found in Navajo with non-volitional verbs like break (K. Hale, p.c.).
some areas of Spain, in which homophonous forms of experiencer verbs allow an alternation accusative-dative in the case marking of experiencer arguments" (p.46). The case distinction is visible on the clitic doubling the object (the latter, when animate, is always morphologically dative in Spanish):

(34) a. Ese tipo de comentarios le\textsubscript{1} enojan a Juan\textsubscript{1}.
    that type of comments cl.DAT anger to Juan
    'That type of comments anger Juan'

b. María lo\textsubscript{1} enojó a Juan\textsubscript{1}.
    María cl.ACC anger to Juan
    'Maria angered Juan'               (Franco 1990, ex. 3)

Crucially, Franco points out that the subject of (34a) is understood as a theme whereas the subject of (34b) must be understood as an agent. Furthermore, in all Spanish dialects, certain psych verbs never allow an accusative experiencer:

(35) María le\textsubscript{1}/lo\textsubscript{1} gusta a Juan\textsubscript{1}.
    María cl.DAT/*ACC like to Juan
    'Juan likes Maria'               (Franco 1990, ex. 12)

Unlike (34b), (35) cannot be interpreted agentively. A natural way of interpreting these facts is the following. (34) instantiates class II in Spanish (hence the ambiguity), (35) instantiates class III (hence the non-ambiguity). Suppose that in the dialects represented here, the preposition associated with object experiencers is uniformly the dative preposition; that is, these dialects lack the null preposition $\emptyset$. Then bona fide accusative experiencers will be generally ruled out.

The object in (34b), then, is more akin to a patient than to an experiencer; it undergoes a change of state which happens to be mental, but it does not function as a mental location as it does in (34a) and (35). We return to this puzzling split in section 9.3. For now, it is sufficient to note the pervasiveness of this pattern. Again and again, we will see that the special behavior of psych verbs is limited to non-agentive contexts; when used agentively, they pattern with normal transitives. Indeed, the fact that a certain psych-effect disappears in agentive contexts does not undermine its reliability; on the contrary, it can (and will) be seen as an indication that it is a genuine effect.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Franco (1990) analyses class II predicates as hidden periphrastic causatives, with a null causative verb which assigns case to the experiencer. Being thematically unrelated to each other, this case must be structural. Hence, Franco rejects Belletti & Rizzi's (1988) claim that the accusative case in class II is inherent. Notice, however,
A similar pattern emerges in Irish. In the previous section we have seen that SubjExp verbs in this language are often rendered as small clause complements to the verb be, composed of a DP (the mental state) and a PP (the experiencer). ObjExp verbs are constructed in the same manner, only the main verb is put. Consider the following data from Irish (J. McCloskey, p.c.):

(36)  a. Chuir sin eagla orm.
      put that fear on-me
      'That frightened me'

      b. Chuir sin fearg orm.
      put that anger on-me
      'That angered me'

      c. Chuir sin iomtás orm.
      put that wonder on-me
      'That surprised me'

Interestingly (as in Spanish), the oblique experiencer correlates with a non-agentive subject (37a,b). Whenever the subject is a volitional agent, a transitive structure must be used instead (37c):

(37)  a. Chuir a aghaidh eagla orm.
      put his face fear on-me
      'His face frightened me'

      b. Chuir sé eagla orm (*d'aon ghnó).
      put he fear on-me (*on-purpose)
      'He frightened me (*deliberately)' [only non-agentive]

      c. Scanraigh sé mé (d'aon ghnó).
      frightened he me (on-purpose)
      'He frightened me (deliberately)'

This contrast is also preserved in cases where the psych predicate is a verb, proving that the choice between PP and DP complements does not simply follow from the category of the

that B&R's analysis was (implicitly) limited to non-agentive verbs — precisely those that assign dative to the experiencer in Spanish. Thus, the Spanish facts are not only harmless, but actually congenial to B&R's analysis.
psych predicate (N vs. V). For example, Irish has two verbs – goill and goin – meaning 'hurt, distress'. The former takes a PP-complement, the latter is transitive. Indeed, only the transitive verb can be used in agentive contexts:

(38) a. Ghoill a bhás orm.
     distressed his death on-me
     'His death distressed me'

     b. Ghoill sí orm (*d'aon ghnó).
        hurt she on-me (*on-purpose)
        'She hurt me (*deliberately)' [only non-agentive]

     c. Ghoin sí mé (d'aon ghnó)
        hurt she me (on-purpose)
        'She hurt me (deliberately)

The correlation goes only one way: An oblique construction forces a non-agentive reading, but a transitive construction does not force an agentive reading. Examples (37c)/(38c) allow a non-agentive reading, and transitive class II verbs are compatible with inanimate subjects:

(39) Ghoin mo choinsias mé.
     wound my conscience me
     'My conscience bothered me'

We can interpret these facts in the following way. Object experiencers in non-agentive psych constructions are universally oblique. In most languages, the preposition governing the experiencer is null (Øψ). Irish is special in lexicalizing a whole paradigm of psych predicates where that preposition is overt (usually, ar 'on'). The "transitive" psych constructions are in fact transitive only in agentive contexts, while the non-agentive context involves a PP headed by Øψ (as in English). The extent to which “psych” prepositions are lexicalized may vary between languages and language-stages. It appears that Scottish Gaelic used to be like Irish in reserving the transitive construction to agentive contexts; however, these forms became archaic, and at present object experiencers in the language are oblique in all contexts (G. Ramchand, p.c.).
2.2 Inherent Case on the Experiencer

Suppose that languages like Navajo, Irish and Scottish Gaelic, rather than displaying an esoteric pattern, genuinely represent the universal case. That is, suppose that (30b) is universally true, and object experiencers are always oblique, only this is not visible in all languages. That would mean that superficially accusative experiencers – in any language – are, in fact, underlingly oblique. Let us pursue this intuition in greater detail, starting with the notion of inherent case.

That the experiencer DP bears inherent case was first suggested by Hermon (1985) and later adopted and expanded by Belletti & Rizzi (1988). The motivation was primarily theoretical. The cornerstone of B&R’s analysis was the claim that psych verbs of classes II and III are unaccusatives. This was unproblematic for class III verbs, which assign dative case to the experiencer and select the auxiliary *essere*. However, class II verbs display two properties that are never found with unaccusatives: They select the auxiliary *avere*, and assign accusative case, in apparent violation of Burzio’s generalization. B&R handled the first problem by revising the condition on auxiliary selection (“V selects *avere* iff it can assign morphological accusative”), and the second problem by arguing that class II verbs assign inherent accusative, while Burzio’s generalization only regulates the assignment of structural accusative. Thus inherent accusative can be assigned even in the absence of an external argument.

We will see below (following Pesetsky 1995) that the motivation behind this reasoning is no longer valid. That is, class II verbs – at least most of them – are not unaccusatives. Therefore, no familiar theoretical principle forces them to assign inherent accusative to the experiencer. But that still leaves open the empirical question: Do they assign inherent accusative or do they not? Belletti & Rizzi may have made a correct factual claim for the wrong theoretical reasons. In fact, I will argue just that, on a larger scale:

(40) Universally, non-nominative experiencers bear inherent case.

Again, the claim is trivial for class III verbs, and extremely non-trivial for class II verbs. Notice that (40) could be correct even if we lack a clear understanding why this is so. This is, in fact, the status of quite a few generalizations within current theories (e.g., Burzio’s generalization, EPP, clause-boundedness of QR, etc.). Thus, Grimshaw’s (1990) objection that the status of inherent case is stipulated in B&R’s theory was correct but premature.

My purpose in the following sections is to argue that B&R’s claim, although based on false premises and applied only to Italian, is universally valid. There is overwhelming evidence that class II verbs assign inherent accusative to the experiencer.

\[13\] Statement (40) holds only in non-agentive contexts. Object experiencers of agentive class II verbs are DPs with standard structural case. In section 9.3 we return to explain this fact.
crosslinguistic evidence that the accusative case on experiencer DPs in class II is “non-standard”; in fact, in every language that has been seriously studied, some contrasts emerge between experiencer and non-experiencer objects, that can be traced to the nature of the accusative case they bear. This point was made sporadically by some authors (Arad 1998, 2000, Anagnostopoulou 1999), but the actual scope of the phenomenon has not been fully realized; hence I think it is an effort worth making. I take this fact to be the most significant aspect of the syntax of psych-verbs, and the analysis to be developed will naturally capitalize on its consequences.

2.3 Some Assumptions About Inherent Case

Before laying out the crosslinguistic evidence, we should spell out what we mean by “inherent case”. Here I follow the traditional distinction, introduced by Chomsky (1981), between inherent and structural case. Unlike structural case, which is assigned/checked in the syntax in certain configurations (government, spec-head, Agree etc.) irrespective of thematic roles, inherent case is assigned in the lexicon and is tied to a specific θ-role. Indeed, one should see inherent case as an inseparable reflex of θ-role assignment. The primary examples of structural case are nominative/ergative and accusative/absolutive. The dative case is more complex, being structural in specific languages and contexts (e.g., double object constructions in English and Japanese, Romance causatives) and inherent in others (Romance double object constructions). Note that there is no uniform correlation between the morphological classification of a given case and its syntactic status (structural/inherent); no should we expect such a trivial relation between morphology and syntax.

How is inherent case represented in the syntax? Is it a feature on nouns, or does it have a phrase-structure realization? 14 I will follow Emonds (1985) in assuming the latter. The reasons and motivation will become clear as we proceed.

(41) Universally, inherent case is assigned by P.

It follows from (41) that nominals marked for inherent case are always dominated by a PP node. This PP may be headed by a lexical P (as in English obliques) or a null P (as in Latin obliques), but both cases are structurally distinct from bare DPs. Emonds further argues that null P’s are subject to a version of the Empty Category Principle, a claim that I remain neutral about. Null prepositions play a key role in syntactic analyses of double object constructions, bare NP adverbs and relative clauses (Czepluch 1982, Kayne 1984, Larson 1987, Emonds 1987, McCawley 1988, Pesetsky 1995, den Dikken 1995, Baker 1997). As it turns out, the

14 I am disregarding other case-bearing elements, such as determiners and adjectives, which I assume get case by concord.
simple idea that experiencers in classes II/III are PPs will prove extremely illuminating for the analysis of psych-constructions.

Two major properties of accusative experiencers follow from the above characterization of inherent case:

(42) a. The experiencer should display PP/dative behavior.
    b. The case of the experiencer should resist syntactic suppression.

Property (42a) trivially follows, given Emonds’s conception of inherent case. Notice that there is no strong entailment that accusative experiencers should behave like PPs in all respects and in all languages. Surely nothing that strong holds of inherently case-marked DPs in general. It is an empirical question – which grammatical processes “see” the null P that governs the experiencer DP and which do not. Possibly, the ability of null P to incorporate into (reanalyse with) the verb will correlate with DP-behavior. Thus languages like English, where V+P reanalysis is relatively common, will display less psych-effects than languages where this process is more marked.

Property (42b) reflects the fact that inherent case is a lexical property, and syntax rarely manipulates such properties (The Projection Principle). Consider NP-movement to the subject position. Barring quirky subjects, such a movement results in the assignment (checking) of nominative case to the promoted argument. If that argument already bears inherent case which cannot be suppressed, we expect a clash. This will rule out NP-movement of the accusative experiencer, unless V+P reanalysis is available (“pseudo-passive”). The consequences of these properties are explored below across a wide range of languages.

3 Core Psych Properties

3.1 Italian

Belletti & Rizzi (1988, fn. 27) cite an observation by Benincà (1986): When dislocated, the experiencer object of class II verbs can surface as a dative – associated with an accusative clitic. This option is not available for standard accusative objects, as in class I verbs:

(43) a. A Giorgio, questi argomenti non l’hanno convinto.
    to Giorgio, these arguments not him-have convinced

    b. * A Giorgio, la gente non lo conosce.
    to Giorgio, people not him know
This pattern will emerge in other languages as well: In various syntactic contexts – particularly, $\bar{A}$-chains – accusative experiencers reveal a dative-like, or PP-like behavior. If (40) and (41) are true, this behavior is expected.\textsuperscript{15}

B&R discuss another peculiarity of accusative experiencers, which they do not attribute to inherent case, but which nonetheless can be understood along these lines. Unlike canonical direct objects, which are transparent to extraction, objects of class II verbs are islands. This is illustrated in (44) for $wh$-extraction and in (45) for $ne$-extraction (yielding a milder violation):\textsuperscript{16}

(44) a. Il candidato di cui questa ragazza apprezza i sostenitori.
the candidate of whom this girl likes the supporters

b. * Il candidato di cui questa prospettiva impaurisce i sostenitori.
the candidate of whom this perspective frightens the supporters

(B&R 1988, ex. 86)

(45) a. Gianni ne trascorrerà tre a Milano.
Gianni of-them will-spend three in Milano

(B&R 1981, ex. II-c)

a. *? Questo fatto ne preoccupa il presidente.
this fact of-it worries the president

b. ?? Questo fatto ne preoccupa molti.
this fact of-them worries many

(B&R 1988, ex. 96)

Extraction is possible in agentive contexts, as Arad (2000) points out:

(46) La ragazza di cui Gianni spaventa i genitori perché gliela facessero sposare.
the girl of which Gianni frightens the parents for him.DAT-her.ACC make.2pl marry

‘The girl whose parents Gianni frightens so that they will allow him to marry her’

(Arad 2000, ex. 12b)

\textsuperscript{15} Kayne (2000:142) points out that some Northern Italian dialects may clitic-double non-experiencer direct objects, the latter again surfacing with the dative preposition $a$. The phenomenon is more typical of first and second person pronoun objects.

\textsuperscript{16} Herschensohn (1992, fn. 10) and Bouchard (1995: 364-5) note that the parallel extraction violations in French are much weaker, although detectable. However, Legendre (1989: ex. 17) points out that $en$-extraction in French is not diagnostic of direct objects, as it can apply to inverted unergative subjects.
B&R attribute the islandhood of the experiencer to its “second object” position; in their analysis, the experiencer is a sister to $V'$, and hence not directly $L$-marked by the verb. This proposal raises some technical problems within more recent theories, that incorporate VP-shells and dispense with non-branching projections. However, an alternative account is available within B&R’s own system, which utilizes the idea that the experiencer bears an inherent case. Assuming that inherent case is syntactically represented as PP, we substitute structure (47c) for B&R’s (47b):

(47) a. This perspective frightens the supporters of John.
   b. $[VP\ [DP\ the\ supporters\ of\ John\ ]\ [V'\ frightens\ [DP\ this\ perspective\ ]]]$
   c. $[VP\ [PP\ of\ [DP\ the\ supporters\ of\ John\ ]\ [V'\ frightens\ [DP\ this\ perspective\ ]]]$

For B&R, *the supporters of John* is an island in (47b) because it is a sister to $V'$; for us, it is an island in (47c) because it is a PP. Notice that it is independently established that PPs are opaque to extraction (preposition stranding is both lexically restricted and crosslinguistically rare), whereas specifiers of VP-shells – other than the external argument – are not. Furthermore, under B&R’s analysis the facts in (43) and those in (44)-(45) are unrelated, whereas under the present proposal they both reduce (as many other facts) to the PP-status of the experiencer argument.

3.2 **Russian**

A well-studied construction in Russian reliably distinguishes structural case from inherent case. The Genitive of Negation (GN) rule, which shifts the case of direct objects to genitive under clausemate negation, obeys the Non-Obliqueness Restriction (Babby 1978, 1986, Pesetsky 1982): Only accusative objects undergo this rule.

(48) a. Ja našel tзветы/*тветов.
'I found flowers.ACC/*GEN
'I found (the) flowers'

b. Ja ne našel tзветы/tветов.
'I didn't find (the) flowers'

(49) a. On управлял фабрикоj/*фабрики.
'He managed factory.INST/*GEN
'He managed a/the factory'
b. On ne upravljal fabrikoj/*fabriki.

he not managed factory.INST/*GEN

'He didn't manage a/the factory'

(Pereltsvaig 1997, ex. 2, 1)

A standard account for this contrast exploits the fact that inherent case is fixed in the lexicon; GN, which is a syntactic rule, cannot override this case (see (42b)).

Strikingly, accusative experiencers of class II verbs resist GN, just like other obliques:

(50) a. *Ètot šum ne pobespokoil ni odnoj devočki.

that noise.NOM not bothered not one girl.GEN

'That noise did not bother a single girl'

b. *Ego neudacca ne ogorila materi.

his failure.NOM not upset mother.GEN

'His failure did not upset mother'

(Legendre & Akimova 1993, ex. 40)

Although Legendre & Akimova have not checked this, it can be shown that GN fails only in non-agentive contexts – by now a familiar restriction on psych-effects:

(51) a. Maša naročno ne ogorila ni odnu devočku / odnoj devočki.

Maša.NOM deliberately not upset no one girl.ACC / GEN

‘Maša deliberately didn’t upset a single girl’

b. Šum ne ogoril ni odno devočku / *odnoj devočki.

noise.NOM not upset no one girl.ACC / *GEN

‘The noise didn’t upset a single girl’

(A. Genin, p.c.)

Legendre & Akimova, working within Relational Grammar (RG), assumed that experiencers are deep subjects (initial 1s), which are demoted to surface objects (final 2s) in class II. Their failure to license the GN rule is challenging the standard RG description, by which the rule applies to working 2s (i.e., any argument that is a direct object at some level and remains a term at the final level). Final 2s are, perforce, working 2s, so the ungrammaticality of (50) is unexpected. To handle that, Legendre & Akimova proposed to modify the GN rule to the effect that it applies only to working 2s which are not initial 1s.
Notice that this proviso is designed solely to exclude accusative experiencers from the jurisdiction of the GN rule. As such, it is suspiciously ad-hoc. By contrast, the present analysis assimilates the facts in (50) to those in (49): Accusative experiencers in non-agentive contexts fail to license GN because they are oblique. Since the Non-Obliqueness Restriction on GN (and other processes) is independently motivated in Russian grammar, no further stipulation is needed to account for the data.\(^{17}\)

### 3.3 Greek

Anagnostopoulou (1999) shows that in two diagnostic environments, accusative experiencers pattern with (dative) indirect objects rather than direct objects. In Greek, clitics doubling direct objects are i) optional, and ii) anaphoric to explicit discourse antecedents (i.e., impossible with novel or accommodative definites). Those two properties are illustrated in (52a) and (52b), respectively:

\[(52)\]  
\[\text{a. } \text{O Jannis (tin) ghnorise tin Maria se ena party.} \]  
\[\text{The John (cl.ACC) met the Mary in a party} \]  
\[\text{‘John met (her) Mary at a party’} \]

\[\text{b. } \text{Prin apo ligo kero eghrapsa mia vivliokrisia jia ena kenourjo} \]  
\[\text{vivlio pano sto clitic doubling.} \]  
\[\text{‘Some time ago, I reviewed a new book on clitic doubling’} \]

\[\# \text{Arghotera ton sinandisa ton sigrafea se ena taksidhi mu.} \]  
\[\text{Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 24a, 25a,b} \]

(52b) shows that doubling the direct object *ton sigrafea* is infelicitous in a context where it may satisfy the familiarity condition on definites only via accommodation. Compare the situation with psych-verbs of class II (where (53b) is a continuation of the first sentence of (52b)):

\[(53)\]  
\[\text{a. } \text{Ta epipla ?*(ton) enohlun ton Petro.} \]  
\[\text{the furniture bothers ?*(cl.ACC) the Peter} \]  
\[\text{‘The furniture bothers Peter’} \]

\(^{17}\) The GN rule is not equally productive for all Russian speakers, so the data in (50)-(51) may reflect a real effect only in some dialects (N. Strahov, p.c.).
b. I kritiki mu ton enohlise ton sigrafea toso oste na paraponethi
The criticism my cl.ACC bothered the author such that SUBJ complain ston ekdhoti.
to-the editor
‘My criticism bothered the author so much that he complained about it
to the editor’

(Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 33, 25c)

(53a) shows that unlike direct object doubling, the accusative clitic is obligatory in class II.
(53b) shows that this grammatical constraint overrides the pragmatic condition, licensing the
clitic even with accommodative definite objects.

This peculiarity of accusative experiencers in Standard Greek (SG) may well fall
together with a more pervasive pattern of obligatory clitic doubling in Macedonian Greek
(MG), spoken in northern Greece. As reported by Dimitriadis (1999), in this dialect the goal
argument of ditransitives may be expressed either as a periphrastic PP or as an accusative
object (second to the accusative theme). In the latter case, it must be doubled by a clitic.
Moreover, this accusative goal displays typical properties of oblique arguments (A.
Dimitriadis, p.c.) – it cannot be passivized and it must be resumed in relative clauses (see
below the SG examples). Accusative objects of certain other oblique verbs and prepositions in
MG also must be doubled. Thus, there seems to be a generalization (at least in Greek) to the
effect that oblique accusative arguments must be doubled by a clitic. Plausibly, as Dimitriadis
suggests, clitic doubling in these environments is triggered by case considerations, the verb
(or prepositions) being a defective case marker on its own. The fact that accusative
experiencers fall under this general pattern strengthens the conclusion that they too bear
inherent case.18

The second environment which brings out the underlying oblique character of
accusative experiencers is relativization. Canonical definite direct objects in Greek cannot be
resumed by a clitic pronoun when relativized (54a); by contrast, relativization of the “shifted”
dative argument in a double object construction is impossible unless a resumptive pronoun is
present (54b) (the same contrast appears in English):

(54) a. Simbatho ton anthropo pu (*ton) sinantise o Petros.
    like-1sg. the man that (*cl.ACC) met.3sg the Peter.NOM
    ‘I like the man that Peter met (*him)’

18 In MG, classes II and III are collapsed, and all object experiencers are oblique accusatives, triggering clitic
doubling. For some speakers of SG and MG, focus on the object renders clitic doubling optional. Notice that I do
not mean to suggest that all instances of obligatory clitic doubling in Greek are related to obliqueness. As shown
in Anagnostopoulou (2003), in an important class of cases involving NP-movement across an intervening A-
position, doubling is required to satisfy the Minimal Link Condition. I thank E. Anagnostopoulou for discussion
of these issues.
b. Simbatho ton anthropo pu o Petros *(tu) edhose to vivlio.
   like-1sg. the man that the Peter.NOM gave *(cl.DAT) the book
   ‘I like the man1 that Peter gave *(him1) the book’
   (Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 28, 30, 27a, 29)

Here as well, accusative experiencers pattern with the dative case, requiring resumption:

(55) O anthropos pu *(ton) provlimatizun ta nea bike mesa.
   the man that *(cl.ACC) puzzles the news came in
   ‘The man that the news puzzles came in’
   (Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 31c)

The inherent case proposal provides a straightforward explanation of these facts. Relativization involves empty operator movement, which leaves a gap behind. Resumptive pronouns surface in contexts where a gap is disallowed. P-stranding, in Greek, is such a context. The fact that resumptive clitics are obligatory with both normal dative arguments and accusative experiencers supports the treatment of the latter as PPs.19

Interestingly, both effects are limited to the non-agentive use of psych-verbs. Thus, (56a), where the accusative experiencer is not clitic doubled, must be interpreted agentively; and the agentive reading of (56b), prompted by the rationale clause, obviates the need for a resumptive pronoun in the relative clause:

(56) a. I Maria enohli ton Petro.
   the Mary bothers the Peter
   ‘Mary bothers Peter’

b. O anthropos pu eknevrise i Maria aplos ja na dhi
   the man that irritated-3sg. the Mary.ACC simply in-order SUBJ see
   tis antidhrasis tu apodhihtike poli anektikos.
   the reactions his proved.3sg very tolerant
   ‘The man that Mary irritated just to see his reactions proved to be very tolerant’
   (Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 32, 35)

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19 Plausibly, pied-piping of the preposition is contingent on the phonetic content of the moved element. This is the reason why it is possible in wh-questions but not in relative clauses (where the moved element is a null operator); see den Dikken (1995). Thus, P-stranding is the only option. As English allows P-stranding, no resumptive pronoun is needed (or allowed) in the counterpart of (55). In the English counterpart of (54b), a gap is presumably ruled out independently of P-stranding.
This corroborates the conclusion that the agentive/non-agentive contrast is represented in the grammar; psych-effects are only found in the non-agentive variants.

3.4 English

Roberts (1991) and Johnson (1992) observed that Belletti & Rizzi’s extraction contrast can be replicated in English:

(57) a. * Which film was Dirk amusing to the director of?
   b. Which film did Sam entrust Marilyn to the director of?  
      (Roberts 1991, ex. 43a,c)
   
   c. ?? Who did your behavior bother the sister of?
   d. Who did you tease the sister of?  
      (Johnson 1992, ex. 24)

The experiencer displays islandhood as an object of a non-agentive psych predicate but not as an object of an agentive verb. Notice that the violation in English is milder, since prepositional objects in this language are not strong islands (e.g., ?? Who did you agree with the sister of?).

Stowell (1986) pointed out that extraction of the experiencer object from a wh-island incurs a strong violation, on a par with subject extraction:

(58) a. * Who$_1$ did you ask me why these things bothered t$_1$?
   b. * What$_1$ did you ask me why t$_1$ bothered me?  
      (Stowell 1986, ex. 25a, 26a)

Although the status of (58a) is quite bad, it is not clear that it is as bad as (58b). Johnson (1992) also notes that experiencer objects are more resistant to extraction from wh-islands than other direct objects:

(59) a. ?? Who did you wonder whether Sam knew?
   b. ??* Who did you wonder whether the book bothered?  
      (Johnson 1992, ex. 25a, 26a)

It is Johnson’s suggestion that object experiencers behave like adjuncts in this regard. However, it seems that the ill-formedness of (59b), while greater than that of (59a), is not as
severe as that of standard adjunct extraction out of a wh-island (60a). In fact, it seems to have just the intermediate status of PP-extraction (60b):

(60) a. * Why\textsubscript{1} did you wonder whether the book appealed to Sam \textsubscript{t}\textsubscript{1}?
    b. ?* To whom did you wonder whether the book appealed \textsubscript{t}\textsubscript{1}?
    c. ?? Who\textsubscript{1} did you wonder whether the book appealed to \textsubscript{t}\textsubscript{1}?

If those (admittedly subtle) distinctions are representative, we have evidence that English too treats accusative experiencers as PPs in certain contexts.

An independent argument to the same effect comes from restrictions on the formation of synthetic compounds. Grimshaw (1990, p.15) observed that the "theme" of class I verbs can occur as the non-head of a such a compound (61a), but that of class II verbs cannot (61b):

(61) a. a god-fearing man, a fun-loving teenager
    b. *a man-frightening god, *a parent-appalling exploit

Grimshaw maintained that (i) the argument in the compound must be thematically lower than the argument left outside; (ii) the non-experiencer argument in both classes I and II is a theme, which is thematically lower than the experiencer. However, (ii) is no longer tenable, as recent research has established the distinctness of "theme" from "causer" (see Pesetsky 1995). Moreover, the assumption that the goal is higher than the theme, invoked by Grimshaw to explain (62a), is contentious.

(62) a. gift-giving to children / *child-giving of gifts
    b. *child-reading, *spy-telling
    c. *charity-depending, *stranger-confiding

Baker (1997) noted that (i) cannot explain why goal-compounds are impossible even in the absence of (the optional) theme, as in (62b). He suggests that the true generalization underlying these facts is quite simple: Prepositions cannot occur inside compounds. Thus, whether an argument requires an overt preposition (62c) or a null one, as the goal in double object verbs (62a,b), it is excluded from compounds. Baker points out that this explanation naturally extends to (61b) – on the crucial assumption that object experiencers are introduced by a (dative-like) null preposition. This assumption perfectly concurs with our analysis.

A final peculiarity of object experiencers in English, noted by a reviewer, is their resistance to Heavy NP Shift (HNPS), parallel to the inner object in double object constructions (63a-b).
As is well-known, the inner object in double object constructions has been independently argued to be introduced by a null P (Czepluch 1982, Kayne 1984, den Dikken 1995, Baker 1997). Moreover, HNPS appears to be a stylistic PF rule. It is tempting to suggest that as a PF rule, it can only apply to phrases headed by a phonologically visible head. Thus, accusative experiencers and inner objects, headed by null prepositions, are invisible to HNPS, whereas overtly prepositional experiencers, as in (63c), are perfectly shiftable.

3.5 **Hebrew**

The Greek relativization contrast in (54)-(55) shows up in Hebrew as well. In standard direct object relativization, either a gap or a resumptive pronoun are possible (64a) (the former being more natural); all other objects – dative and oblique – require a resumptive pro (64b) (doubled by an agreeing morpheme on the stranded preposition):

\[(64)\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th>ha-iš 1 śe-Rina hikira (?oto1) higia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the-man the-Rina knew (?him) arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘The man that Rina knew has arrived’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b.</th>
<th>ha-iš 1 śe-Rina xašva al-*(av1 pro1) higia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the-man that-Rina thought of-*(him) arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘The man that Rina thought of has arrived’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The accusative pronoun becomes obligatory when resuming a relativized object experiencer in a non-agentive context (65a); predictably, agentivity restores the normal pattern (65b):

\[(65)\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>ha-muamadim śe-ha-toca’ot hiftiu *(otam) lo amru mila.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the-candidates that-the-results surprised *(them) not said word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘The candidates that the results surprised did not utter a word’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b</th>
<th>ha-muamadim śe-ha-itonay hiftia (otam) lo amru mila.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the-candidates that-the-journalist surprised (them) not said word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘The candidates that the journalist surprised did not utter a word’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

20 This was first observed by Sharon Armon-Lotem (p.c.); see also Arad (1998: 199-200, ex. 35-6).
This is typical of inherent accusative case. Double accusative verbs bring this out very clearly, as one of their objects bears structural accusative and the other one inherent accusative. The verb *limed* ‘teach’ requires resumption of the goal argument but not of the theme:\(^{21}\)

(66)  
\(\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{limadti et ha-yeladim et ha-šir}. \\
& \quad \text{I-taught acc. the-children acc. the-song} \\
& \quad \text{‘I taught the children the song’}
\end{align*}\)

\(\begin{align*}
\text{b.} & \quad \text{ha-šir še-limadti et ha-yeladim (?oto) haya arox.} \\
& \quad \text{the-song that-I-taught acc. the-children (?it) was long} \\
& \quad \text{‘The song I taught the children was long’}
\end{align*}\)

\(\begin{align*}
\text{c.} & \quad \text{ha-yeladim še-limadti *(otam) et ha-šir hayu xasrey-savlanut} \\
& \quad \text{the-children that-I-taught *(them) acc. the-song were lacking-patience} \\
& \quad \text{‘The children I taught the song to were impatient’}
\end{align*}\)

The English contrast in *wh*-island violations (59) is also reproducible in Hebrew. In an agentive context, extraction of the object of *hitrid* ‘bother’ is distinctly better than the same extraction in a non-agentive context:

(67)  
\(\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{? Eyze šxenim lo yadata im Rina hitrida?} \\
& \quad \text{which neighbors not know-2sg.M whether Rina bothered} \\
& \quad \text{‘Which neighbors didn’t you know whether Rina bothered?’}
\end{align*}\)

\(\begin{align*}
\text{b.} & \quad \text{?* Eyze šxenim lo yadata im ha-ašpa hitrida?} \\
& \quad \text{which neighbors not know-2sg.M whether the-garbage bothered} \\
& \quad \text{‘Which neighbors didn’t you know whether the garbage bothered?’}
\end{align*}\)

These facts establish that accusative experiencers in Hebrew are underlyingly oblique.

3.6 *Romance Reflexives*

B&R observed that non-agentive class II verbs do not reflexivize with the clitic *si*:

(68)  
\(\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{* Gianni si preoccupa.} \\
& \quad \text{Gianni *si worries} \\
& \quad \text{‘Gianni worries himself’}
\end{align*}\)

\(^{21}\) Indeed, the goal argument of *limed* was dative in previous stages of Hebrew.
Arad (2000) notes that reflexivization is possible when the psych verb is used agentively:

(69) Gli studenti si spaventano prima degli esami per indursi a studiare di più.

The students *si* frighten before the exams to urge-*si* to study more

‘The students frighten themselves before exams in order to urge themselves to study harder’

(Arad 2000, ex. 9b)

Following Rizzi (1986), B&R took this to be an unaccusative diagnostic: Only verbs with external arguments reflexivize. This follows from the Chain Condition of Rizzi (1986) (coupled with the θ-criterion), which rules out NP-movement across an argument (here, the reflexive clitic) coindexed with the NP. Hence, the ungrammaticality of (68) was seen as an argument for the unaccusative analysis of psych-verbs.

The first problem with this analysis was noted by Grimshaw (1990, 155), who observed that B&R have no satisfactory account for the fact that the binding violation with a full reflexive is milder:

(70) a. *? Gianni preoccupa se stesso.

Gianni worries himself

‘Gianni worries himself’

b. * Politicians depress/worry each other.

For B&R, (68) and (70) are structurally equivalent. To account for the acceptability contrast, they invoke focus, claiming that the full reflexive (unlike the clitic) can be stressed and hence be assigned a referential index after the Chain Condition applies. However, it seems that examples like (70) have a different flavor than examples like (68) even without focal stress on the anaphor. In section 8.4 I return to these cases and show that while reflexive-clitic violations occur with all class II verbs, full-reflexive violations occur only with *stative* ones.

Grimshaw herself accounted the ill-formedness of (68) by reference to the argument structure of class II verbs. In her system, these verbs lack an external argument (which is defined as the most prominent argument both thematically and aspectually). *Si*-reflexivization is a lexical operation that binds the external argument to an internal one, thus reducing by one
the valency of the base verb. Since class II verbs lack an external argument, they cannot undergo this operation.

There is much to be said about Grimshaw’s analysis, which assigns an unaccusative derivation to reflexive verbs (see the critique in Reinhart 1997, 2000, Reinhart & Sironi 2004). However, there is reason to believe that both B&R’s and Grimshaw’s accounts are flawed in a more fundamental sense. Notice that B&R’s examples are exclusively drawn from class II verbs. It turns out that class III verbs do allow reflexive si, even on their non-agentive use, as Arad (1998) pointed out:

(71) a. Gianni si piace.
   Gianni si appeal
   ‘Gianni likes himself’

   b. Abbiamo insegnato ai bambini a piacersi.
   have taught to-the children to appeal-si
   ‘We taught the children to like themselves / think highly of themselves’

And in fact, the same class II/class III contrast exists in French as well:22

(72) Class II
   a. * Jean se préoccupe.
      John himself worries

   b. * Jean se frappe par son intelligence.
      John strikes himself by his intelligence

   (Bouchard 1992, ex. 6b, 22a)

Class III
   c. Jean se suffit.
      ‘John suffices to himself’

   d. Je me plais avec les cheveux longs.
      ‘I like myself with long hair’

   (Legendre 1989, fn. 18)

---

22 In Spanish too, class III verbs can be reflexive:

i. Hoy, Juan se gustó.
   ‘Today, Juan liked himself’

   (Franco 1990, ex. 25b)
Both B&R and Grimshaw assumed that reflexive *si* is found only with verbs that select an external argument. Yet class III verbs are uncontroversially unaccusative: They select the *be* auxiliary, do not passivize, allow word-order alternations that are typical of unaccusatives, etc. (Perlmutter 1984, Legendre 1989, Mulder 1992, Pesetsky 1995). The fact that they reflexivize with *si* falsifies the generalization that links this process to external arguments and calls for an alternative account.

Arad (1998) maintains that an “operational” reformulation of Burzio’s generalization can explain the reflexivization facts. According to this reformulation, “if you do something to the accusative case, you should also do something to the external argument” (p.248). Reflexivization absorbs accusative case, hence the argument marked by *si* must be the external one. Class II verbs violate this requirement since they lack an external argument. Class III verbs are exempt from it as they do not assign accusative case. The account is revised in Arad (2000), where class II and III verbs are no longer treated as unaccusatives. Instead, it is claimed that the accusative case in class II is inherent, whereas the dative case in class III is structural. Transitivity is defined as the co-occurrence of an external argument with structural case, hence class III but not class II verbs are transitive. Finally, reflexivization and causativization are said to apply only to transitive verbs, explaining the (68)/(71) contrast.

It is unclear whether the assumptions incorporated into this account can be independently motivated (e.g., structural dative case which is thematically restricted to experiencers, transitivity divorced from accusative case). At any rate, I would argue that Arad’s observation concerning the contrast between class II and class III reflexivization can be readily explained within the present system.

Suppose that reflexive verbs are syntactically unergative, formed by a reduction operation (Reinhart 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, Reinhart & Siloni 2004). Reduction identifies two θ-roles of a verb (thus reducing its arity), so that only one of them projects to the syntax, and absorbs one of the verb’s case features (accusative or dative). In reflexive (as opposed to unaccusative) reduction it is the external argument that is projected, hence the unergative syntax. Reinhart assumes, following Grimshaw, that one of the θ-roles involved in reduction must be external, but we have already seen that class III reflexivization forces one to weaken this condition.

Given these assumptions, the possibility of reduction depends, inter alia, on the possibility of absorbing verbal case. Now, it is independently known that the reflexive clitic *si/se* is subject to the following restriction:

(73) Reflexive *si/se* may absorb accusative or dative, but not oblique case.

(73) is a morphosyntactic property of reflexive clitics. If oblique arguments are introduced by a preposition, as suggested above, then perhaps this property can be restated in categorial
terms: Reflexive si/se may absorb nominal but not prepositional case. The validity of this restatement depends on the treatment of the dative marker à: Is it a case marker or a genuine preposition? In the former case, datives will be bare DPs, and a categorial distinction is available between accusatives/datives and obliques. In the latter case, no such distinction exists, and (73) would remain a morphological generalization, true but unrelated to category labels. Since the categorial status of à is contentious, I would like to remain neutral on this choice, and simply assume that (73) is a correct descriptive generalization, whether reducible or not.

The generalization (73) accounts for representative paradigms like the following (French data due to M.A. Friedemann):

(74) **Accusative se**

a. Il s’est accusé (lui-même).
   he se-is accused (himself)
   ‘He accused himself’

b. Il s’est acheté une voiture (à lui-même).
   he se-is bought a car (to himself)
   ‘He bought himself a car’

(75) **Oblique se**

a. Il a parlé de lui-même.
   he has talked of himself
   ‘He talked about himself’

b. * Il s’est parlé (de lui-même).
   he se-is talked (of himself)
   ‘He talked about himself’

(76) a. Il compte sur lui-même.
   he counts on himself
   ‘He counts on himself’

b. * Il se compte (sur lui-même).
   he se counts (on himself)
   ‘He counts on himself’
I suggest that inherent accusative case is truly oblique, hence cannot be absorbed by the reflexive clitic. The impossibility of reflexive class II verbs follows with no further assumptions. As for class III verbs, since it is dative case which is absorbed, reflexivization is fine.

How would these facts be explained in Reinhart’s system, which does not assume inherent case? For Reinhart (2002), reduction of the experiencer argument is impossible since reduction can only apply to "causative" arguments (specified [+c]) unspecified for mental state ([+m]). Since experiencers are specified for [+m], they cannot be reduced. This means that reduction of class II verbs can only be what she calls “expletivization”, reducing the external cause argument, and not of the reflexive type, reducing the internal argument. Reflexive interpretation of (68)/(72a,b) is correctly ruled out (but not incohesive interpretation; indeed, Belletti & Rizzi (1988, fn. 2) note that *si preoccupare* has an incohesive use). However, the same constraint would incorrectly block reduction of the experiencer in class III, which lacks any [+c] argument in Reinhart's system, rendering (71)/(72c,d) non-derivable. It appears that the case restriction on reduction is empirically superior to the semantic restriction.23, 24

Although class II verbs cannot be reflexivized, in section 4 we will see that they can be passivized in certain languages. One might wonder why the same oblique case that cannot be absorbed by the reflexive clitic can be absorbed by the passive morphology. There is a principled explanation for this asymmetry. In section 4 I argue that oblique arguments can be passivized using two strategies: P-stranding (“pseudopassive”) or quirky passive. The first strategy, available in several Germanic languages, reanalyses the preposition that introduces...

---

23 Ultimately, the very presence of inherent case on experiencers might be semantically motivated, as suggested in section 2.1. However, the present point is that reduction as such need not be sensitive to semantic features. Another potential problem with Reinhart’s (2002) analysis of class III verbs is the assimilation of dative experiencers to dative goals. Unlike the experiencer in class II verbs, which is analysed as [-c,+m], the experiencer of class III is [-c], the goal/source assignment. Reinhart is forced into this distinction by her mapping procedure, but she recognizes that this leaves unexplained the fact that class III verbs typically involve a psychological reading (unlike standard goal-taking verbs). Moreover, as we will see in section 8.1, there are compelling syntactic reasons, related to control of adjuncts, to keep dative experiencers distinct from dative goals.

24 I assumed throughout that reflexives in Romance are unergatives, in line with Reinhart & Siloni (2004). Notice that the independent evidence for inherent case on object experiencers strengthens that view; this case can only be lexically absorbed, hence reflexive class I verbs must be derived in the lexicon and not, as in most unaccusative analyses, in the syntax. Nonetheless, the present proposal is also compatible with the syntactic (unaccusative) analysis of reflexives. Assume that *si/se* absorbs (or spells out) the highest argument of the verb, and cliticizes to Infl, triggering the raising of the lower argument to the subject position (Marantz 1984, Kayne 1988). In the case of a class II verb, the causer argument is absorbed (or realized) by *si/se*, and the experiencer is targeted for raising. That experiencer, however, bears inherent accusative case. By assumption, this case cannot be syntactically absorbed. Moreover, Romance languages allow neither [V+P]-reanalysis nor quirky accusative subjects. Thus, raising the experiencer to the nominative position would result in a case clash. By contrast, nothing of the sort happens upon reflexivization of class III verbs. The highest argument now is the experiencer, absorbed (or realized) by *si/se*. The Target/Subject-Matter argument bears no inherent case, and can freely raise to the nominative position.
the object with the verb (e.g., *John was depended on*). The second strategy, available in
languages like Finnish and Icelandic, pied-pipes the preposition along with the object to the
subject position. Languages of the Romance family lack both strategies and hence do not
passivize oblique arguments. Consequently, Romance reflexivization cannot absorb oblique
case, and and class II reflexives are ruled out.

3.7 Romance causatives

One of the arguments put forward by Belletti & Rizzi (1988) in favor of the unaccusative
analysis of class II rests on a test developed by Burzio (1986). Burzio argued that clauses with
derived subjects cannot be embedded as infinitival complements of the causative verb *fare*.
This provides an unaccusative test for Italian, and indeed, B&R illustrate that class II verbs
(77a) pattern with unaccusatives, as opposed to SubjExp verbs (77b), which display the
normal transitive behavior:

(77) a. * Questo lo ha fatto preoccupare/commuovere/attrarre ancora più a Mario.
     this him has made worry/move/attract even more to Mario
     ‘This made Mario worry/move/attract him even more’

     b. Questo lo ha fatto apprezzare/temere/ammirare ancora più a Mario.
     this him has made estimate/fear/admire even more to Mario
     ‘This made Mario estimate/fear/admire him even more’

Although unmentioned by B&R, the effect disappears, as expected, in agentive contexts,
where class II verbs restore normal behavior. This has been noted by Arad (1998):

(78) Gli ho fatto spaventare il candidato per farlo lavorare di più.
     ‘I made him frighten the candidate1 to make him1 work harder’
     (Arad 1998: 189, ex. 16)

Prima facie, this looks like a nice consequence of B&R’s theory. Moreover, similar facts
obtain in French: Neither class II (79) nor class III verbs (80) can be embedded in causative
constructions (Kayne 1975: 253 notes that the restriction is lifted in agentive contexts):

(79) a.  * Son bruit déplaisant fait dégoûter Jean à la télévision.
     its noise unpleasant makes disgust John to the television
     ‘Its unpleasant noise makes television disgust John’
     (Kayne 1975: 252, ex. 144a)
Nevertheless, close consideration of Romance causatives suggests that the correct explanation for the ungrammaticality of these sentences is unrelated to unaccusativity.

First, as mentioned above, there is strong evidence that class II verbs are not unaccusative, hence are not amenable to Burzio's analysis. On just too many points – e.g., auxiliary selection, passivization, lexical operations referring to external arguments, compatibility with pure expletives (e.g., *il* vs. *cela* in French) – class II verbs do not pattern with unaccusatives, their subject (a Causer rather than a Theme) behaving like a normal external argument (see Campbell & Martin 1989, Zaring 1994, Pesetsky 1995, Iwata 1995, Cançado & Franchi 1999, Reinhart 2001).

But even if class II verbs were unaccusative, it is hard to see how that analysis (on which B&R rely) could be maintained in its original form. Burzio assumed that causative complements that assign dative case to the external argument - so-called *FI causatives* - are full clausal projections (as opposed to *FP causatives*, which are bare VPs). The embedded VP undergoes leftward movement past the subject, giving rise to the VOS word order. If the subject is derived, as with passive and unaccusative verbs, the unbound trace in the fronted VP yields ungrammaticality (irrepairable by reconstruction).

However, subsequent work (e.g., Guasti 1996, 1997) has established that the causative complement is in fact subclausal, lacking all functional projections where Aux/Neg/Tense are
The embedded verb forms a complex predicate with the causative verb (possibly via incorporation). Under current assumptions, it is plausible to assume that FI causatives are vP projections whereas FP causatives are VP projections; the difference boils down to the inclusion or exclusion of the external argument. Since unaccusative verbs do not project the vP level, they will only occur in the FP causative. Yet nothing in principle should block the assignment of dative case to the Theme argument in an FP causative, if that argument were internal, as B&R assumed. In other words, robbed of the assumption that the dative DP occupies a subject position (Spec of IP), B&R cannot derive the failure of class II causatives – even on the unaccusative analysis.

This leaves us with no obvious solution to the ungrammaticality of (77a) and (79). The present analysis, I argue, combined with independently known properties of Romance causatives, provides a straightforward solution to the puzzle.

In Romance as in many other languages, nominative case is withheld from the subject of the small clause embedded under the causative verb (the causee). Instead, the causee gets some structural case from the matrix causative verb, the identity of that case varying across languages and construction types. In Romance causatives, the case assigned to the embedded subject crucially depends on the transitivity of the embedded verb: The causee is assigned dative case if the embedded object "uses up" the accusative case; otherwise – with intransitive verbs – the accusative case goes to the causee.

A simple way of understanding this is the following. The light v heading a causative complement in Romance is case-defective, lacking the [acc] feature. Thus, any embedded argument without inherent case (assigned internally to the vP complement) must be externally case-licensed – by the causative verb. The hierarchy of functional projections enveloping this verb dictates that structural accusative must be checked before (and below) structural dative. Thus, the causee – the highest embedded argument – will be assigned accusative only if no internal argument needs case; otherwise, the causee will be assigned the second, dative case.

In principle, there are four logical possibilities of distributing case in class II causatives:

(81) **Class II causatives**

a. \( * V_{\text{Caus}}^{\text{ACC}} \rightarrow \text{Theme} , \text{Experiencer}_{[\text{ACC}]} \)

b. \( * V_{\text{Caus}}^{\text{DAT}} \rightarrow \text{Theme} , \text{Experiencer}_{[\text{ACC}]} \)

c. \( * V_{\text{Caus}}^{\text{DAT}} \rightarrow \text{Theme} , \text{Experiencer}_{[\text{ACC}]} \)

\[ \text{ACC} \]

39
d. * V_{Caus}^{ACC} \rightarrow Theme, Experiencer_{[ACC]}^{ACC} \rightarrow DAT

Option (81a) surfaces with two accusative arguments. I will assume that aside from rare exceptions, double accusatives are morphologically ill-formed; at the least, productive syntactic processes (unlike lexical ones) may not produce double accusatives. Option (81b) violates the case-assignment sequence; dative may not be discharged before accusative is. Options (81c,d) involve suppression of the inherent case on the experiencer, in favor of external structural case. This is also excluded on general grounds (see (42b)).

Thus, there is no grammatical derivation for class II causatives that satisfies the case properties of both class II verbs and of the causative construction. This result is obtained without any ad-hoc assumptions, and crucially relies on the idea that object experiencers are oblique.25

Turning to class III verbs, we expect them to occur in grammatical derivations parallel to (81a). The experiencer would retain its dative case and the theme would be assigned the first case, accusative, by the causative verb.

(82) Class III causatives

In fact, however, these structures are ungrammatical in French (see (80)). The question, then, is this: Why is a dative experiencer not licensed in a causative complement, whereas a dative goal is?

(83) a. * Ça a fait plaire Marie à Pierre.
     this has made to-appeal Mary to Peter
     ‘This made Mary attractive to Peter’

b. Ça a fait parler Marie à Pierre.
     this has made to-talk Mary to Peter
     ‘This made Mary talk to Peter’

25 Notice that the strategies of oblique passivization mentioned above, which are absent from Romance and in any case depend on movement, cannot license causativization anymore than reflexivization
To answer this question, we must make some assumptions about the structure of the causative complement. Although a topic of much debate (see Rouveret & Vergnaud 1980, Burzio 1986, Guasti 1996, Kayne 2004), the following three observations are generally accepted: i) A dative embedded subject is “misplaced” (following instead of preceding its VP); ii) It is thematically dependent on the embedded verb; iii) It is case-licensed by the matrix causative verb. Following Chomsky’s (2001b) thesis that theta- and (structural) case-positions are divorced (the former involving Merge, the latter Move), the natural conclusion from (i)-(iii) is that the dative embedded subject occupies a \textit{derived} position. Given the evidence that the causative complement is a bare VP/vP lacking any high functional layers (Guasti 1996, 1997), we must conclude with Kayne (2004) that the landing site of the embedded subject is a matrix position, where dative case is licensed (say, in Agr\textsubscript{d}P projection). This ECM-like derivation is outlined in (84) for a normal transitive verb. Notice that the label ‘Subj’ only serves to identify the causee, carrying no further “subjecthood” implications. Following Guasti 1996, I assume obligatory incorporation of the embedded verb to the causative verb; the object checks accusative case covertly at [Spec,\textit{fa(i)reP}].

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (IP) at (0,0) {IP};
\node (Causer\textsubscript{2}) at (-3,1) {Causer\textsubscript{2}};
\node (I\textprime) at (3,1) {I\textprime};
\node (I\textsubscript{0}) at (-0.5,2) {I\textsubscript{0}};
\node (Agr\textsubscript{d}P) at (3.5,2) {Agr\textsubscript{d}P};
\node (Agr\textsubscript{d}P\textsubscript{+v+V}) at (-0.5,3) {Agr\textsubscript{d}P\textsubscript{+v+V}};
\node (Subj\textsubscript{1}) at (3.5,3) {Subj\textsubscript{1}};
\node (fa(i)reP) at (0.5,4) {fa(i)reP};
\node (fa(i)re\textprime) at (1,4.5) {fa(i)re\textprime};
\node (t\textsubscript{1}) at (1.5,5) {t\textsubscript{1}};
\node (v\textprime) at (2,5.5) {v\textprime};
\node (vP) at (3,6) {vP};
\node (t\textsubscript{2}) at (1.5,6) {t\textsubscript{2}};
\node (VP) at (2.5,7) {VP};
\node (Obj) at (3,7.5) {Obj};
\draw (IP) -- (Causer\textsubscript{2}) -- (I\textsubscript{0}) -- (Agr\textsubscript{d}P);\draw (IP) -- (I\textprime) -- (Agr\textsubscript{d}P\textsubscript{+v+V}) -- (Subj\textsubscript{1});\draw (Agr\textsubscript{d}P\textsubscript{+v+V}) -- (fa(i)reP);\draw (fa(i)reP) -- (fa(i)re\textprime);\draw (fa(i)re\textprime) -- (vP);\draw (vP) -- (t\textsubscript{1}) -- (v\textprime);\draw (v\textprime) -- (t\textsubscript{2}) -- (VP);\draw (VP) -- (Obj);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

If one is reluctant to posit a right-hand specifier for Agr\textsubscript{d}P, additional reordering is needed in order to derive the surface final position of the dative subject (such as VP-fronting, as in
I follow Guasti (1997) in assuming the former option, which allows one to transparently express the connection between the surface position of the embedded subject and its case licensing.26

Suppose that V in (84) is a class III verb; being unaccusative, it projects a VP with no vP layer. The (non-causer) theme is projected as the complement of V and the experiencer, higher on the thematic hierarchy, is projected as its specifier (see (114) below). Crucially, [Spec,VP] is on the left; the righthand [Spec,AgrdP] is an exception in Romance phrase structure. We may assume that the obligatory incorporation of V to faire requires linear adjacency, perhaps for prosodic reasons. The experiencer in [Spec,VP] breaks this adjacency and thus blocks incorporation. By contrast, the dative goal in (83b) is projected as a right-hand sister to V, not interfering with incorporation. The contrast is illustrated in (85a-b):

(85) a. * [IP faire [VP Exp [V V Theme]]]
   
   b. [AGRdP Agrd [IP faire [VP tAgent [V V [VP V Goal]]] Agent]]
   
   c. [AGRdP Agrd [IP faire [VP tExp [V V Theme]]] Exp]

Notice that faire-v-V adjacency is guaranteed in (85b) by raising of the embedded external argument to [Spec,AgrdP], a case-driven operation that leaves a caseless trace in [Spec,vP]. It is well-known that traces block contraction only in case positions (e.g., wanna-contraction); assume the same for incorporation. This explains why (85a) is not saved even if [Spec,VP] is vacated by wh-movement or cliticization (independently, Kayne (1975) and Burzio (1986) observe a general ban on dative cliticization in the presence of an accusative argument in these causative contexts). In fact, the only way to redeem (85a) is to embed it in an AgrdP layer and raise the experiencer to its specifier, as in (85c). When will this option materialize?

Recall that the experiencer bears inherent dative case, while Agrd checks structural dative case on its specifier. On economy assumptions, the experiencer can raise only if it bears an additional structural case feature to be checked at AgrdP; in other words, only if it is a quirky dative (McGinnis 1998, Chomsky 2000, 2001a). However, it is an independent fact that unlike Italian (86), French does not allow quirky dative experiencers (87):

---

26 My analysis incorporates Kayne's (2001) insight that Romance causatives involve overt ECM-type movement of the causee for case reasons, yet does not adopt two additional ingredients of his account: i) The preposition à is merged separately of the embedded subject, and acts as a probe for VP-fronting (to its specifier); ii) Standard ditransitive constructions (e.g., Jean a donné un livre à Paul 'John gave a book to Paul') involve a parallel derivation, with overt raising of the dative argument. (i) implies that the sequence à DP is never a constituent, a consequence that raises a host of problems (as Kayne observes). (ii) implies that dative case is structural even when tied to the θ-role Goal, a consequence that undermines the inherent/structural case distinction. Notice that the very contrast in (83) argues against a parallel treatment for dative causees and dative goals.
(86) a. A Gianni è sempre piaciuta la musica.
   to Gianni is always pleased the music
   ‘Music always pleased Gianni’

   b. La musica è sempre piaciuta a Gianni.

(87) a. * A Marie plaît cette musique.
   to Mary pleases this music
   ‘This music pleases Mary’

   b. Cette musique plaît à Marie.

Preverbal datives in French are always dislocated (as topic or focus), and cannot switch with
the nominative DP. This means that French does not license quirky DPs with both inherent
dative and structural case. We may assume that the same restriction against a quirky dative
subject in (87a) is at work in (80) and (83a), banning a quirky “indirect object” of faire. The
latter can only be derived by some extraneous reordering, which is not freely available.

An immediate expectation is that Italian will license causatives of class III verbs, since
dative experiencers are licensed as quirky subjects in this language (86a). B&R, who
established the latter fact, did not test this prediction. Arad (1998, 2000) did, arguing that
class III verbs in Italian are possible under causatives, unlike class II verbs:

(88) Gianni ci ha fatto piacere il gelato.
   ‘Gianni made us like ice cream’

Arad (2000) relates the asymmetry in causativization to “transitivity”, defined in such a way
so as to be a property of class III but not of class II. As mentioned in the discussion of si-reflexives, this notion is not independently motivated. Moreover, Arad’s account would
incorrectly predict French to be equally tolerant to class III causatives.

In fact, it is not clear that this represents a uniform judgment (G. Cinque (p.c.) finds
(88) ungrammatical). The few class III verbs in Italian exhibit variable behavior in the
causative construction (L. Brunetti, M.T. Guasti, p.c.):

(89) a. Gianni ha fatto mancare il vino a tutti, alla sua festa.
   Gianni has made miss/lack the wine to everybody, at his party
   ‘Gianni has made everybody miss wine at the party’
b. ?? Paolo ha fatto dispiacere a tutti di aver votato X.
   Paolo has made dislike to everybody to have voted X.
   ‘Paolo made everybody dislike voting X’

c. ?? Abbiamo fatto bastare la torta a tutti gli invitati, alla festa.
   (We) have made be-enough the cake to all the guests, at the party
   ‘We made the cake suffice to all the guests at the party’

d. * Gianni ha fatto seccare a Maria di andare a Roma.
   Gianni has made bother to Mary to go to Rome
   ‘Gianni made going to Rome bother Mary’

Possibly, this variation reflects the fact that [Spec,Agr_dP] in Italian is not as “hospitable” as [Spec,IP] is to quirky arguments; the ability to check structural case on a DP with inherent case is a property that can vary across specific functional heads and dialects. Still, the fact that at least some class III verbs, for some Italian speakers, may grammatically occur in causatives is naturally explained in our system by the option of quirky datives. This saves these examples from the fate of class II causatives (quirky accusatives do not exist in Italian). The same option is unavailable in French, explaining the (apparently uncontroversial) status of (80).

To conclude, I have shown that the single thesis in (40), interacting with independent principles of grammar, some universal and others parametric, accounts for a fairly intricate pattern of facts in Romance psych constructions: The lack of si/se-reflexives in class II but not in class III (both Italian and French), the lack of class II causatives (both Italian and French) and the lack of class III causatives (French and some Italian verbs/dialects). This has been done with minimal violence to the grammar. Alternative analyses both fail to take into account the entire set of facts, and rest on dubious assumptions (the unaccusative status of class II, "transitivity" of class III).

4   Passive

languages, passive participles are ambiguous between a verbal and an adjectival form. Thus the evidence bearing on the debate is often indirect, consisting of tests that are supposed to distinguish the two uses. Those tests are themselves not clear-cut, adding to the overall confusion.

In fact, I think there is even a deeper reason for this confusion, namely – both camps are right, in a sense. A careful consideration of the available evidence suggests that there are two types of languages:

(90) *Psych Passives*

**Type A Languages:** Only eventive (non-stative) Class II verbs have verbal passive.
(English, Dutch, Finnish)

**Type B Languages:** Class II verbs have no verbal passive.
(Italian, French, Hebrew)

In section 4.1 I discuss type A languages and argue that the only relevant constraint in them is the (universal) ban on passivization of unaccusatives. It turns out that stative class II verbs (like all class III verbs) are unaccusative, a generalization that is established and derived in section 4.2. In section 4.3 I turn to type B languages, where passive uniformly cannot apply to DPs with inherent case (a parametric property).

Let us see now whether the distinction between type A and type B languages can be related to independent parameters. Putting aside stative verbs, we may pose the question: What does it take to be a type A language? In other words, what grammatical strategies can be exploited to allow passivization of quirky objects? In principle, there are two possibilities:

(91) *Strategies for Passivization of Quirky Objects*

a. **P-stranding:** The preposition that governs the object is stranded and reanalysed with the verb.

   Pseudopassive: \([TP [DP Exp]]_i [T^* Aux [V [V \_PASS + o_v] [DP t_1]]]\\]

b. **Pied-Piping:** The preposition that governs the object is carried along to the subject position.

   Quirky passive: \([TP [PP o_v [DP Exp]]_i [T^* Aux [V [V \_PASS [PP t_1]]]]\\]

It is important to realize that both options are parametric: (91a) will only be available in languages where \([V+P] \) reanalysis can feed A-movement; essentially, these are languages that
license pseudopassives.27 (91b) will be only available in languages licensing quirky subjects. Both options will give rise to type A languages, where verbal psych passives are attested.

In fact, I argue that both options exist. English and Dutch are type A languages in virtue of strategy (91a); both languages allow pseudopassives, although in Dutch it is restricted to impersonal passives:

(92) a. This bed was slept in.
   b. Mary can be relied on.

(93) a. Daar werd over gepraat.
   ‘There was talked about’

   b. Daar werd in geslapen.
   ‘There was slept in’

   (J. Schaeffer, p.c.)

The third type A language to be discussed here, Finnish, exemplifies strategy (91b), where inherent case (below, elative) is retained under passive:

(94) a. Pidän sinu-sta.
   like.1sg you.ELA
   ‘I like you’

   b. Sinu-sta pidetään.
   you.ELA like.PASS
   ‘You are liked’

   (L. Pylkkänen, p.c.)

Thus, the hypothesis that accusative experiencers bear inherent case, coupled with the independently known strategies in (91), yield an extremely non-trivial crosslinguistic prediction:

(95) Verbal passives of non-agentive ObjExp verbs will only be available in languages allowing either pseudopassives or (oblique) quirky passives.

27 There is nothing “pseudo” about pseudopassives; a better term perhaps is “applied passive”, familiar from American Indian and Bantu languages, where an applicative morpheme (in English – the incorporated preposition) “promotes” an oblique argument to a direct object. (91a) recalls, of course, Kayne's (1981) parameter of "P as a structural governor" which accounted for contrasts in P-stranding, ECM and Comp-PRO effects between English and French. It may be a special case of Kayne's parameter, although I think a finer distinction is needed between P-stranding under A- and Ā-movement (which are not co-extensive).
Clearly, (dis)confirmation of this prediction is a matter for much research. Yet the sample of six languages examined below does split nicely into type A and type B languages, in conformity with our prediction. We first discuss type A languages.

4.1 Type A Languages: No Stative Psych Passives

When one examines the range of possible psych passives in type A languages, a generalization emerges: Only non-stative psych verbs passivize. This is particularly interesting since in the languages to be discussed there is no general constraint against stative verbal passives; it is only stative verbal psych passives (of class II) that are excluded. The best solution to this puzzle is the most general solution, namely – these verbs do not passivize because they lack an external argument. Thus, the generalization in (96a) should reduce to the one in (96b):

(96) a. Universally, stative class II verbs do not passivize.
    b. Universally, stative class II verbs are unaccusative.

Sections 4.1.1-4.1.3 illustrate (96a) with three languages; section 4.2 derives (96b) from general principles regulating the lexicon-syntax mapping.

4.1.1 English

Adopting Belletti & Rizzi’s claim that psych passives are always adjectival, Grimshaw (1990) noted the following contrast:

(97) a. The situation is depressing Mary.
    b. * Mary is being depressed by the situation.  
       (Grimshaw 1990:114, ex. 13)

The progressive aspect in English is a standard test for non-statives. Grimshaw’s reasoning was as follows: The verb depress is not (or need not be) stative in the active, as it can appear in the progressive. Yet its passive form is stative, and rejects the progressive. We know, independently, that verbal passivization does not change verbs from stative to non-stative or the other way round. Therefore, the passive in (97b) must be adjectival (explaining its stativity).

In response, Pesetsky (1995) observes that class II verbs vary in the extent to which they exhibit stative behavior. Unlike depress, which is strongly stative, scare, terrify, shock...
and surprise all admit an eventive reading which is preserved in the passive (98a). Pesetsky further argues that (97a) has a special (“judgmental”) non-iterative meaning which (for some reason) is unavailable with passives. This restriction applies to other statives, such as Class I psych verbs (98b-d):

(98) a. Sue was continually being scared by odd noises.
    b. Harry is clearly fearing an outbreak of the flu.
    c. * An outbreak of the flu is clearly being feared by Harry.
    d. An outbreak of the flu is feared by Harry.

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 73a, 75e, 76e, 77e)

Moreover, psych passives in the progressive are incompatible with special prepositions, a clear indication of their verbal status (see (121) below). English thus has eventive verbal psych passives.

However, Pesetsky also noted that some class II verbs do not passivize at all (99a,b), and in that respect resemble class III verbs that never form pseudopassives (99c-e) (see also Perlmutter & Postal 1984):

(99) a. * We were escaped by Smith’s name.
    b. * Panini was eluded by the correct generalization.
    c. * Mary wasn’t appealed to by the play.
    d. * John was mattered to by this.
    e. * Mary was occurred to by the same idea.

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 153b, 154b, 155b, 156b, 157b)

It is Pesetsky’s suggestion that all these verbs are unaccusative, hence their resistance to passive. Additional evidence for the unaccusativity of escape and elude comes from the fact that they do not form middles or -er nominal (the same is true of concern and interest):

(100) a. * Great ideas elude/escape/concern/interest easily.

Crucially, these are all stative verbs. Avoiding the progressive test, which is problematic for reasons discussed above, notice that they fail the pseudocleft test (cf. the eventive class II verbs in (101b)):

(101) a. * What that solution did was escape/elude/concern Mary.
    b. What that noise did was scare/surprise/startle Mary.
Thus, English supports the correlation stated in (96b) between stativity and unaccusativity in class II.  

Further evidence that eventiveness, rather than agentivity, is the relevant determinant of verbal psych passives is provided by the Pittsburghese dialect of English (Tenny 1998). In this dialect there is a construction which unambiguously selects for verbal passive participles. Tenny shows that the construction is compatible with eventive adverbials, progressive aspect and idiom chunk passives, and incompatible with the adjectival *un-passive.

(102) a. The dog needs scratched hard.  
   b. The car has been needing washed for a long time now.  
   c. Tabs need kept on the suspect.  
   d. * The house needs unpainted.

Crucially, Tenny observes that class II passives are generally accepted in this construction, even when explicitly nonagentive.

(103) Nobody needs angered/irritated/discouraged/dismayed by the truth.

The existence of these passives favors Pesetsky's view over Grimshaw's. Interestingly, Tenny also observes that the acceptability of class II passives is somewhat unstable across speakers, and across different verbs. She notes that the verbs in (104) yielded more degraded sentences.

(105) a. The actor needs fascinated by the play.  
   b. Young people shouldn't need depressed by life.  
   c. The local farmers need concerned by the worsening drought.

Tenny's interpretation of these facts is in full accordance with our thesis: "... verbal passives are more felicitous the more eventive the verb. A complex of factors influences the degree of eventiveness, including not only agentivity but also volitionality, punctuality, and the affectedness of change of state in the experiencer. A loose gradient can be defined from the purely stative ascription of property to the most eventive verb type... Individual speakers vary in how strict they are with this scale in making verbal passives" (p. 595). We see, then, that English provides evidence from independent sources for the contingency of verbal passive on non-stativity in class II verbs.

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28 Pesetsky (1995, fn. 47) mentions a suggestion by R. Mulder that a null preposition introduces the objects of *escape/elude*. This is precisely the present proposal, which extends to *all* accusative experiencers. In the case at hand, though, what blocks passivization is not the null preposition but the lack of external argument.
4.1.2 Dutch

As in English, Dutch passive participles are ambiguous between a verbal and an adjectival use. Following den Besten (1989), Pesetsky (1995) argues that psych passives undergo V-raising, a test distinguishing verbs from adjectives in Dutch. V-raising optionally inverts the order of the participle and the auxiliary (adjoining the former to the right of the latter):29

\[(106)\]  
\[a. \text{dat hij gelachen heeft.} \]
\[\text{that he laughed has} \]
\[\text{‘that he has laughed’} \]

\[b. \text{dat hij heeft gelachen.} \]

\[(107)\]  
\[a. \text{dat Jan de hele dag druk bezig is.} \]
\[\text{that John the whole day very busy is} \]
\[\text{‘that John is very busy the whole day’} \]

\[b. \ast \text{dat Jan de hele dag druk is bezig.} \]

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 84, 88)

Verb raising, not surprisingly, can only apply to verbs. Thus, it can apply to the verbal participle in (106b) but not to the adjective in (107b). Psych passives can undergo V-raising, confirming their verbal status:

\[(108)\]  
\[a. \text{dat ik door het college geboeid werd.} \]
\[\text{that I by the classes fascinated became.} \]
\[\text{‘that I got fascinated by the classes’} \]

\[b. \text{dat ik door het college werd geboeid.} \]

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 100)

Nevertheless, Pesetsky reports that not all psych passives are of equal status; e.g., *irriteeren* ‘irritate’ and *ergern* ‘annoy’ yield a question mark in (108). If the present proposal is correct, this marginality is related to stativity: Strongly stative psych verbs should resist verbal passivization since they are unaccusative.

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29 The Dutch data are taken from den Besten (1989) and R. Mulder (p.c. to Pesetsky). Pesetsky mentions another test – compatibility with the auxiliary *worden* – yet judgments on that seem less stable.
This prediction is confirmed (judgments by J. Schaeffer and A. van Hout, p.c). Consider the behavior of *intrigeren* ‘intrigue’ (the same judgments are reported for *interesseren* ‘interest’):

(109) a. dat musicals Jan intrigeren.
   that musicals John intrigued
   ‘that musicals intrigued John’

   b. dat Jan door musicals geïntrigeerd was / *was geïntrigeerd.
   that John by musicals intrigued was / *was intrigued
   ‘that John was intrigued by musicals’

The passive of *intrigeren* cannot undergo V-raising, a clear indication of its adjectival status. Crucially, V-raising is *not* generally excluded with stative verbal passives (unlike the case of the Italian auxiliary *venire* ‘come’, as Pesetsky 1995 shows); class I passives do raise:

(110) a. dat Jan musicals haatte.
   that John musicals hated
   ‘that John hated musicals’

   b. dat musicals door Jan gehaat was / was gehaat.
   that musicals by John hated become / become hated
   ‘that musicals came to be hated by John’

Thus, stative class II verbs are distinct both from eventive class II verbs and from stative class I verbs. It is only the combination of an experiencer with inherent case and stativity which yields an unaccusative verb, resisting passivization.

4.1.3 Finnish

Pylkkänen (2000) argues that the stative/eventive distinction in class II verbs is morphologically marked in Finnish – in two ways: i) Eventive class II verbs contain an incohative morpheme lacking from stative verbs; ii) Stative class II verbs mark their object with partitive case (like all atelic verbs), whereas the object of eventive class II verbs is marked accusative. 30

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30 Notice that the stative verb in (111a) is causative; the main point of Pylkkänen’s paper is to establish the existence of an aspeccual class (of psych verbs) that is both causative and stative.
Pylkkänen shows that those two types of verbs have different selectional properties, a fact which she attributes to the presence of an external argument in the eventive type vs. its absence in the stative type. The argument is fairly theory-internal, however Pylkkänen also shows that the same assumption accounts for a contrast in passivization: Only the eventive type has a passive form (the with-phrase in (112b) is an event-modifier; Finish passive has no by-phrase):

    Maija.PAR find-disgusting-CAUS-PASS
    ‘Maija is disgusted’

    Kaisa fright-INCH-CAUS-PASS.PAST with bad news
    ‘Kaisa was frightened with bad news (by somebody)’

(Pylkkänen 2000, ex. 50a, 52a)

This contrast confirms our generalization regarding type A languages: Passive in class II is only found with eventive verbs, while stative verbs are unaccusative. The Finnish data is even sharper than the English/Dutch data because the aspectual distinctions are morphologically marked, so the relevant judgments need not appeal to subtle semantic intuitions.

4.2 Deriving the Unaccusativity of Stative Class II/III Verbs

The assumption that stative class II verbs are unaccusative explains why they lack verbal passives. Moreover, in section 8.4 I argue that it also explains their failure to license forward binding of object anaphors. Those two properties seem to be universal. It is therefore highly desirable to derive the stative/psych-unaccusative correlation from principles of UG. In this section I outline the steps of this derivation. Although some of these steps are as yet underived generalizations, I believe that they are all empirically well-established.
Recall that stative class II/III verbs select both an experiencer and a target/subject-matter argument:

(113) a. Global warming preoccupies George.
    b. preoccupy: <EXP, T/SM>

Let us assume that mapping to the syntax is governed by the following thematic hierarchy:

(114) Causer >> Experiencer >> T/SM.  (Pesetsky 1995, ex. 166)

I take (114) to instantiate a segment of some universal thematic hierarchy, feeding a relativized version of the UTAH (Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis). That is, while the grammar may contain statements to the effect that specific θ-roles (or aspectual roles) are intrinsically external (or internal), the hierarchy in (114) (and its extensions) "fill in" whatever is left unspecified. In particular, the experiencer role may find itself internal or external, depending on the identity of other roles in its environment.

Normally, only two (adjacent) members of this hierarchy are simultaneously realized; this is the content of Pesetsky’s (1995) T/SM restriction (to be discussed in section 5.1). As discussed in section 1, I assume that the eventive interpretation of class II verbs is associated with the causer argument, and vice versa. Conversely, the stative interpretation and the T/SM argument are likewise associated. Thus, stative psych verbs realize experiencer and T/SM, and (114) requires the latter to project lower than the former. If one can show that the experiencer argument must be internal, the hierarchy in (114) would entail that the T/SM argument is internal too.\(^{31}\)

The problem, then, narrows down to the following question: Why can't the experiencer of a stative class II/III verb (e.g., preoccupy) project externally, like the experiencer of a class I verb (e.g., fear)? It is here that we bring in the next universal generalization:

(115) Inherent case is only assigned to internal arguments.

Again, there might be different views on why (115) should be true, yet there is little doubt that it is. It is well-known that quirky subjects – bearing inherent case in a canonical subject position – are always derived, hence internal arguments (Zaenen, Maling & Thráinsson 1985, Sigurðsson 1989, 1992). Within GB, there was a natural way of deriving (115). As Belletti & Rizzi (1988) pointed out, inherent case is assigned (like a θ-role) under government by V, but V governs only internal arguments (the external one being governed by Infl). Within the minimalist program, where government is discarded, an alternative distinction exists between

internal and external arguments: Only the latter are introduced by a functional light \( v \). We may assume that only lexical \( V \) can assign inherent case; the only case feature on light \( v \) is structural accusative.\(^{32}\)

The account is complete if we add in the claim in (40), defended at length above and repeated below (recall that we presently disregard agentive contexts):

\[(116)\] Universally, non-nominative experiencers bear inherent case.

From (115) and (116) it follows that in all class II/III verbs – statives included – the non-nominative experiencer is an internal argument. In the stative ones, the remaining T/SM argument must also be internal, given the hierarchy in (114). Consequently, stative class II/III verbs have no external argument, Q.E.D.\(^{33}\)

Notice that most class II verbs are ambiguous, to varying degrees, between stative and eventive readings. Empirically, unaccusative behavior is exhibited only by those verbs (like \( \text{concern, interest} \)) which are unambiguously stative. We may assume that only the latter verbs lack, in their thematic grid, a causer argument (which is the source of eventive interpretation).

An anonymous reviewer raises the question how to distinguish stative class I verbs, which project the experiencer externally (e.g., \( \text{hate} \)), and stative class II/III verbs, which project it internally (\( \text{concern, appeal} \)). Reinhart (2001), for example, classifies external experiencers as \([+m]\) and internal ones as \([-c,+m]\) or \([-c]\); however, the distinction is not independently supported by the semantics of these arguments.

In fact, it is not clear that a principled distinction could or should be drawn between these two types of experiencers. Verbs denoting nearly identical concepts map differently across languages (e.g., English \( \text{like} \) vs. Italian \( \text{piacere} \)). Strikingly, one can find class I-class III alternations for the same verb in the same language, involving no change of meaning (at most, the distinction is in register).

\[(117)\] a. Mær dámar væl hasa bókina.
Me.DAT like well that book.ACC

\(^{32}\) Notice that certain languages have productive dative subjects in various environments (e.g., infinitives in Russian, the evidential mode in Georgian, causatives in Romance). By all tests this is structural dative, hence does not fall under (115).

\(^{33}\) A recent attempt to derive the same result is developed in Reinhart (2000, 2001, 2002), where \( \theta \)-roles are decomposed into constituent features, \([\pm c]\) (cause) and \([\pm m]\) (mental-state). Mapping rules operate on features, linking \([+c]\) and \([+m]\) roles to the external argument position. One important difference between the present system and Reinhart’s is the relative ranking of internal arguments: (114) dictates that even when both arguments are internal, the experiencer is higher than T/SM. By contrast, Reinhart’s system only distinguishes between the external argument and the internal arguments; the latter are unordered. This is particularly problematic because there is considerable evidence – from word order and scope – that the experiencer is higher than T/SM in unaccusative psych verbs, evidence which is used, but not explained, by Reinhart (2001).
It is, of course, possible to insist that such pairs are semantically distinct to an extent justifying the projection of the experiencer internally in the (a) examples and externally in the (b) examples. However, such a claim finds no support in native intuitions. Alternatively, we may suppose that lexical entries of verbs specify whether and to which argument the verb assigns inherent case. An experiencer marked by this lexical diacritic will be mapped internally, due to (115). Otherwise, a class I configuration will emerge, with an external experiencer.

4.3 Type B Languages: No Verbal Psych Passives

4.3.1 Italian

Belletti & Rizzi (1988) presented four arguments in favor of the adjectival status of psych passives. The first two arguments were: i) Like adjectives, and unlike verbal passives, psych passives cannot bear a clitic pronoun in reduced relatives; ii) Unlike verbal passives, psych passives are incompatible with the auxiliary venire ‘come’. However, Pesetsky (1995) showed that argument (i) rests on a problematic choice of clitics, which renders the argument uninformative; and argument (ii) diagnozes stativity, not adjectivehood.

However, Belletti & Rizzi presented two additional pieces of evidence, which Pesetsky does not discuss. That evidence points quite clearly to the adjectival status of some psych passives in Italian.

First, some class II verbs do not have regular participial forms (119b), and instead have only irregular adjectival forms (119c):

(119) a. Le sue idee mi stufano/stancano/entusiasmano.
   ‘His ideas tire/excite me’
b. * Sono stufato/stancato/entusiasmato dalle sue idee. [participial form]
   ‘I am tired/excited by his ideas’

c. Sono stufo/stanco/entusiasta dalle sue idee. [adjectival form]
   ‘I am tired/excited by his ideas’

(B&R 1988, ex. 55-56)

Belletti & Rizzi interpret this as a consequence of the Blocking Principle: An irregular form blocks the regular form. But notice that the irregular form is unambiguously adjectival. Therefore, the blocked participial form must also be adjectival, otherwise no competition should arise. This implies that the verbs in (119) have no verbal passives. Importantly, these are not stative verbs, hence the lack of verbal passives cannot be subsumed under type A of (90).

Second, some psych passives resist the regular da-phrase and only occur with special prepositions:

(120) a. Gianni è interessato a/*da Maria.
   ‘Gianni is interested to/*by Maria’

   b. Gianni è appassionato di/*dalla poesia.
   ‘Gianni is fond of/*by poetry’

(B&R 1988, fn. 13)

The occurrence of idiosyncratic prepositions is a hallmark of adjectival passives, which are lexically derived. Such prepositions are excluded in contexts that force the choice of a verbal passive, like the progressive aspect:

(121) a. Bill was enraged by/at totally innocent remarks.

   b. Bill was often being enraged by/*at totally innocent remarks.

   (Pesetsky 1995, ex. 81)

Granting that some Italian class II verbs lacks verbal passives, we would still be on safer grounds if it were possible to show that no such verb has a verbal passive; recall that this follows from (95), given that Italian has neither pseudo- nor quirky passives.

Showing that a language lacks a certain feature is much harder than showing that it has it. In principle, the objection is always conceivable that we have not looked hard enough.

34 Cf. the English alternation sunk/sunken between the verbal and the adjectival participles.
Still, I think that in this particular case, an argument with this desirable conclusion is available from certain facts about Italian verb morphology.\textsuperscript{35}

Suppose we find an affix $X$ with the following profile:

(122) a. $X$ is a (relatively) productive deverbal affix.
    b. $X$ attaches to verbal passive participles.
    c. In particular, $X$ attaches to class I passive participles.
    d. $X$ does not attach to adjectives.
    e. $X$ does not attach to class II passive participles.

If $X$ satisfies these conditions, two conclusions follow: (i) $X$ attaches to verbs, regardless of stativity (since class I verbs are stative, and allow it); (ii) Class II passives are adjectival. Notice that this test is not vulnerable to Pesetsky’s critique, as it explicitly diagnoses verbhood, not eventiveness.

It turns out that the semeliterative prefix $ri$- 're-' fits perfectly the description in (122):

(123) a. $ri$- attaches to class I passive participles:

- $riamato$ 'reloved',
- $riconsiderato$ 'reconsidered',
- $ridetestato$ 'redetested',
- $revenerato$ 'reworshiped',
- $ridimenticato$ 'reforgotten'.

    b. $ri$- does not attach to adjectives:

- *$rifelice$ 're-happy',
- *$rifurioso$ 're-furious',
- *$ristanco$ 're-tired',
- *$ribello$ 're-beautiful',
- *$rimalato$ 're-sick'.

    c. $ri$- does not attach to class II passive participles:

- *$risconcertato$ 'restartled',
- *$risorpreso$ 'resurprised',
- *$rischioccato$ 'reshocked',
- *$riterrorizzata$ 'reterrified',
- *$ridivertito$ 'reamused',
- *$ripreoccupato$ 'reworried',
- *$rieccitato$ 'rethrilled, reexcited'.

I conclude, then, that Italian has no verbal class II passives, in accordance with (95).

4.3.2 French

Legendre (1993) presents four arguments in favor of the adjectival status of psych passives. First, they are compatible with the adverbials $si/très$, which modify adjectives; second, they form causatives with $rendre$ ‘render’ like other adjectives; third, they appear as complements of $rester$ ‘remain’, which selects adjectives; and fourth, they are incompatible with $faire$.

\textsuperscript{35} For discussion and data, I am grateful to Lisa Brunetti.
causatives, unlike normal verbal passives. Notice that of the four tests, only the last one shows that psych passives are not verbal. The first three tests merely show that psych passives have an adjectival use, but do not preclude the existence of a verbal use as well. Since French passive participles are morphologically ambiguous, this possibility cannot be discounted. However, the fourth test does show what it purports to. Consider the data:

(124) a. Ça rendra/*fera Pierre très célèbre.
   ‘This will make Peter very famous’

   b. * Ça fera Pierre passioné par les timbres.
      ‘This will make Peter crazy about stamps’

   c. Sa visite à la Nouvelle Orléans a rendu Pierre vraiment passioné
      par le jazz.
      ‘His visit to New Orleans has rendered Peter really crazy about jazz’
      (Legendre 1993, ex. 16, 17a, 18c)

(124a) shows that regular adjectives in French form causatives with rendre and not with faire. (124b,c) show that the psych passive passioné behaves like an adjective in this respect; the ungrammaticality of the faire-variant rules out a verbal passive.

Moreover, as in Italian, a general argument can be made on the basis of re-prefixation. This prefix attaches to verbs, including class I passives (though some sound awkward), but not to adjectives. Class II passives pattern with the latter, resisting re- (M.A. Friedemann, p.c.):

(125) a. re- attaches to class I passive participles:
   reconsidéré 'reconsidered', ?réaimé 'reloved', ?redétesté 'redetested',
   réestimé 'reestimateded', ?réoublié 'reforgotten'.

b. re- does not attach to adjectives:
   *recontente ‘re-content’, *reheureux 're-happy', *reprêté 're-ready',
   *rebelle ‘re-beautiful’, *resûre ‘re-sure’.

c. re- does not attach to class II passive participles:
   *réalarmé 'realarmed', *resurpris 'resurprised', *rechoqué 'reshocked',
   *réeffrayé 'rescared', *réamusé 'reamused', *réennuyé 'rebored'.

36 The same logical flaw afflicts Belletti & Rizzi’s (1988) and Grimshaw’s (1990) arguments against verbal passives of class II in Italian and English (see Pesetsky 1995 for extensive discussion).
One could speculate that the forms in (125c) are morphologically ruled out. That this is not the case is shown by the following minimal pairs:

(126) a. Çe film a rechoqué Pierre.
   'That movie reshocked Pierre'

   b. * Pierre a été rechoqué par çe film.
      'Pierre was reshocked by that movie'

(127) a. ? La derniere attaque a réeffrayé Pierre.
   'The last attack refrightened Pierre'

   b. * Pierre a été réeffrayé par la derniere attaque.
      'Pierre was refrightened by the last attack'             (G. Legendre, p.c.)

Class II participles are acceptable in the perfect tense (126a)/(127a); it is only their usage as verbal passives that is ruled out (126b)/(127b), indicating that the constraint at work is syntactic rather than morphological. French, like Italian, has no verbal class II passives, in accordance with (95).

4.3.3 Hebrew

Unlike French and Italian, Hebrew (past and future) passive is a synthetic form, inflected for tense. Hence, it is unambiguously verbal, and no verb/adjective differentiating tests are needed. Running through the class of Hebrew class II verbs, one finds out that passivization breaks them into three categories:

(128) Hebrew Psych Passives

   a. Verbs that have no morphological passive: hilhiv/*hulhav ‘excite’,
      hiršim/*huršam ‘impress’, hirgiz/*hurgaz ‘annoy’, ci’er/*co’ar ‘sadden’,
      hitmi’ha/*hutma ‘puzzle’, hidhim/*hudham ‘amaze’, hirgia/*hurga ‘calm down’,

   b. Verbs that form morphological passive only in the agentive use: kišef/kušaf
c. Verbs that form morphological non-agentive passive with me- ‘of, from’:
   zi’aze’a/zu’aza ‘shock’, hiksim/huksam ‘charm’, hitrif/hutraf ‘drive s.o. mad’,
   sixrer/suxrar ‘dazzle’.

A great many class II verbs – perhaps more than half - belong to category (128a). It is not entirely clear why so many class II verbs lack passive forms, even on their agentive readings, although various restrictions on passive in Hebrew are known to exist. At any rate, the issue is orthogonal to the present thesis, which makes the right predictions with respect to the other two categories.

Few verbs belong to category (128b): They allow a verbal passive with the regular al-yedey-phrase (by-phrase), but only under the agentive reading; the non-agentive reading is ruled out either with al-yedey or with me-:

(129) a. ha-bosit/ha-bdixa he'eliva et Gil.
   the-boss/the-joke insulted acc. Gil
   ‘The boss/joke insulted Gil’

b. Gil hu'alav al-yedey ha-bosit.
   Gil was-insulted by the-boss
   ‘Gil was insulted by the boss’

c. * Gil hu'alav al-yedey/me- ha-bdixa.
   Gil was-insulted by/of the-joke
   ‘Gil was insulted by the joke'

This state of affairs is not surprising: We already know that agentive psych verbs lose all the special psych properties. If lack of verbal passive is a psych property, the only exceptions to it should have agentive readings. Nor do we expect the non-agentive passives to license prepositions other than al-yedey (like me-); recall that Hebrew passives are unambiguously verbal, and special prepositions only occur with adjectival passives.

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37 Doron (2003) argues that Hebrew passive is only compatible with verbs that select an Actor (normally, an agent) as their external arguments. Since psych verbs select a Causer but not an Actor, they cannot passivize. The first claim, however, is false; Hebrew has stative passives with no Actor (see next footnote). Moreover, the psych verbs in categories (128b,c) do allow agentive passives, even though their active forms select a Causer. Hence, the absence of non-agentive psych passives cannot be reduced to a general property of Hebrew passives.
In light of this, the behavior of category (128c) is prima facie puzzling. Although we expect these verbs to have agentive passive with al-yedey (130a), we do not expect them to license non-agentive passive with me-; but in fact they do (130b):

(130) a. Gil hufta me-/al-yedey ha-orxim.
   Gil was-surprised of/by the-guests
   ‘Gil was surprised at/by the guests’

   b. Gil hufta me/*al-yedey ha-xadašot.
   Gil was-surprised of/*by the-news
   ‘Gil was surprised at/*by the news’

The psych passive in (130b) is a strange hybrid from the point of view of current theories: Its morphology classifies it as a verb, whereas the preposition it takes classifies it as an adjective. How should we analyse it?38

Let me first point out that this peculiar behavior is exhibited by a very small number of verbs. In fact, the list in (128c) is pretty much exhaustive. I would like to claim that these verbs, although semantically normal, are morphologically anomalous. Specifically, these are intransitive psych verbs with abnormal passive morphology. That is, the form hufta ‘surprise (passive)’ is really derived by reduction of the external causer ofhiftia ‘surprise (active)’ (Reinhart’s “expletivization”, resulting in the promotion of the experiencer to external argument). Normally, such an operation is marked by reflexive or incoative morphology. In these exceptional verbs, however, the lexical marker is the one normally used to mark saturation of the external argument – namely, passive morphology. Let us refer to this phenomenon as “fake-passive”.

This hypothesis, although striking at first sight, ties together four peculiar properties of fake-passives. First, the fact already observed, that these verbs take me-PP and not al-yedey-PP. This is typical of unergative psych verbs in Hebrew (note that the English translations are approximate, as they involve by-phrases):

(131) a. Gil hitrageš me-/*al-yedey ha-seret.
   Gil was-moved of/*by the-movie
   ‘Gil was moved by the movie’

38 Notice that one cannot rule out al-yedey in (130b) by assuming that this preposition only occurs in agentive/eventive passives. In fact, stative non-psych verbs allow it:

i. ha-bama hustera al-yedey ha-masax.
   the-stage was-hidden by the-screen
   ‘The stage was hidden by the screen’
b. Gil nig’al me-/*al-yedey ha-marak.
   Gil was-disgusted of/*by the-soup
   ‘Gil was disgusted by the soup’

*al-yedey* introduces a demoted external argument – agent/causer or stative experiencer in class I. By contrast, *me-* introduces an internal argument – the Target/Subject-Matter of Pesetsky (1995). The parallelism between (130b) and (131) supports the idea that fake-passives are in fact unergatives.

Second, unlike the verbs in categories (128a,b) (with very few exceptions), the verbs in category (128c) have no “morphologically normal” unergative variant. In Hebrew, the unergative member in psych alternations often carries reflexive (the hitpael paradigm) or incohative (the nifal paradigm) morphology. The examples in (131) illustrate these two types. However, the transitive verbs in (128c) have no such counterparts (e.g., hitobia/*nitoba/*hitpatea ‘surprise’, hitraid/*nitraid/*hittared ‘bother’, hiksim/*niksam /*hitkasem ‘charm’, etc.). This is readily understood on the assumption that the fake-passives *are* the unergative counterparts; being morphologically irregular, they block the formation of the regular forms.39

Third, if fake-passives are in fact unergatives, they should fail familiar tests for derived subjects. In Hebrew, subject verb inversion (in the absence of preverbal material) is perfect with passives/unaccusatives, but very marginal with unergatives/transitives. Indeed, fake-passives pattern with the latter and not with the former:

(132) a. ani xošev še-huzmenu harbe studentim.
   I think that-were-invited many students
   ‘I think that many students were invited’

b. ?? ani xošev še-hitragzu harbe studentim me-ha-švita.
   I think that-were-angry many students of-the-strike
   ‘I think that many students were angry at the strike’

c. ?? ani xošev še-hutredu harbe studentim me-ha-švita.
   I think that-were-bothered many students of-the-strike
   ‘I think that many students were bothered with the strike’

39 There are two exceptions which have both fake-passive and reflexive forms: zu’aza/hiza’a ‘shock’ and suxraa/histaaxa ‘dazzle’. I can only speculate that this is related to the fact that the psych reading of these verbs is parasitic on a physical, non-psych reading. Notice that lack of a reflexive/incohative variant is a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the formation of a fake-passive; some verbs may lack such a variant simply due to a lexical gap (e.g., hexli/*nixla/*hitxale ‘sicken’).
Unlike the genuine passive (132a), the psych unergative (132b) (morphologically reflexive) resists inversion. The fake-passive (132c) is similarly marginal with inversion.

Fourth, the idea that the passive forms in (128e) are not real passives explains another peculiarity they exhibit – namely, their occurrence as control predicates without active counterparts (133a,b):

(133) a. Gil hufta/hutrad/huksam/zu'aza legalot še-ha-arec agula.
   Gil was-surprised/bothered/enchanted/shocked to-discover that-the-earth round
   'Gil was surprised/bothered/enchanted/shocked to discover that the earth is round'

   Rina surprised/bothered/enchanted/shocked acc. Gil to-discover that-the-earth round
   'Rina surprised/bothered/enchanted/shocked Gil to discover that the earth is round'

   c. Gil hitragez/nexrad legalot še-ha-arec agula.
   Gil was annoyed/appalled to-discover that-the-earth round
   'Gil was annoyed/appalled to discover that the earth is round'

Such active-passive asymmetry is unknown among control verbs; it is readily understood if the verbs in (133a) are unergative psych verbs, on a par with those in (133c), which do not carry passive morphology. Indeed, the English counterparts are clearly adjectival passives, resisting the progressive; compare (134a) and (134b):

(134) a. John was (*being) surprised/bothered/enchanted/shocked to discover that the earth is round.
   b. John was (being) urged/encouraged/compelled/forced to discover that the earth is round.

I conclude that there is ample evidence against the existence of verbal passive of class II psych verbs in Hebrew, morphological appearance notwithstanding.41

40 But not among ECM verbs:

i. John was wagered/affirmed/announced to have cheated on his wife.
ii. * We wagered/affirmed/announced John to have cheated on his wife.
41 The occurrence of unergative psych-verbs with irregular passive morphology is perhaps less surprising than it first appears. The reverse situation is also attested: The passives of the verbs kibel 'accept, receive' and gila 'discover' are the morphologically reflexive hitkabel/hitgala, not the expected *kubal/*gula. Of course, this is familiar from Romance, where passive/middle constructions can be formed with si/se. Thus, the lexical operations saturation and reduction normally map to passive and reflexive morphology, respectively; however, irregular forms may arise when the mapping is reversed.
To conclude, we lay out the crosslinguistic typology that emerged from the discussion of psych passives. Observe that the association of a particular language with a particular slot in this typology is predictable from independent morphosyntactic properties of the language:

(135) The Psych Passive Typology

5 Peripheral Psych Properties

The psych properties discussed hitherto fall naturally together in that they characterize, among transitive verbs, all and only psych verbs. A crucial contrast, recurring throughout, exists between the non-agentive reading of the psych construction (which exhibits the core properties) and the agentive reading (which does not). Furthermore, I argued that all the core properties can be traced back to the presence of a null prepositional head that assigns inherent case to the experiencer argument.

The two psych properties to be discussed in sections 5.1-5.2 – the T/SM restriction and causative psych nominalizations – fall outside this description. First, they are neutral with respect to agentivity; second, they are less rigid, tolerating idiosyncratic exceptions; and third, they seem to involve diverse morphosyntactic mechanisms. It is for this reasons that I distinguish them from the core psych properties. The property to be discussed in section 5.3 – backward binding – perhaps should be more aptly called a pseudo-psych-property. In spite of its dominance in the early literature (starting with Postal 1971), there is every reason to believe that it has nothing to do with psych constructions as such. This has already been realized by several researchers, and their case will be defended below.

The discussion to follow will not attempt to develop an account of the T/SM restriction and causative psych nominalizations. As hinted above, I think that such an account will
ultimately incorporate various ingredients that do not bear directly on the syntax of psych verbs. Nevertheless, this discussion is methodologically warranted in light of the significant attention that these topics have drawn in the literature on psych constructions. If I am correct, this attention has been misplaced, obscuring our understanding of the essential nature of the phenomenon. Thus, this section is somewhat of a detour off the main plotline of this monograph; the reader who is impatient with deadends is advised to skip directly to section 6.

5.1 The T/SM Restriction

Pesetsky (1987, 1995) observed that the semantic roles borne by the “theme” argument in Subject-Experiencer and in Object-Experiencer predicates are not identical. In the first case, the “theme” object is interpreted as Target of Emotion or Subject Matter (T/SM), whereas in the second case the “theme” subject is interpreted as a Cause. Thus, for example, *The article angered Bill* does not entail *Bill was angry at the article*, since the article could have provoked an anger in Bill directed at the government. Surprisingly, though, the two logically distinct arguments cannot be simultaneously realized; this is the T/SM restriction:

(136) a. *The article in the Times angered Bill at the government.*
    b. *The Chinese dinner satisfied Bill with his trip to Beijing.*
    c. *Something Bill had said bothered Mary about her future.*
    d. *The distant rumbling frightened Mary of another tornado.*

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 171)

Pesetsky shows that the restriction is not semantic, as periphrastic (causative) counterparts exist: *The article in the Times made Bill angry at the government.* The source of the restriction, in Pesetsky’s analysis, is the need of the affixal *CAUS* null morpheme (which is present in every causative psych construction) to raise to the root. In a cascade configuration, the intervening preposition (heading the T/SM PP) blocks this movement. The resulting structure either violates the Stray Affix Filter or the Head Movement Constraint.

A crucial observation, missing from Pesetsky’s discussion, is the fact that psych verbs used agentively also obey the T/SM restriction:

(137) a. *We all tried to satisfy Bill with his trip to Beijing.*
    b. *Bill maliciously worried Mary about her future.*
    c. *The weather man deliberately frightens people of another tornado.*

This is significant because all of the core psych properties do *not* persist in agentive contexts; indeed, the agentive/non-agentive contrast was a recurring diagnostic for these properties in
the preceding sections. Evidently, the T/SM restriction is not of a piece with these properties. Notice that this is unexpected under Pesetsky’s analysis, which does not assume a Caus morpheme in agentive constructions.

Other facts cast further doubt on the claim that the T/SM restriction is a core psych property. Pesetsky himself observes that with certain psych verbs, it is violable:

(138) a. The rain discouraged us from our tasks.
    b. Sue’s remarks inspired them to action.
    c. These results inclined us toward the more difficult course.
    d. Mary shamed us into going to the movies.

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 543)

In Spanish and Greek, a near-translation of (136a) is fine:

(139) a. El artículo enojó a Bill con la prensa.
    ‘The article angered Bill at the media’

        (Franco 1990, fn. 7)

    b. To arthro stin efimerida thimose tin Maria me ta mesa
    The article to-the newspaper angered the Maria with the media
    mazikis enimerosis
    massive.Gen information.Gen
    ‘The newspaper article angered Mary with the media’

        (E. Anagnostopoulou, p.c.)

42 As far as I am aware, the fact that the T/SM restriction fails to distinguish agentive from non-agentive psych constructions was noted (in passing) only by Anagnostopoulou (1999, ex. 47). Bouchard (1995: 333) denies this, citing as grammatical examples like (i-ii)

i. Mary satisfied Bill with her trip to Beijing.
ii. Mary bores John with her life as a linguist.

However, English speakers that I have consulted reject (i), and accept (ii) only on a “speech act” reading (Mary is talking to John on and on about her life as a linguist); in fact, this is Bouchard’s own rendering. It is also possible that with-PPs admit an instrumental reading, licensed in agentive contexts. This does not change the general fact, illustrated below in Hebrew as well:

iii. * Gil be-xavana icben/zi’azea et Rina al/me- ha-toxnit.
    Gil in-intention irritated/shocked acc. Rina on/of the-program
    ‘Gil deliberately irritated/shocked Rina about/with the program’

43 Curiously, Pesetsky (1995, p. 68) notes that the T/SM restriction in Japanese shows up in agentive contexts. He also speculates (fn. 179) that Caus may occur in agentive contexts, to allow, at least marginally, backward binding. However, elsewhere (p. 197) he denies this option, assuming that Caus-affixation suppresses the agent role. This plays an important role in his explanation of certain restrictions manifested by double object verbs in their causative use (but not in their agentive use). First, “Oherle’s effect” (Katya/Lipson’s textbook taught Russian to me) and second, nominalizations (Bill’s/hard work’s procurement of the prize).
More seriously, the proper distinction between the cases that obey and those that disobey the restriction does not correspond to synthetic vs. periphrastic causatives. Mulder (1992) observes that in Dutch (and English), some periphrastic causative psych constructions exhibit the T/SM restriction:

(140) a. drie flessen wijn maakten me vrolijk (*over het voorval).
three bottles (of) wine made me merry (*over the event)

b. Jeltsin’s toespraak wond Gorbatsjov op (*over de toestand in Rusland).
Yeltsin’s speech excited Gorbachov PRT (*about the situation in Russia).

c. The publication of his prior conviction in the Boston Herald yesterday gave John a hard time (*about his past).

(Mulder 1992:144, ex. 74, 76, 77)

McGinnis (2001) argues that the relevant factor is whether the causative morpheme is lexically specified or the default form. Thus, in Chinese, the T/SM restriction only obtains with the lexically specified shi and not with the default ling, even though both are non-affixal:

(141) a. Wo dui zengfu hen shiwang.
I with government very disappointed (Adj.)
‘I was very disappointed with the government’

b. Ni shi wo wang.
you V1 me V2-disappoint
‘You disappointed me’

c. * Ni shi wo dui zengfu wang. (any order)
you V1 me with government V2-disappoint

d. Ni ling wo dui zengfu hen shiwang.
you CAUS me with government very disappointed (Adj.)
‘You made me disappointed with the government’

(McGinnis, 2001, ex. 16)

Conversely, synthetic psych-verbs in Japanese that are formed with the default morpheme (s)ase do not show the T/SM restriction, whereas those that take the lexically specified asi do:
McGinnis concludes from these facts that the T/SM restriction does not diagnose zero or affixal morphemes, but rather lexically restricted causative morphemes (that must be adjacent to the root). Notice that nothing in this statement makes any special reference to psych verbs as such. Indeed, Pesetsky cites data from Higgins (1973) highly reminiscent of the T/SM restriction. Higgins noted that many English adjectives can be predicated either of a person or a person’s manner/remarks. However, a complement to the adjective can only appear in the first context:

(143) a. John was proud (of his son).
    b. Sue was nervous (about the exam).
    c. Tom was fearful (of an earthquake).

(144) a. John’s manner was proud (*of his son).
    b. Sue’s behavior was nervous (*about the exam).
    c. Tom’s attitude was fearful (*of an earthquake).

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 181, 182)

Here as well, Pesetsky postulates a null morpheme, $SUG$ (interpreted roughly as “suggesting that...”), which must raise to the adjectival head across the prepositional head of the complement. McGinnis (2001) translates this account too into her system.
Let me stress that all these facts deserve to be studied thoroughly and explained. Presently, though, I wish to set them apart from core psych properties, as they seem to involve many independent factors that are not necessarily unique to psych constructions.

5.2 Causative Nominalizations

It is an old observation that psych nominalizations lack any causative force (Lakoff 1970):

(145) a. Bill’s continual agitation about the exam was silly.
    b. Mary’s constant annoyance about/at/with us got on our nerves.
    c. * The exam’s continual agitation of Bill was silly.
    d. * Our constant annoyance of Mary got on our nerves.

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 199a-b, 208a-b)

According to Grimshaw (1990), the same reason that blocks reflexive si/se and passivization of class II verbs, blocks nominalization: The lack of an external argument (which must be suppressed in process nominalizations). More precisely, the kind of nominalization that is excluded is the non-agentive process kind: Result nominalizations do not project an argument structure (hence do not suppress the base external argument), and agentive process nominalizations do select an external argument. Both types are fine with psych roots. Indeed, Grimshaw cites the following contrasts in support of this prediction:

(146) a. The embarrassment/humiliation of the bystanders.
    b. The amusement/entertainment of the children.
    c. John’s/*the event’s embarrassment/humiliation of Mary.
    d. The clown’s/*movie’s (constant) amusement/entertainment of the children.

(Grimshaw 1990: 119-120, ex. 26c, 28a, 26a, 27, 28c,d)

(146a,b) only have the result (state) reading; and (146c,d), the process nominals, only tolerate an agentive possessor.

Pesetsky (1995), who claims that class II verbs do select an external argument, offers an alternative account. In his analysis, causative psych verbs are formed with a null causative affix, CAUS; nominalization attaches a nominalizer affix to this complex: [[[psych-root] CAUS] nominalizer]. This configuration violates Myers’s generalization (Myers 1984), which does not permit (derivational) affixation to zero-derived words.

Ultimately, Pesetsky argues, following Fabb (1988), that Myers’s generalization is epiphenomenal (and indeed, violated by the suffixes –er and –able) and that the relevant generalizations constrain the type of affixes that can attach to CAUS rather than CAUS itself.
He devises a complex system where each nominal suffix is lexically associated with distributional restrictions. The fact that zero morphemes, including CAUS, disallow further affixation is thereby decomposed into many smaller facts about specific nominalizers.

This treatment, I think, misses an important crosslinguistic fact: As far as we know, the ban on causative psych nominalizations is universal and indifferent to morphology. Thus, it applies in Hebrew too, where causative morphology is both overt and non-concatenative. It is hard to see how the Fabb/Pesetsky system can extend to this language:

(147) a. * zi’azua Rina/ha-xadašot et Gil.
     shock.CAUS.NMZ Rina/the-news acc. Gil
     ‘Rina’s / the news’ shock of Gil’

     b. * ha-hafta’a šel Gil et išto tuxena zman rav.
     the-surprise.CAUS.NMZ of Gil acc. his-wife was-planned time long
     ‘Gil’s surprise of his wife was long planned’

     c. * ha-bilbul (ha-mexuvan) šel Gil/ha-kolot et Rina.
     the-bafflement.CAUS.NMZ the-deliberate of Gil/the-voices acc. Rina
     ‘Gil’s/the voices’ (deliberate) bafflement of Rina’

These examples also demonstrate the first important reason why the restriction on nominalizations should only be seen as a peripheral psych effect: It persists even in agentive contexts. In fact, this was already noted for English as well:

(148) * John’s deliberate amazement/depression/pleasure/delight/disgust/interest of Mary.
     (Iwata 1995, ex. 41)

While not all of the base verbs in (148) allow agentive interpretations, those that do still disallow agentive nominalizations. Grammatical agentive psych nominalizations, as in (146c,d), are quite rare, as the following examples further illustrate:

(149) a. John deliberately scared/frightened/bothered/terrified Mary.

     b. *John’s deliberate scare/fright/bother/terror of Mary.

This fact has escaped the attention of most researchers. Again, as in the case of the T/SM restriction, it sets nominalization apart from all the other core psych properties, which fail to obtain in agentive contexts.
Other facts that point to the same conclusion are more well-known. As Pesetsky (1995) observes, restrictions on nominalization are not limited to psych-verbs. They are found with the so-called SUG-predicates and also with zero-derived incohatives:

(150) a. Your remarks were angry / *your remarks’ anger
b. her expression was optimistic / *her expression’s optimism
c. his words were sad / *his words’ sadness
(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 211, 212, 214)

(151) a. The thief returned the money / *the thief’s return of the money
b. Inflation diminished his salary / *inflation’s diminishment of his salary
c. Bill ceased/stopped the activity / *Bill’s cessation/stoppage of the activity
(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 231, 233, 236)

Pesetsky suggests that all these cases involve embedded zero affixes, violating Myers’s generalization. However, if the restriction on psych nominalizations is indeed orthogonal to zero morphology, then it is far from obvious that all these facts fall together. At any rate, the lack of causative nominalizations does not necessarily point to a specific property of psych verbs as such.

5.3 Backward Binding

Postal (1971) argued that the fact that experiencer objects can bind anaphors embedded inside the theme subject tells us something about their special syntax. This idea was resurrected by Hermon (1985), Stowell (1986) and Belletti & Rizzi (1988), and later adopted, in a different form, by Pesetsky (1995):

(152) a. Questi pettegolezzi su di sé preoccupano Gianni più di ogni altra cosa.
   ‘These gossips about himself worry Gianni more than anything else’

   b. * Questi pettegolezzi su di sé descrivono Gianni meglio di ogni biografia ufficiale.
      ‘These gossips about himself describe Gianni better than any official biography’
      (B&R 1988, ex. 57)

(153) a. Each other’s supporters worried Freud and Jung.
   b. Each other’s remarks annoyed John and Mary.
   c. * Each other’s parents harmed John and Mary.
   d. * Each other’s teachers insulted John and Mary.
For Postal, at Deep Structure the experiencer is a subject and the theme is an object. Binding (or "reflexivization") applies at that level, where the proper command relations hold. A "flip" transformation was held responsible for the inverse Surface Structure of these verbs. For Belletti & Rizzi, both the experiencer and the theme are internal arguments, but still, the former c-commands the latter at D-structure. Condition A may apply at that level, before the theme is raised to the subject position. For Pesetsky, the theme (actually – a Causer) is associated with two ω-positions – one below the experiencer and one above it. The Causer is generated in the lower position and moves to the higher one, yet it is in virtue of the former (just as in B&R's analysis) that Condition A is satisfied.

However, subsequent research has challenged the claim that backward binding falls under Condition A, or indeed, that it is even a structural phenomenon (Zribi-Hertz 1989, Bouchard 1992, Pollard & Sag 1992, Reinhart & Reuland 1993, Iwata 1995, Arad 1998, Caçado & Franchi 1999). That backward binding is licensed by the causative nature of the construction rather than its psych properties can be seen below:

(154) a. Each other's remarks made John and Mary angry.
   b. Pictures of himself give John the creeps.
   c. Pictures of each other caused John and Mary to start crying.
   d. Each other’s criticism forced John and Mary to confront their problems.

(Pesetsky 1995, ex. 124a,d, 125a,b)

Pesetsky extends his "doubly-filled-Cause" analysis to these cases as well, at the cost of several auxiliary stipulations. Yet even that cannot explain the following cases:

(155) a. The picture of himself in Newsweek shattered the peace of mind that John had spent the last six months trying to restore.

(Pollard & Sag 1992, ex. 62c)

   b. These nasty stories about himself broke John’s resistance.

(Bouchard 1992, ex. 38c)

   c. These rumors about himself caught John’s attention.

(Iwata 1995, ex. 72c, due to D. Pesetsky)

Here, the antecedent of the anaphor (John) fails to c-command it even at D-structure. Cases like this strongly indicate that backward binding is conditioned (at least partially) by non-structural factors. More evidence to this effect is provided by the following contrast:
(156) That book about/??by herself struck Mary as embarrassing.  

(Bouchard 1992, ex. 37a, 40a)

Bouchard (1992, 1995) points out that backward binding only applies when the DP containing the anaphor is construed as a representation of the referent of the anaphor. This might be too strong a statement, in light of (153a), but it does trace the peculiar properties traditionally associated with picture-anaphora. The general response to these effects is to classify backward binding with cases of logophors, whose antecedent must be a subject of consciousness or a participant whose point of view is evaluated in the discourse (see Zribi-Hertz 1989, Sells 1987). At any rate, it is safe to conclude that backward binding is not a purely structural phenomenon, hence does not attest to any specific feature in the syntax of psych verbs.

6 Interim Conclusion

Let us review the major results and conclusions achieved so far. We have collected and classified a variety of psych properties across several languages. The emerging picture is the following:

(157) A Classification of Psych Properties

I) Core Properties

a) All Class II Verbs (Non-A g en tive)

  1. Overt obliqueness of experiencer (Navajo, Irish, Scottish Gaelic).
  2. Accusative→ Dative alternations (Italian, Spanish).
  3. Islandhood of experiencer (Italian, English).
  4. PP-behavior in wh-islands (English, Hebrew).
  5. No synthetic compounds (English).
  6. No Heavy NP Shift (English).
  7. No Genitive of Negation (Russian).
  8. Obligatory clitic-doubling (Greek).
  9. Obligatory resumption in relative clauses (Greek, Hebrew).
 10. No si/se-reflexivization (Italian, French).
 11. No periphrastic causatives (Italian, French).
 12. No verbal passive in type B languages (Italian, French).
b) **Class III and Stative Class II (Unaccusatives)**

1. No verbal passive (English, Dutch, Finnish).
2. No periphrastic causatives (French, Italian dialects).
3. No forward binding (see section 8.4).

II) **Peripheral Properties**

1. The T/SM restriction.
2. No causative nominalizations.

The theoretical claim we made was very simple: Non-nominative experiencers universally bear inherent case, where the latter is assigned by a preposition. The interesting implication is for class II verbs, where the superficial accusative object, the experiencer, is in fact an oblique argument. I argued that this single assumption, interacting with independent principles of syntax and morphology, derives the entire set of properties in (157-I.a). Although the idea that accusative experiencers bear inherent case is not novel in itself, as far as I know its full empirical efficacy has never been explored.\(^{44}\) For example, Belletti & Rizzi (1988), who first proposed this idea, either drew the wrong conclusions from it (e.g., *all* class II verbs are unaccusative) or failed to recognize its explanatory value.

Simple as it is, this idea is incompatible with quite a few analyses that explicitly argue for accusative experiencers being canonical direct objects, i.e., receiving structural case (Herschensohn 1992, 1999, Reinhart 2000, 2001, 2002, Bennis 2004). There is a family of proposals which decompose class II verbs into causative structures in the syntax, where a null causative verb assigns structural case to the experiencer, much like its overt counterpart *make* (Franco 1990, Saltarelli 1992, Park 1992, Mulder 1992). Likewise, in the Relational Grammar literature (Legendre 1989, 1993, Cresti 1990, Legendre & Akimova 1993), class II verbs participate in the antipassive construction, where the experiencer is demoted from an initial 1 (deep subject) to a final 2 (surface direct object), the latter crucially distinct from the Oblique relation. If the ample evidence presented in sections 2-4 indeed establishes the obliqueness of accusative experiencers as a universal fact, then all these analyses must be revised.

A legitimate question to ask at this point is the following: If accusative experiencers are PPs, why don't they manifest *all* properties of PPs, in *all* languages? Why do we find, crosslinguistically, a mixed picture? For example, accusative experiencers in Italian behave like PPs with respect to left-dislocation and extraction, but not with respect to resumption in

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\(^{44}\) Åfarli & Lutnaes (2002) discuss class II verbs in Norwegian, which historically derive from class III verbs in Old Norse. Indeed, many of their properties can be explained on the assumption that the experiencer bears inherent accusative case.
relative clauses, unlike Greek and Hebrew (see Belletti & Rizzi 1988, fn. 29). Likewise, in both French and Italian, they trigger participial agreement – a property of direct objects. And as we saw above, they do passivize, albeit not universally.

The general reply to this question is perhaps not extremely enlightening, but nonetheless observationally true: In many languages, direct objects with inherent case retain some of their DP properties while losing others. Simply put, there is no one-to-one mapping between morphology and syntax, and specific analyses must be sought in each case where discrepancies arise. For example, the lack of resumption of extracted experiencers in Italian relative clauses may be illusory, and a null resumptive pro is actually used in place of the overt pronoun which appears in Greek/Hebrew; Romance participial agreement might be triggered by morphological accusative, disregarding the structural/inherent distinction; and as argued at length above, languages might resort to auxiliary strategies in order to passivize an oblique argument.

I am not trying to suggest here that any of these ideas is necessarily true. Rather, my general point is that superficial similarities that accusative experiencers bear to direct objects, and parallel dissimilarities to oblique arguments, do not invalidate the present account in and of themselves. Short of specific analyses, such observations are hardly informative. By contrast, I believe that the present account does meet the challenge of explaining why accusative experiencers display the properties they do, in so many unrelated languages.

In the remainder of this monograph we will pursue a more radical thesis concerning the nature of non-nominative experiencers. We will see that these arguments do not only bear inherent case, but that this case is quirky, in a sense more universal than previously thought. This thesis will provide insight into several other psych properties that we have so far left aside.

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45 In fact, there is some evidence that even in this domain, experiencers are different from canonical objects. It is well-known that participial agreement in French is frequently not audible, and even when it is, non-formal speech treats it as an optional rule. Still, for some speakers participial agreement is obligatory when possible. Interestingly, for those speakers, a contrast emerges between agentive and non-agentive uses of class II verbs (I am grateful to M.A. Friedemann for bringing this fact to my attention):

i. Les femmes que la tempête a surpris(‘es) sont parties.  
   The women that the tempest has surprised are left  
   'The women that the tempest surprised have left'

ii. Les femmes que les invités ont surpris(‘es) délibérément sont parties.  
   The women that the guests have surprised deliberately are left  
   'The women that the guests surprised deliberately have left'

Agreement is disfavored in the non-agentive case (i), and strongly favored in the agentive one (ii). Under the present analysis, this contrast is anything but surprising: It is only in non-agentive contexts that accusative experiencers display the behavior of oblique arguments (which, of course, never trigger participial agreement). Unfortunately, it is very hard to find other class II participles that both allow this ambiguity and display audible agreement. Yet the direction of the contrast is telling.
Experiencers as Quirky Subjects

7.1 Quirky Experiencers: Direct Evidence

In the previous sections we saw that non-nominative experiencers (in classes II/III) bear inherent case; furthermore, it was argued that this property is universal. In this section we will see that the inherent case of these experiencer arguments is often quirky. Quirky case is inherent case that can be realized in subject position; accordingly, a quirky subject is just an argument that displays most canonical subject properties (except for agreement), but bears inherent case.

The quirkiness of experiencers is a robust crosslinguistic fact, although not as uniform as their inherent case. One can distinguish three types of languages along the quirkiness scale. On one extreme, we have Greek, Icelandic and Faroese. In those languages, dative, accusative or genitive experiencers freely occur preverbally as quirky subjects. Often (and in Greek – always) the construction is reversible, also allowing the nominative theme to surface as the subject:

(158) a. Tu Petru tu aresi to krasi.
the Peter.DAT cl.DAT like the wine.NOM
‘Peter likes the wine’

b. To krasi tu aresi tu Petru.

(159) a. Ton Petro ton endhiaferum ta mathimatika.
the Peter.ACC cl.ACC interest the mathematics.NOM
‘Mathematics interests Peter’

b. Ta mathimatika ton endhiaferum ton Petro.

(Greek: Anagnostopoulou 1999: ex. 7,16)

Anagnostopoulou (1999) argues convincingly that the preverbal experiencer in these examples is a subject rather than a (clitic-)left-dislocated argument. Not only is this word order more natural than the experiencer-final word order, but the experiencer can be a bare quantifier (unlike left dislocated arguments) and is perfect in contexts that strongly disfavor left dislocation (relative clauses). Moreover, like canonical subjects, the preverbal experiencer can control absolutive adjuncts, antecede a subject gap in conjunction reduction, trigger
obviation, and bind an anaphor. Anagnostopoulou shows that those properties characterize both dative and accusative quirky experiencers in Greek.46

Icelandic is perhaps the language where quirky subjects are most pervasive, and quirky experiencers are a common (though not exclusive) example of this:

(160) a. Mig dreymdi ömmu.
   LACC dreamt grandma.ACC
   'I dreamt of grandma'

b. Petta hefur alltaf hentað mér.
   this.NOM has always pleased me.DAT
   'This has always pleased me'

c. Mér hefur alltaf hentað petta.
   me.DAT has always pleased this.NOM
   'I have always been pleased with this'

(Barðdal 1999, ex. 2c, 4)

That the preverbal argument in these constructions is a genuine subject has been argued extensively in the literature (e.g., Zaenen, Maling & Thráinsson 1985, Sigurðsson 1989, 1992, 2000). Except for agreement, Icelandic quirky subjects exhibit all canonical subject properties in diagnostic environments like subject-verb inversion, conjunction reduction, reflexive binding, raising and control.

Interestingly, not all psych verbs in Icelandic allow the "dual" word-order seen in (160b,c); some verbs only allow the quirky experiencer to surface in the subject position (Barðdal 1999, 2001, Platzack 1999). In particular, all double accusative verbs, as in (160a), disallow the variant with a theme subject (Platzack 1999). This follows straightforwardly from our hypothesis that the accusative case on the experiencer is inherent, hence potentially quirky, whereas the case of the theme is structural. Since structural accusative cannot be checked by $T^0$, the theme argument of double accusative psych verbs cannot be realized as a subject.47

46 Dative PP's and genitive morphology often alternate in Greek, so Anagnostopoulou glosses the genitive morphology in (158) as dative.
47 Platzack (1999, fn. 8) notes that many Icelandic speakers tend to replace the accusative case of the experiencer of these verbs with a dative case, confirming its inherent status (as in Italian and Spanish; see sections 2.2.2, 3.1). Platzack also notes that the accusative case on the experiencer is preserved under raising, as is typical with quirky subjects:

i. Mig/*Eg virðist dreyma ömmu.
   me.ACC/*I.NOM seem to-dream grandma.ACC
   'I seem to dream of grandma'

(Platzack 1999, ex. 14)
Faroese is another language where quirky subjects can be either dative or accusative (genitive case being quite rare in the language). Surprisingly, unlike Icelandic, to which it is closely related, but like Greek, quirky subjects in Faroese are almost exclusively experiencers:

\[(161)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{ Meg droymdi dreym.} \\
& \text{me.ACC dreamt dream. ACC} \\
& \text{`I dreamt a dream'} \\
\text{b. } & \text{ Mær dámar mjólkina.} \\
& \text{me.DAT likes the milk.ACC} \\
& \text{`I like the milk'} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Barnes 1986, ex. 2, 3)

Barnes notes that Faroese differs from Icelandic in disallowing nominative objects (although historically, they existed). Thus, the theme argument occurs in the nominative only in those "dual verbs" that allow the theme to surface as the subject. At any rate, the quirky experiencers pass a battery of subject tests, including reflexive binding, stylistic inversion, ellipsis, ECM subjects, conjunction reduction etc.48

In the middle of the quirkiness scale, we find languages like Italian, Spanish and Dutch. In these languages, class III sentences are reversible but class II ones are not.49 That is, only dative experiencers, not accusative ones, can occur as subjects:

\[(162)\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a. } & \text{ A Gianni è sempre piaciuta la musica.} \\
& \text{to Gianni is always pleased the music} \\
& \text{`Music always pleased Gianni'} \\
\text{b. } & \text{ La musica è sempre piaciuta a Gianni.} \\
& \text{ (Italian: B&R 1988: ex. 101)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(163) a. dat de taalkundige die analyse opviel. \\
that the linguist.DAT the analysis.NOM occured-to \\
`that the analysis occured to the linguist'

---

48 The "desiderative experiencers" in Imbabura Quechua, discussed in Hermon (1985), are probably quirky accusatives. They can be realized as controlled PRO and raise across raising/passive ECM predicates, much like standard surface subjects. For theory internal reasons, Hermon suggests that they become subjects only in the LF component, however most of those reasons lose force in current theories; see fn. 64.

49 Mulder (1992: 121) argues that inverted accusative experiencers in Dutch class II verbs are in fact "embedded topics", conditioned by animacy contrasts, and are not quirky subjects (like dative experiencers). Dative experiencers with typical subject properties have also been reported to exist in Kannada (Sridhar 1979).
b. dat die analyse de taalkundige opviel.  

(Dutch: Mulder 1992:151, ex. 5)

Here as well, evidence exists that the preverbal dative argument is a real subject. Belletti & Rizzi (1988) show that it can be a negative quantifier (unlike left dislocated arguments) and appear in contexts that strongly disfavor topicalization (adverbial and relative clauses). Mulder (1992) shows that the Dat-Nom-V word order is unmarked for Dutch class III verbs: The nominative argument licenses vat-voor split (a diagnosis of direct object positions), and the dative argument is in complementary distribution with the expletive er (a subject diagnosis).

Spanish too allows dative subject experiencers:

(164) a. A Marcos le gusta la música coral.  
  to Mark cl.DAT likes music choral  
  'Mark likes choral music'

b. A Adriana le sorprende tu actitud.  
  to Adriana cl.DAT surprises your attitude  
  'Your attitude surprises Adriana'

(Masullo 1992, ex. 1, 6)

Masullo (1992) shows that these preverbal datives differ from standard left-dislocated datives in the same ways their Italian counterparts do. Moreover, they participate in raising and they control absolute adjuncts just like normal nominative subjects do. Masullo assimilates these cases to a productive process of locative inversion in Spanish. I will return below to this proposal and suggest that it offers an important insight. For now, however, it is sufficient to note that Spanish has no quirky accusative experiencers.50

Finally, on the other extreme, we find languages that disallow any kind of quirky experiencer, like English, French and Hebrew.

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50 According to Masullo, quirky accusative subjects are found only in impersonal constructions, where [Spec,IP] is non-thematic:

i. A nadie lo llaman por el apellido aquí.  
  to nobody cl.ACC they call by his/her last name here  
  'They don't call anyone by his/her last name here'  
  (Masullo 1992, ex. 45)

It is not clear to me that these are genuine quirky subjects (despite the bare quantifier which is supposed to rule out left dislocation). Unlike all the other cases Masullo cites, these are not unaccusative. If Spanish did allow accusative subjects (like Icelandic, Faroese and Greek), class II verbs – at least the stative-unaccusative ones – should have exemplified this option, but they do not.
Thus, we seem to have a three-way parametric picture:

(165) Possible Case of Quirky Subjects

a. **All cases**: Icelandic, Faroese, Greek.
b. **Dative only**: Italian, Spanish, Dutch.
c. **No case**: English, French, Hebrew.

Notice that this state of affairs calls for a weakening of Marantz’s (1991) thesis that the licensing of subjects (EPP) and their case realization are completely divorced. Although we keep to Marantz’s claim that nominative case and the EPP are mutually independent, we must maintain a residue of “case sensitivity” in the EPP. It just seems to be a brute fact about certain languages that some morphological cases (e.g., dative) are tolerated in subject position and others (accusative/genitive) are not.51

In principle, languages could instantiate other options than are not represented in (165) (e.g., only accusative quirky subjects), yet in practice, this is doubtful. Overwhelmingly, it seems that the unmarked case for quirky subjects across languages is dative (e.g., Russian, Polish, Georgian, Japanese, Korean); if a language allows non-dative quirky subjects, it also allows dative ones, but the opposite does not hold. Moreover, finer distinctions among the non-dative cases vis-à-vis quirkiness are not attested. These implicational universals – whatever their source is – are not captured by the description in (165).

In order to express the tripartite picture in (165) parsimoniously, we need a descriptive vocabulary below the level of the case labels Nom/Dat/Acc/Gen. Suppose, then, that the morphological case categories in Nominative/Accusative languages decompose into a binary feature system in the following manner:

(166) A Feature Analysis of Morphological Case

a. **Nominative** = [+n,-a]
b. **Dative** = [+n,+a]

51 Because Italian (unlike Greek) disallows accusative subjects, Anagnostopoulou (1999) concludes that experiencers in Italian class II receive structural, rather than inherent case. That would follow only if the typological picture was binary, with (165a,c) the only options. Yet there is independent evidence that in languages like Italian and Spanish, accusative experiencers do bear inherent case (see sections 2.2.2, 3.1) without ever occurring as surface subjects. This implies (at least) a tripartite typology.

Belletti & Rizzi (1988, fn. 33) speculate that the option of dative subjects arises only in null subject languages, where Inf can assign nominative case to the right. This explains the Italian-French contrast, but fails to account for Icelandic (which allows dative but not null subjects) and Hebrew (which allows null but not dative subjects). Moreover, their way of blocking quirky accusatives in Italian (inherent case must be licenced by a governing preposition at S-Structure) is too strong, excluding them in any language. Masullo (1992) suggests that there are two kinds of quirky subjects: The Italian/Spanish type, which depends on nominative assignment to the right, and the Icelandic type, which is lexically governed.
c. Accusative = [-n,+a]
d. Genitive = [-n,-a]

The features [n] and [a] are mnemonically related to Nom and Acc, much like the relation between the features [V]/[N] and the syntactic categories Verb/Noun. I will not offer here any substantial argument from morphology to motivate [n] and [a], although obviously such arguments are relevant to the proposal. The purpose of the system in (166) is simply to facilitate the expression of important crosslinguistic generalizations; to the extent that other (perhaps better motivated) systems can achieve the same goal, they could supplant (166).

We can now state the Quirky Subject Parameter as follows:

\[(167) \text{Quirky Subject Parameter (QSP)}\]

At PF, [Spec,TP] must be marked:

\[\begin{align*}
a. \quad [+n,-a] & \quad \text{(English, French, Hebrew)} \\
b. \quad [+n] & \quad \text{(Italian, Spanish, Dutch)} \\
c. \quad \text{Anything} & \quad \text{(Icelandic, Faroese, Greek)}
\end{align*}\]

The QSP acts as a morphological filter at PF, filtering out subjects that do not bear the morphological feature(s) required of subjects in the language. Notice that it is orthogonal both to the EPP (which is, presumably, universal) and to case checking (which applies in the syntax/LF, not PF). In fact, we do not assume that quirky subjects establish any case relation with T\(^0\). Marked with inherent case, they only bear a case relation to the preposition that governs them.\(^{52}\) The standard assumption in recent work on quirky subjects is that their movement to the subject position is triggered by the EPP. I keep to that assumption, however, in the next section I argue that experiencer quirky subjects have an additional reason to raise to the subject position.

### 7.2 Experiencers and LF Quirkiness

The past 20 years have seen the gradual deconstruction of the notion "subject" (McCloskey 1997, Sigurðsson 2000). Subjecthood is no longer viewed as a package deal; rather, particular subject properties are distributed over separate dimensions (structural positions, case, agreement, EPP, thematic prominence, topicality, etc). Importantly, again and again we see that these properties can be dissociated, within and across languages, such that the question

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\(^{52}\) See Taraldsen (1995), Anagnostopoulou (2003) and Sigurðsson (2004) for the claim that quirky subjects enter a [person]-relation with T\(^0\).
"Is X a 'real' subject?" becomes increasingly vague. Are expletives 'real' subjects? Are they more or less so than nominative associates? Are quirky subjects 'real' subjects, even if they fail to bind anaphors? Is there any single criterion for subjecthood? It is not clear that any of these questions is meaningful.\textsuperscript{53}

Nonetheless, meaningful questions can be posed, and answered, once we restrict attention to specific subject attributes. Consider the case of interest – experiencers. Most studies of psych verbs within the GB tradition, although differing radically in details, shared one implicit assumption: Non-nominative experiencers are not subjects. The reasons for making that assumption are pretty obvious: These arguments bear morphological case (accusative/dative) which is typical of objects; they do not trigger verb agreement; they normally occupy object positions; and in general, they lack any of the perspicuous subject properties associated with nominative arguments.

However, in light of the above considerations, these observations do not warrant the sweeping conclusion that non-nominative experiencers are not subjects. At most, non-nominative experiencers lack certain subject properties. More significantly, we now know that some of these observations were unfortunately biased by language-particular factors. In some languages, all or some non-nominative experiencers \textit{can} surface in subject positions. English happens not to be one of them, but why should English be the norm?

Indeed, the intuition I would like to pursue in this section is that it is languages like Greek, Icelandic and Faroese that represent the general case, whereas English-type languages are special. The meaning of "general" and "special" here is, of course, not statistical. Rather, the "general case" is the one which reflects UG more transparently, regardless of actual crosslinguistic ubiquity. The level where crosslinguistic differences dissolve, where different word orders are collapsed, is LF. In this spirit, I propose the following universal:

\begin{equation}
(168) \text{All experiencers are LF-subjects.}
\end{equation}

The term "subject" in (168) refers specifically to subject position, namely, [Spec,TP]. Thus, we make no global claims about the "subjecthood" of experiencers, but we do make a strong claim about their LF position. For now, I suspend discussion on why (168) should be true until section 9.

Consider the consequences. (168) is trivially true for class I verbs, where the experiencer is the nominative surface subject. As shown in the previous section, (168) is also empirically true for quirky experiencers in quite a few languages. The only domain in which (168) becomes non-trivial, perhaps surprising, is with respect to surface object experiencers, whether potentially quirky (i.e., may occur as subjects, like accusatives/datives in

\textsuperscript{53} See Moore & Perlmutter (2001) for a recent attempt to restore a primitive notion of subjecthood.
Greek/Icelandic/Faroese and datives in Italian/Spanish/Dutch) or not (like accusatives/datives in English/French/Hebrew). All these, according to (168), must end up as subjects by LF.

How can this come about? In a standard psych construction of the form Nom-V-Acc/Dat, [Spec,TP] is occupied by the nominative theme. However, the possibility of multiple specifiers is well-attested: Japanese and Korean exhibit double A-specifiers (Ura 1996) while Slavic languages exhibit multiple Ā-specifiers (Richards 1997). Moreover, Richards shows convincingly that it is very common for a functional head to license only one overt specifier but several covert ones. This is precisely what I take to be the case with object experiencers: The theme argument raises to [Spec,TP] overtly, and the experiencer raises to a second [Spec,TP] at LF. This effect deserves to be called *LF-quirkiness*; it gives rise to the following LF configurations:\(^{54}\)

(169) a. Eventive Psych Verbs: LF

\[\text{TP} \rightarrow (\text{Exp.} \quad \text{Causer}) \quad \text{T} \quad \text{vP} \]

\[\text{v'} \quad \text{t}_1 \quad \text{v} \quad \text{VP} \quad \text{t}_2\]

\[\text{DP}_1 \quad \text{DP}_2 \quad \text{Exp} \quad \text{pp}_2 \quad \text{TP} \]

\[\text{v} \quad \text{v'} \quad \text{t}_1 \quad \text{v} \quad \text{VP} \quad \text{t}_2\]

54 Note that “raising at LF” here is just a traditional way of referring to covert movement, fully consistent with recent derivational models denying the existence of LF as an isolated grammatical component. That is, covert movement is cyclically integrated with overt movement; the difference is only reflected in PF (pronunciation of high or low copies). See Groat & O’neil (1997), Bošković (2001) and Bobaljik (2002) for discussion.

The idea that the experiencer raises at LF to a second subject position has been proposed by Campbell & Martin (1989). They, however, restrict LF-raising of the experiencer to stative predicates (whereas I assume it applies to eventive ones as well) and make it optional (whereas I assume it is obligatory). Campbell & Martin’s evidence largely consisted in backward binding effects, shown above to be non-structural (section 5.3); furthermore, they did not address the question why experiencers raise at LF. Evidence in favor of the present analysis will be discussed below.
Strictly speaking, then, all non-nominative experiencers are quirky: Depending on the language in question and on morphological case, this quirkiness can be expressed either overtly (what is standardly called "quirky subject") or covertly (the "second" subject in (169)).

A few technical comments are in order concerning the LF configurations above. The second LF-specifier, just like the first one, is an A-position, the "adjunct" appearance being an artifact of the limitations of tree notation. This is related to the fact that the feature which triggers this movement – to be discussed in the next section – is not an operator feature. Second, both specifiers mutually c-command (or m-command) each other. In fact, they are structurally non-distinct, a point which will be of empirical significance later on. Third, although I placed the LF-specifier outside the overt one, I am not committed to this choice, and the reverse order ("tucking-in") is equally compatible with everything I say.

Consider how the pieces of the system – (167), (168) and (169) – work together. In a language of type (167c), any non-nominative experiencer can satisfy (168) by overt raising to [Spec,TP]. The same goes for dative experiencers in languages of type (167b). Alternatively, the nominative theme can raise overtly to [Spec,TP], postponing to LF the raising of the object experiencer. This is how we account for the alternating surface patterns – Dat/Acc-V-Nom or Nom-V-Dat/Acc - in such languages (cf. (158)-(163)). In languages of type (167a), (168) cannot be satisfied in overt syntax, since the occurrence of non-nominative case in [Spec,TP] would violate the setting of the QSP in these languages. Crucially, though, since the QSP is a PF parameter, it does not govern LF operations. Thus, in these languages (168) is satisfied by LF movement of the experiencer to a second [Spec,TP], as depicted in (169).

What is the trigger for experiencer LF-raising? Recall that non-nominative experiencers are prepositional objects in our analysis, governed by $\theta_\psi$ (class II) or the dative preposition...
(class III). Clearly, something about the special semantic interpretation of experiencers arises from these prepositions. This interpretation, we suggested, involves a locative relation between the stimulus/causer and the experiencer. For simplicity, let us assume that all locative relations, including "mental" ones, are encoded by the feature [loc]. Thus, prepositions like at, into and Ø bear [loc], whereas for and despite do not.

Adapting traditional ideas, I will assume that T serves as the spatio-temporal anchor of the clause. This implies that all temporal and locative descriptions in the clause must form a semantic and a syntactic relation with T; furthermore, if the semantic relation is predication or functional application, then the syntactic relation must be sisterhood (Heim & Kratzer 1998). Notice that temporal and locative modifiers are usually assumed to attach to some projection of T. Arguments, however, are generated inside VP. It follows that locative arguments, including experiencers, must raise to TP. Being semantically motivated, this movement does not require an additional feature on T, attracting or checking the [loc] feature; however, we may leave this open for the moment. Note that other types of covert movement have been taken to be semantically motivated – most notably, Quantifier Raising.

Finally, we understand the EPP as a PF parameter, regulating whether and to what extent a specifier of a functional head may or must be filled. In English-type languages, [Spec,TP] must be filled by one and only one constituent. Given (167a), it must be the theme. Consequently, the experiencer PP may only raise covertly to form the requisite semantic relation with T. We thus obtain the derivations in (169). In section 9.1 I return to experiencer raising and attempt to relate it to other EPP-phenomena.

The idea that object experiencers are subjects at some level of representation, although uncommon in the GB/Minimalist literature, is not unheard of. In fact, the earliest generative analyses assumed that object experiencers are generated as deep subjects, and are subsequently "flipped" with the deep object, the theme (Lakoff 1970, Postal 1971). Within Relational Grammar, object experiencers are also deep subjects (initial 1s), later demoted to object positions by inversion or antipassive (Perlmutter 1984, Harris 1984, Legendre 1989, 1993, Cresti 1990, Legendre & Akimova 1993).

Within GB, there is a line of research maintaining that experiencers raise at LF to the subject position (Hermon 1985, Stowell 1986, Campbell & Martin 1989, Park 1992). These proposals, although tracing a similar intuition to the one behind the present analysis, are motivated by very different considerations. In fact, the predominant motivation of Lakoff (1970), Postal (1971), Stowell (1986), Campbell & Martin 1989 and Park (1992) is the same – the phenomenon of backward binding. Common to all of them is the idea that at some hidden level – D-structure or LF – the experiencer occupies a subject position, from which it binds the anaphor inside the theme. Yet as we have seen in section 5.3, there are strong reasons to believe that backward binding is not specific to psych constructions, nor should it be understood in purely structural terms. As to the RG literature, the main – in fact, the sole –
motivation presented for analysing object experiencers as subjects is taken from adjunct control. This is indeed an important empirical challenge, which we tackle in the next section. However, as we show below, the notion of LF quirkiness is superior to the RG notion of subjecthood in explaining a whole set of additional psych effects.

Most importantly, the present proposal is different from all its precursors in the explicit link it establishes between the inherent case on object experiencers and their LF position. Namely, it is not an accident that precisely the same experiencer arguments that manifest all the oblique properties discussed in the first half of this monograph, also manifest the LF-subjecthood properties, to which we turn below. Both sets of properties stem from the nature of the preposition that assigns quirky case to the experiencer DP. In this respect, the present analysis offers a novel insight into these traditional puzzles.

8 Arguments for LF Quirkiness

8.1 Adjunct Control

8.1.1 The Data

There is a rich body of research within Relational Grammar (RG) dedicated to the so-called Inversion Construction (Perlmutter 1984, Harris 1984, Legendre 1989, 1993, Cresti 1990, Legendre & Akimova 1993). This research has produced some fairly solid crosslinguistic results, specifically as regards dative experiencers. In this section I summarize the results and demonstrate how they follow naturally from my proposal.

The predicates under consideration all belong to classes II and III, taking a nominative theme and a dative/accusative experiencer. The constructions under consideration all involve control into various types of non-finite adjunct clauses. The generalizations, which obtain universally, it seems, can be stated as follows (abstracting away from RG terminology):

(170) Given a structure […]X[…] [S PRO…], where X is a matrix argument and S is a non-finite adjunct:

a. X may control PRO if X is a surface subject (i.e., deep or derived).
b. X may control PRO if X is a dative/accusative Experiencer.
c. X may not control PRO if X is anything else (e.g., accusative Patient, dative Goal).

This state of affairs – to be illustrated below – is rather curious. (170a) immediately rules out a semantic/thematic characterization of the possible controller X; there is no unique semantic role (or even a restricted set of such roles) that only surface subjects bear. The contrast
between (170b-c) further rules out a unified statement in terms of surface grammatical functions: Not all datives or accusatives can control, only experiencers. Notice further that the latter need not occupy a (quirky) subject position to act as controllers; (170b) holds even in languages where accusative/dative experiencers never surface as subjects (e.g., French). Thus we face a disjunctive generalization, where the controller is grammatically specified in the first disjunct (surface subject) and thematically specified in the second one (experiencer). The RG grammarians correctly identified this as a theoretical challenge.

Before we turn to the RG account, let us illustrate the data. Perlmutter discusses Italian data involving control into four types of adjuncts: *da*+infinitive, gerunds, participial absolute and temporal infinitives. I will only cite the facts concerning the first construction, as the four paradigms are entirely parallel. Consider the following examples:

(171) a. La mamma mi ha sgridato con tanta furia [da pentirsi/*mi subito].
   'Mother scolded me so furiously that she/*I immediately felt remorseful'

b. Sono stato sgridato dalla mama con tanta furia [da pentirmi/*si subito].
   'I was scolded by mother so furiously that I/*she immediately felt remorseful'

c. Gli sono mancate vitamine tanto [da ammalarsi].
   'He lacked vitamins to such an extent that he got sick'

d. * Gliel'ho detto tante volte [da arrabbiarsi].
   'I said it to him so many times that he got angry'

e. * A Giorgio è stata detta la stessa cosa tante volte [da diventare matto].
   'The same thing was said to Giorgio so many times that he went crazy'

(171a) shows that a standard transitive verb allows its subject, but not its object, to control the adjunct. Notice that the reflexive clitic in the adjunct, bearing person agreement, indicates unambiguously the control options. (171b) shows that the same argument that cannot control as an object, can do so as a derived subject, upon passivization. By contrast, the demoted deep subject, now in a by-phrase, can no longer control. (171c) involves a class III predicate with a dative experiencer, the clitic *gli*, which indeed can control. By contrast, a dative goal, as in (171d), is not a possible controller, even when fronted to initial position (171e). This paradigm thus illustrates all the statements in (170).

Since dative experiencers may co-occur with nominative subjects, (170a-b) permit either argument to be the controller. Perlmutter shows that this prediction is correct; the
sentence in (172) (involving a temporal infinitive) is ambiguous as to the choice of controller (the notation with PRO is mine):

(172) Prima di partire per l'estero, Giorgio mi sembrava un po' nervoso.
    'Before PRO\textsubscript{1/2} leaving for abroad, Giorgio\textsubscript{1} seemed a bit nervous to me\textsubscript{2}.

Japanese has a gerund-like construction, headed by –nagara 'while, although', which exhibits the same pattern:

(173) a. Hooritu no senmon-ka de arinagara, Katoo-san wa Yamamoto-san o damasita.
    law.GEN expert being-while Mr. Katoo.TOP Mr. Yamamoto.ACC deceived
    'Though (he\textsubscript{1/2} was) an expert on law, Mr. Katoo\textsubscript{1} deceived Mr. Yamamoto\textsubscript{2}'

b. Hooritu no senmon-ka de arinagara, Yamamoto-san wa Katoo-san ni damasareta.
    law.GEN expert being-while Mr. Yamamoto.TOP Mr. Katoo by was-deceived
    'Though (he\textsubscript{1/2} was) an expert on law, Mr. Yamamoto\textsubscript{2} was deceived by Mr. Katoo\textsubscript{1}'

c. Sutoraiki o yatte inagara, roodoosya ni wa keisya no hoo ga tadasiku omoeta.
    strike.ACC doing be-while workers.DAT.TOP employer.GEN side.NOM correct seemed
    'Although they\textsubscript{1} were on strike, the employers position seemed correct to the workers\textsubscript{1}'

d. * Sono koto o kangaenagara, Tanaka-san ni denwa ga kakatta.
    those things.ACC think-while Mr. Tanaka.DAT phone.NOM connected
    'While thinking about those things, Mr. Tanaka got a phone call'

(Perlmutter 1984, ex. 141, 142, 144, 140)

(173a-b) show that the –nagara construction can be controlled by a surface subject, but not by a direct object or a demoted subject. (173c-d) show that a dative experiencer is a possible controller, but a dative goal is not.

Gerunds in French fall under the same generalizations (the notation with PRO is mine):

(174) a. [PRO\textsubscript{1/2} ayant critiqué la politique étrangère du gouvernement],
    les membres de l'opposition\textsubscript{1} ont attaque leur chef\textsubscript{2}.
    'Having criticised the government's foreign policy, the members of the opposition attacked their leader.'
b. [PRO₁/₂ ayant cambriolé plusieurs banques dans la région], l’homme balafré₁ a été reconnu par un individu₂ bien connu des services de la police.

'Having robbed several banks in the area, the scarred man was recognized by a fellow well known to the police'

c. [PRO₁ ayant trimé toute sa vie], l’oisiveté lui₁ répugne.

'Having slaved away all his life, he is disgusted by idleness'

d. [PRO₁/₂ quitté la Californie], nos amis₁ nous₂ manquent.

'Having left California, we miss our friends'

e. [PRO₁/₂ s’etant remis*(e) à sortir], Marie₁ a envoyé une invitation à Pierre₂.

'Having started to go out again, Mary sent an invitation to Peter'

(Legendre 1989, ex. 44, 48, 50b, 51, 46)

In (174a), the matrix subject but not the object can control the gerund, while in (174b) a derived but not a demoted subject can control. (174c) shows that a dative experiencer in class III can control the gerund; when both the theme and the experiencer are animate, ambiguous control results (174d). (174e) shows that a dative goal is not a possible controller, as reflected by the participial agreement in the adjunct.55,56

Turning to class II predicates, a similar pattern emerges. Accusative experiencers – unlike standard direct objects – can control non-finite adjuncts. We illustrate this in three different languages. Consider French first:

(175) Les soirées mondaines agacent Pierre₁ [avant PRO₁ même d’y avoir mis les pieds].

'Society affairs irritate Peter even before attending them'

(Legendre 1993, ex. 3c)

(175) should be contrasted with (174a), where object control is excluded. Next, consider control of gerundive adjuncts in Russian:

55 Legendre (1989) argues that some adjuncts in French – infinitives headed by avant/après/sans/en 'before/after/without/while' – can be controlled by a demoted subject. For these, the statement in (170a) would be less restrictive, with "subject" substituting for "surface subject". Other than that, the control facts are the same, classifying dative experiencer with subjects.

56 Control of secondary predicates also distinguishes dative experiencers from dative goals, as the following Spanish examples illustrate:

i. Le ocurrió un accidente borracha.

'to-her happened an accident drunk'

ii. * Le entregaron el premio a Juan borracho.

'to-him they-gave the prize to Juan drunk'  (Fernández-Soriano 1999, ex. 38c,d)
(176) a. [PRO$_{1/2}$ soobščiv ob étom sobytii načal'stvu], Miša$_{1}$ byl arestovan reporting about this event bosses.DAT, Miša$_{1}$.NOM was arrested sotrudnikami KGB$_{2}$. operatives.INST KGB

'Having reported this event to the authorities, Misha was arrested by KGB operatives'

b. [PRO$_{1}$ vojdja v komnatu], Kolju$_{1}$ porazil besporjadok. entering in room, Kolya.ACC impresed mess.NOM

'Having entered the room, the mess impressed Kolya'

c. * [PRO$_{1}$ tancuja s Olej], ego$_{1}$ pozvali k telefonu. dancing with Olya, him.ACC asked to phone

'(While) dancing with Olya, (somebody) asked him to the phone'

(176a) shows that a surface (derived) subject can control the gerund, whereas a demoted subject cannot. (176b) shows that an accusative experiencer is also a possible controller. By contrast, (176c) shows that a standard accusative object is not a possible controller – even when it is the single overt matrix argument in an impersonal construction.

Finally, consider absolute participials in Greek:

(177) a. [Akugontas PRO$_{1/2}$ tin istoria] o Petros$_{1}$ arhise na antipathi tin Maria$_{2}$. [hearing PRO the story] the Peter.NOM started to dislike the Mary.ACC

'Hearing the story, Peter started disliking Mary'

b. [Akugontas PRO$_{1/2}$ tin istoria] tin Maria$_{2}$ o Petros$_{1}$ arhise na tin antipathi.

c. [Akugontas PRO$_{1}$ tin istoria] o Petros arhise na tin goitevi tin Maria$_{1}$. [hearing PRO the story] the Peter.NOM started SUBJ.cl.ACC attract the Mary.ACC

'Hearing the story, Mary started being attracted by Peter'

(Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 19a,b, p.c.)

(177a) shows that in a normal transitive construction (here, a class I verb), the matrix subject but not the matrix object may control the adjunct. This asymmetry is preserved even when the
object is left-dislocated (177b). By contrast, an accusative experiencer is a possible controller (177c). The control behavior of dative experiencers in Greek is parallel.

The control paradigms in the RG literature give rise to some worries. It turns out, for example, that nearly all experiencer controllers are clitics, whereas nearly all non-experiencer arguments that fail to control are full DPs. This confound raises the suspicion that what is diagnosed is clitic-control, not experiencer-control. Furthermore, virtually no minimal pairs are given, where the same adjunct is placed in both a psych and a non-psych environment.

To remove such suspicions, I have constructed a minimal paradigm in French (M.A. Friedemann, p.c.), which shows that the RG results are solid, despite these methodological flaws. The participle in the adjuncts below is one which displays audible agreement contrasts (masculine vs. feminine), depending on the features of PRO, which in turn depend on the features of the controller. The matrix clause always contains one masculine DP and one feminine DP. Thus, agreement on the participle forces an unambiguous choice of controller, rendering subtle interpretive distinctions unnecessary.

57 The example (177c) is adopted from Anagnostopoulou (1999, ex. 19c), with the important difference that the accusative experiencer does not appear in the (quirky) subject position. E. Anagnostopoulou informs me that as long as the psych verb is used non-agentively, the experiencer can control the adjunct from the object position as well. This is precisely what we expect, given that the special psych properties always emerge in non-agentive contexts.

58 The control properties of accusative experiencers in Italian are murky. Perlmutter (1984) argues that unlike dative experiencers, accusative ones cannot control, based on the following example:

i. * La difficoltà finanziarie preoccupavano tanto Mario da ammalarsi.
   ‘Financial difficulties preoccupied Mario so much that he got sick’ (Perlmutter 1984, ex. 59b)

However, Cresti (1990) claims that the problem with (i) is not the case of the experiencer but its position. Namely, in order to control, it must be either a clitic or preverbal. Since the latter option is impossible in Italian (no accusative subjects), only the former exists:

ii. Questa cosa lo preoccupa talmente da esserne ossessionato.
    This worries him too-much that (he) be obsessed about-it (Cresti 1990, ex. 4.25)

Contrary to Perlmutter's and Cresti's data, there are examples where postverbal accusative experiencers control (a da-infinitive in (iii) and a temporal adjunct in (iv); G. Cinque, p.c.):

iii. Questa cosa preoccupa’ Gianni a tal punto da rimanerne segnato per il resto della sua vita.
    ‘This thing worried Gianni to such an extent that he remained marked for the rest of his life’

iv. La sua malattia preoccupava Gianni (anche) prima di essere operato.
    ‘His illness used to worry Gianni (also) before being operated’

Cresti also argues that dative experiencers must be preverbal in order to control da-infinitives. G. Cinque (p.c.) notes that temporal adjuncts are different, allowing control by a postverbal dative experiencer:

v. Il sole manco/comincio a piacere a Gianni solo dopo essere stato in California.
    ‘Gianni missed/began to like the sun only after being in California’

Overall, then, it seems that postverbal experiencers – both dative and accusative – can control in Italian, although some subtle distinctions between different adjuncts require further investigation.
The pattern is clear: With a class III verb, either the nominative subject (178a) or the dative experiencer (178b) may control (depending on the participial agreement in the adjunct). However, when the dative is a goal argument, only the nominative subject may control (179a-b). Similarly, accusative experiencers may control (180a), but accusatives non-experiencers may not (180b).59

8.1.2 Analysis

The RG analysis of the control facts consists of three components. First, it is claimed that experiencers are universally initial 1s (=deep subjects). Class III predicates are analysed as an Inversion construction, where the initial 1 is demoted to a final 3 (=surface indirect object).
Class II predicates are analysed as an *Antipassive* construction, where the initial 1 is demoted to a final 2 (=surface direct object). In both classes, the theme argument is advanced to a final 1 (from an initial 2/oblique).

(181) a. Inversion (Class III)  b. Antipassive (Class II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exp.</th>
<th>Th.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Stratum:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Stratum:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Stratum:</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second component in the analysis is the notion of a *Working 1* (Perlmutter 1984, ex. 6):

(182) *Working 1* (Definition)

A nominal is a working 1 of a clause b iff:

a. It heads a 1-arc with tail b, and
b. It heads a final term arc with tail b.

In other words, a working 1 is any nominal that at one point in the derivation is a subject, and is a term (=1, 2 or 3) in the final stratum. (182b) excludes a demoted subject – 1-chômeur – from the class of working 1s.

The third component is a control condition:

(183) *Condition on Non-finite Adjunct Control*

Only a matrix working 1 can control the adjunct.

The RG analysis meets the challenge raised by the apparent disjunctive character of adjunct control, as stated in (170). The common feature of all controllers is subjecthood at one point in the derivation; since experiencers (but not goals or patients) are deep subjects, they pattern with surface subjects with respect to adjunct control. The unified account is made possible by the concept of a working 1.

As far as I know, the challenge of explaining the privileged status of experiencers as controllers was never met within GB or Minimalism – with the single exception of Hermon (1985) (see below). In fact, the generalizations in (170) were not even addressed. There is an obvious reason to this unfortunate lacuna: Structural demotion (i.e., lowering) is a theoretical impossibility in most varieties of GB/Minimalism. Thus, neither inversion nor antipassive

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60 (183) generalizes over a set of conditions, each associated with a specific type of adjunct. Some types permit a final 1-chômeur as a controller (see fn. 55).
have counterparts that can be utilized to unify experiencer objects with canonical subjects. Yet, clearly, the unifying feature must be structural, given that no semantic characterization of the controller can do the work. But if experiencer objects are never subjects, then the GB/Minimalist grammarian is at a loss how to explain the facts.

The present proposal offers an elegant solution to this dilemma, while keeping to the principle that structural demotion is not available in UG. It is precisely the claim that object experiencers are LF (quirky) subjects that distinguishes our account from most previous accounts. Suppose, as is plausible, that the adjuncts under discussion all attach at the TP level – sisters to T' or TP. Suppose further that Williams (1992) is correct in analysing adjunct control as a case of (secondary) predication, and let us adopt the standard assumption that predication requires mutual c-command. Then the class of possible controllers of a TP-adjunct will be all and only the DPs that mutually c-command it at the relevant level. In line with the "no-intermediate-levels" minimalist maxim, we may take the relevant level to be the interpretive interface LF. The single A-position that mutually c-commands a TP-adjunct is [Spec,TP], the subject position. Therefore, all and only LF-occupants of [Spec,TP] will be possible controllers. This correctly includes surface subjects of all kinds and LF-subjects (=experiencers), and excludes any other element. Hence, we derive (170).

Thus, our account shares with the RG account some important features. Both agree that the theoretical characterization of adjunct controllers should be structural. Furthermore, both agree on the content of this characterization – the controller must be a subject. Yet the two

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61 Legendre (1989, fn. 23) mentions a suggestion by L. Rizzi how to deal with the control facts within GB. According to this suggestion, i) Experiencers are thematically higher than goals, hence structurally higher; ii) The controller must c-command the adjunct at D-structure or S-structure. However, (ii) assumes that the adjuncts under discussion are VP-internal (otherwise, the dative/accusative experiencer would not c-command them). This is implausible for clause-final adjuncts, and clearly impossible for initial adjuncts (nor are the latter moved from inside the VP, as the lack of reconstruction effects suggests).

62 The RG literature does not make this point, but it is worth pointing out that another alternative to a structural solution is untenable – namely, logophoric control. It is well-known that in long-distance control (Super-Equi), the controller must be a logophoric center, much like the antecedent of a picture-anaphora (Grinder 1970, Kuno 1975, Lebeaux 1985, Williams 1992, Manzini & Roussou 2000, Landau 2000). Consider the minimal pair:

i. John said to Mary, that it was possible that [PRO1 praising herself] had been a mistake.
ii. * John said about Mary, that it was possible that [PRO1 praising herself] had been a mistake.

Addressees of communicative acts – thematic goals – qualify as logophoric centers, whereas subject matters of mental attitudes do not, hence the control contrast. Observe that the cases of adjunct control discussed in the text respect a stricter condition, excluding goal controllers (e.g., (171e), (173d), (174e)). Furthermore, adjunct controllers can be inanimate (unlike logophoric controllers):

iii. Étalée en une couche très mince, la peinture sécha en une heure.
   'Spread in a very thin coating, the paint dried in an hour'

iv. Cette chambre conviendra à mes parents tout en n'étant pas tout à fait à leur goût.
   'This room will be OK for my parents while not being quite to their taste'

(Legendre 1989, ex. 34b, 68d)

Thus, adjunct control cannot be reduced to logophoric control (see Williams 1992 for an explicit distinction).
accounts differ on the relevant level of subjecthood: While RG holds that the final stratum is not privileged, and subjecthood can be satisfied at any level, the present account requires that the controller be a subject at the "final" level, namely LF. This contrast may be seen as a theory-internal artifact of the fact that unlike GB/Minimalism, RG is not committed to a single interpretive interface. Thus, control relations in RG can be established at any level. The observation is true, but it does not follow that there can be no empirical way of deciding between the two accounts.

The empirical extension of the RG notion "working 1" is broader than that of "LF subject". Notice that all LF subjects are working 1s, but the reverse is not true. There could be an argument that qualifies as a 1 (and a final term) for RG, but still not an LF subject for the present analysis. Indeed, nominative objects come closest to being such entities. The status of these arguments is not entirely clear in the RG literature. Perlmutter (1983) treats postverbal nominative arguments as final chômeurs, hence non-terms, yet Perlmutter (1984) is silent on their status. Cresti (1990) tentatively adopts the chômeur analysis, noting that it may turn out to be spurious. In any event, in order to exclude nominative objects from the class of potential adjunct controllers, RG must stipulate that they are not final 1s (despite their nominative case).

The same result follows more smoothly within recent minimalist accounts of case and agreement (Chomsky 2000, 2001a). In this framework, nominative objects do not raise covertly to [Spec,TP]. Rather, an Agree relation is established between T0 and the nominative argument, checking phi-features without actual movement. The scope of that argument is therefore confined to VP, and adjunct control is precluded.

Data from two languages confirm this prediction. In the Italian examples below, the quirky experiencer may control from either subject or object position. The nominative theme, however, can control only from the subject position. Although object control is somewhat marginal for the experiencer, it is entirely excluded for the theme.

(184) a. A Maria cominció a piacere la psicoterapia
to Mary began to please the psychotherapy
dopo aver parlato di se stessa così candidamente.
after having talked about herself so candidly
‘Psychotherapy began to please Mary after having talked about herself so candidly’

b. ? La psicoterapia cominció a piacere a Maria
the psychotherapy began to please to Mary
dopo aver parlato di se stessa così candidamente.
after having talked about herself so candidly
Similarly, a quirky dative subject can control in Kannada, whereas a nominative object cannot:

(186) a.  |PRO1 bisilinalli tirugi| sureshanige1 bayarike ayitu.  
          |PRO sun-in having-wandered| Suresha.DAT thirst happened  
          'Having wandered in the sun, Suresha became thirsty'

b.  * |PRO1 nannannu cennagi matadisi| nanage avalu1 ishta adalu.  
      |PRO me.ACC nicely talked-to| me.DAT she.NOM liking became  
      'Having talked to me nicely, I liked her'

(Sridhar 1979, ex. 26a, 28b)

Thus, nominative arguments can control only when occupying a surface subject position, but quirky experiencers can control from either subject or object position. This contrast is inexplicable if subjecthood at any level is sufficient for control. Within minimalism, the same condition that permits experiencers to control adjuncts prohibits nominative objects from doing so – namely, LF-subjecthood.63 Within RG, experiencer control is explained by the assumption that experiencers are Working 1s, whereas lack of control by nominative objects is explained by the independent assumption that they are final chômeurs. The former account

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63 It might be objected that nominative associates in expletive constructions can control adjuncts (Cardinaletti 1995). However, this option is severely limited, as the following examples suggest:

i. There entered the room three unidentified men1 [without PRO1 introducing themselves].
ii. ?? There entered the room three unidentified men1 [while PRO1 chatting with each other].
iii. * [PRO1 covered with mud], there entered the room three unidentified men1.

It appears that without-adjuncts are attached lower than other adjuncts, so control into them does not diagnoze subjecthood.
thus seems more economical. Ultimately, the explanatory value of each theory is proportional to the number of distinct phenomena that it reduces to the same principle or mechanism. The notion of LF-quirkiness, I submit, is to be preferred over the notion of a Working 1 as a theoretical construct, precisely because it accounts for a variety of psych effects in addition to adjunct control. In the next sections we turn to these effects.

The analysis of adjunct control in this section shares much of the spirit of Hermon (1985), although some important differences remain. Hermon argues that experiencers in different languages (and constructions) exhibit different clusters of subject-properties, depending on the point in the derivation where the object experiencer raises to subject position; the earlier raising occurs, the more grammatical processes will treat the experiencer as a subject. As to control, Hermon suggests that it is determined at LF. Hence, the ability of object experiencers to control adjuncts – in Imbabura Quechua, Kannada and Italian – is attributed to their being LF-subjects.

Several aspects of Hermon's analysis, however, are problematic. First, the option of multiple specifiers was not recognized in GB. Hence, Hermon was forced to assume that LF raising of the experiencer is possible only into an empty subject position. This implied an unaccusative analysis, much as in Belletti & Rizzi (1988), which cannot be maintained in the general case. Hermon further predicted, that if the subject position is occupied by the nominative theme, the experiencer will have no available landing site at LF, and is expected to exhibit no subject properties. However, this is clearly false (as she mentions w.r.t. Italian): The data in section 8.1.1 demonstrate that surface object experiencers, occurring with surface nominative themes, systematically can control. Ambiguities as in (172) cannot be handled within a system that does not allow for multiple subjects.64

8.2 Super-Equi

The analysis of adjunct control bears directly on another domain where experiencers display a unique control behavior – Super-Equi constructions. In Landau (2001) I analyse in detail the structural properties of these constructions and account for the special way in which they interact with experiencers. Most of this account can be left intact under the present analysis, however a few assumptions must be modified. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the positive results of Landau (2001) persist even after those assumptions are modified. Let us start with a brief description of the relevant phenomena and generalizations.

64 Most of the internal problems in Hermon's (1985) analysis, I believe, are due to the failure to recognize the option of quirky (non-nominative) surface subjects. If desiderative experiencers in Imbabura Quechua and dative experiencers in Kannada are indeed surface subjects, and not objects that raise covertly as Hermon suggests, then their ability to undergo raising (across seem and passive ECM verbs) and to function as controlled PRO need not contradict their morphological case. The interesting case, where only LF-subjecthood is attested, is the one of lexical (accusative) experiencers in Imbabura Quechua (e.g., with the verb hurt); this case falls together with the data discussed in section 8.1.1.
The Super-Equi construction (first discussed and analysed by Grinder 1970) involves control into subject clauses, intraposed (i.e., preposed) or extraposed. Super-Equi is not as constrained as complement control, in that the controller need not be local, unique, or even grammatically expressed:

(187)a. Eric insisted that it would be ridiculous [to call for help].
   b. That [covering themselves with mud] disturbed Spiro amused Dick.
       (Grinder 1970, ex. 2c, 51b)

However, control in Super-Equi is not entirely free. In Landau (2001) I show that the correct generalizations are sensitive both to the position of the nonfinite clause (intraposition or extraposition) and to the thematic nature of the matrix predicate (psych or non-psych). The relevant contrasts are illustrated below (see Landau 2001 for extensive discussion, as well as evidence from other languages):

(188)a. Mary thought that it pleased John [PRO to speak his / *her mind].
   b. Mary thought that it helped John [PRO to speak his / her mind].
   c. Mary thought that [PRO to speak his / her mind] would please John.
   d. Mary thought that [PRO to speak his / her mind] would help John.

In each sentence of (188), there are two potential controllers for PRO – John or Mary – the first of which is contained in the clause immediately dominating the infinitive, the second of which is higher up. Notice that in the structure standardly called “extraposition”, Mary cannot control PRO in (188a), where the predicate governing the infinitive is the psych verb please, but can do so in (188b), where the governing predicate is the non-psych help (though local control is preferred, for processing reasons). However, this contrast is neutralized when the infinitive is in subject position, as in (188c,d). This state of affairs is summarized below:

(189)a. In a structure [... X ... [ it Aux Pred Y [S PRO to VP]], where Y and S are arguments of Pred:
   i) If Pred is psychological, Y must control PRO.
   ii) If Pred is non-psychological, either X or Y may control PRO.

b. In a structure [... X ... [ S [S PRO to VP] Pred... Y]], either X or Y may control PRO.

Effectively, (189a-i) describes the circumstances of Obligatory Control (OC), whereas (189a-ii) describes the circumstances of Non-Obligatory Control (NOC), where long-distance
(or even arbitrary) control is permitted. The ingredients of the theory of Landau (2001), which derives these generalizations, are the following:

(190a) **The OC Generalization**
In a configuration $[\ldots \text{DP}_1 \ldots \text{Pred} \ldots [S \text{PRO}_1 \ldots ] \ldots ]$, where DP controls PRO: If, at LF, S occupies a complement/specifier position in the VP-shell of Pred, then DP (or its trace) also occupies a complement/specifier position in that VP-shell.

b. **Extraposition**
VP-internal clauses must be peripheral at PF (here - right-peripheral).

c. **Chain Interpretation**
Any link in a chain may be the LF-visible link.

d. **Argument Projection**
i. Experiencer is generated above Causer.
   ii. Causer is generated above Goal/Patient/Theme.

(190a) is a distributional law, assigning OC to clauses internal to the VP-shell and NOC to all others; ultimately, it derives from the fact that OC is an island-sensitive phenomenon (an instance of *Agree*, in Landau 2001). (190b) expresses the common intuition that extraposition is driven by a PF condition, which does not tolerate a clause intervening between a predicate and its internal arguments. (190c) is the null hypothesis under the view that traces of movement are full copies of the element moved (Chomsky 1995, Fox 1999). Finally, (190d) states Landau’s (2001) assumptions about argument projection – precisely what needs to be modified in light of the present discussion.

Consider how the system in (190) derives (189). When occurring under a psych verb, the infinitive is a causer, generated below the experiencer according to (190d-i). Being already at the right periphery of the VP, extraposition is unmotivated, hence excluded by economy. The infinitive is interpreted inside the VP, falling under OC by (190a), explaining the lack of long-distance control in (188a). Under a non-psych verb, the infinitive is higher than its co-argument DP, by (190d-ii). Extraposition is warranted by the need to comply with (190b), giving rise to a chain, each of whose links is interpretable, by (190c). If the VP-internal base position is interpreted, we get OC; if the extraposed, VP-external position is interpreted, we get NOC, sanctioned by (190a). Hence the possibility of long-distance control in (188b). Intraposed infinitives, as in (188c,d), are interpreted in the EPP/subject position, which is obviously outside VP. Hence, regardless of the nature of the matrix verb, NOC is allowed. Landau (2001) shows that PRO in NOC infinitives is a logophor of sorts, rather than
a pronoun, (parallel to picture-anaphora), whose reference is partially determined by discourse factors. This fact will be of some relevance below.

The crucial evidence for the extraposition analysis comes from systematic correlations between control and extraction. Since displaced (adjoined) clauses are known to block extraction, we predict a correlation of this property with NOC. Conversely, OC infinitives (which are interpreted in-situ) are expected to be transparent. The following paradigm confirms this prediction (see Landau 2001 for additional tests, using WCO and Condition C):

(191)a. It would kill the workers\textsubscript{1} [PRO\textsubscript{1} to build this dam].  
b. What\textsubscript{2} would it kill the workers\textsubscript{1} [PRO\textsubscript{1} to build t\textsubscript{2} ?]  
c. It would kill the forest [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to build this dam].  
d. * What\textsubscript{2} would it kill the forest [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to build t\textsubscript{2} ?]

Consider now the implications of the present analysis. The system in (190) can be carried over in toto – except for (190d-i). Recall that we have motivated two different structures for ObjExp verbs: In stative verbs, the experiencer is indeed the higher argument in the VP-shell, yet eventive ones merge the causer as an external argument, above the experiencer. The account of Landau (2001) thus covers only the stative verbs. Eventive psych verbs are essentially equivalent to non-psych verbs, falling under (190d-ii), insofar as their infinitival argument is not peripheral, and hence it must extrapose. Yet the brute fact is that NOC is impossible under a psych verb – any psych verb, eventives included:

(192)a. It helped John\textsubscript{1} [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to praise him\textsubscript{1}].  
b. * It amused John\textsubscript{1} [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to praise him\textsubscript{1}].

Since OC is forced in (192b), Condition B is violated, unlike the non-psych case (192a), where PRO can be arbitrary. Suppose we choose to interpret the extraposed copy of the infinitive in both cases; then we have the following representations:

(193)a. It [\textsubscript{VP} [\textsubscript{VP} [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to praise him\textsubscript{1}] [\textsubscript{VP} t\textsubscript{V} John\textsubscript{1}]] [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to praise him\textsubscript{1}]]  
b. * It [\textsubscript{VP} [\textsubscript{VP} [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to praise him\textsubscript{1}] [\textsubscript{VP} t\textsubscript{V} John\textsubscript{1}]] [PRO\textsubscript{arb} to praise him\textsubscript{1}]]

Our problem now is to explain why the same extraposition that licenses NOC in (193a) does not do so in (193b).

In fact, the present analysis already provides an answer to this question: Although (193a,b) are equivalent as far as the infinitive’s position is concerned, they are not equivalent w.r.t. the controller’s position. Given the claim that experiencers raise at LF to the subject
position, *John* occupies its ultimate scope position in (193a) but not in (193b). The proper LF representations are as follows:

(194) a. \[
\text{TP It} [\text{vP} [\text{vP} t_2 \text{helped+v [VP tV John}_1] \text{]} [\text{PROarb to praise him}_1]]
\]

b. \* \[
\text{TP John}_1 [\text{TP it} [\text{vP} [\text{vP} t_2 \text{amused+v [VP tV t}_1] \text{]} [\text{PROarb to praise him}_1]]]
\]

In (194b), extraposition has not removed the infinitive from the c-command domain of the experiencer, since the latter has raised yet higher, to the subject position. In the framework of Landau (2001), this fact would have been irrelevant, as the possibility of NOC arose whenever the infinitive was VP-external; no structural constraints on the choice of controller in NOC were explored in that study, since NOC was assimilated to logophoric dependence. Yet, it is probably the case that logophoric dependence is not entirely indifferent to structure (see Zribi-Hertz 1989 for some evidence). Taking our clue from *picture*-anaphora, notice that a clausemate subject is an obligatory antecedent, but beyond the immediate clause no particular choice is forced:

(195) a. \[
\text{John}_2 \text{thought [that Bill}_1 \text{disliked many pictures of himself}_1/2\text{].}
\]

b. \[
\text{John}_2 \text{thought [that Bill}_1 \text{said [that many pictures of himself}_1/2 \text{were found in the attic]].}
\]

With this restriction on logophors in mind, we may conclude that the controller of PRO in (194b) must be the LF-subject *John*, clausemate to the infinitive, even though this is, in principle, a NOC configuration. Since the reading obtained by extraposition in a psych-context is indistinguishable from the reading obtained without it – in both cases we get local control by the experiencer – there is in fact no way to determine whether structures like (194b) actually exist: The LF-copy of the infinitive could be uniformly the base copy, explaining the transparency property illustrated in (191b). At any rate, the results of Landau (2001) can be fully subsumed under the present analysis, and provide independent evidence for the special scopal properties of object experiencers.

8.3 *Functional Readings*

Kim & Larson (1989) noticed that *wh*-quantifier interactions are sensitive to psych contexts. The standard observation, due to May (1985), is that an object question with a subject quantifier (196a) allows a pair-list reading, answered by (196c), but a subject question with an object quantifier (196b) does not, admitting only a single answer (196d):

\[\text{Kim & Larson (1989) noticed that *wh*-quantifier interactions are sensitive to psych contexts. The standard observation, due to May (1985), is that an object question with a subject quantifier (196a) allows a pair-list reading, answered by (196c), but a subject question with an object quantifier (196b) does not, admitting only a single answer (196d):}\]

65 If Fox (2000) is correct in claiming that LF operations must give rise to novel interpretations, otherwise economy blocks them – then extraposition in (194b) would be at most *phonological*, the LF copy being the base copy.
(196) a. What did everyone bring?
   b. Who brought everything?
   c. John brought the wine, Bill brought the flowers, Mary brought some cheese,…
   d. John did.

However, according to Kim & Larson, the judgments are reversed with object experiencer verbs:

(197) a. What worries everyone?
   b. Who does everything worry?

Kim and Larson claim that the subject question (197a) is ambiguous, allowing a pair-list reading, while the object question (197b) is unambiguous, allowing only a single answer. They note, however, that the latter judgment is more variable, and when the subject quantifier is animate, a pair-list reading marginally re-emerges. In fact, Chierchia (1992) shows that the psych effect is restricted to subject questions, rendering them ambiguous (as opposed to non-psych subject questions), while leaving intact the ambiguity of object questions (attested in non-psych contexts as well):66

(198) a. Who does every conference worry the most?
   b. NELS worries Bill, WCCFL worries Mary, …

(Chierchia 1992, ex. 93)

I will assume that Chierchia's description is correct; the puzzle to be explained is the ambiguity of (197a) vs. the non-ambiguity of (196b). I will also assume that Chierchia's basic insight is correct, and pair-list readings arise from "functional readings" of wh-questions. The idea is that on the pair-list reading of (199a), what is being asked for is a (Skolem) function, associating patients with psychiatrists. This function can be specified intensionally, as in (199b), or extensionally, as in (199c). This view nicely explains why pair-list readings are only possible when functional readings are (cf. (200)):

(199) a. Who does every patient adore?
   b. His psychiatrist.
   c. John adores Prof. Jung, Mary adores Prof. Klein,…

66 The ambiguity of (198a) indicates that the animacy factor, if relevant, is only secondary.
(200) a. Who adores every psychiatrist?
    b. * His patient.
    c. * John adores Prof. Jung, Mary adores Prof. Klein,…

The reason why a functional reading is OK in (199) but not in (200), Chierchia argues, is the same reason that underlies the contrast in (201), namely, Weak Crossover:

(201) a. Every patient$_1$ adores his$_1$ psychiatrist.
    b. * His$_1$ patient adores every psychiatrist$_1$.

However, for the analogy to be explanatory, one has to identify in (199a)/(200a) the counterpart of the bound pronoun which is c-commanded by the QR-trace in (201a) but not in (201b). Chierchia argues that such a counterpart exists, in the form of an implicit variable inside the (complex) wh-trace. The index of the wh-trace denotes the Skolem function, while the index of the implicit variable denotes the argument to which it applies. (199a) and (200a) would be represented at LF as follows (t$_1$=QR-trace, t$_2$=wh-trace, e$_1$=implicit variable):

(202) a. [CP Who$_2$ does [TP every patient$_1$ [TP t$_1$ [VP adore [t$_2$ e$_1$]$_2$ ]]] ]
    b. * [CP Who$_2$ [TP every psychiatrist$_1$ [TP [t$_2$ e$_1$]$_2$ [VP adores t$_1$ ]]] ]

The application of WCO to these configuration is straightforward:

(203) "At LF, the trace of the [quantified] NP has to c-command the trace of the wh-word for a list reading to be possible" (Chierchia 1992: 182).

It is easy to verify that (202a) satisfies (203) whereas (202b) does not.

Back to psych verbs. Chierchia shows that given Belletti & Rizzi's (1988) unaccusative structure for psych verbs, this analysis predicts that both (197a,b) will be ambiguous. I will not go through the details, but simply show that the present analysis makes the same prediction. Recall that we have good reasons to reject Belletti & Rizzi's structures for non-stative class II verbs. Therefore, the challenge is to demonstrate that both the transitive and the unaccusative derivations in (169) satisfy (203).  

67 Neither Kim & Larson (1989) nor Chierchia (1992) mention this, but the ambiguity of subject questions with object quantifiers is also found with class III verbs:

i. (I want to know) which painting appeals to every collector.
ii. Las Meninas.
iii. The one he bought.
iv. The Picasso appeals to Mr. Roberts, the Goya appeals to Mr. Morrison, …
Consider the pair in (204), where eventive interpretation is forced by the progressive aspect. The psych effect obtains, and (204a) admits a pair-list reading just like (204b):

(204) a. Which puppet is scaring every kid?
   b. Which kid is every puppet scaring?

Incorporating Chierchia's proposal into the present analysis, these sentences are assigned the following LF representations:

(205) a. \[CP \text{Which puppet}_2 \ [TP \text{every kid}_1 [TP \text{t}_1 [TP \text{t}_2 \text{e}_1]_2 \text{is} [\nuP \text{[t}_2 \text{e}_1]_2 [\nu \nu [\nuP \text{scaring t}_1 ]]]]]\]
   b. \[CP \text{Which kid}_2 \text{is} [TP \text{every puppet}_1 [TP \text{t}_2 \text{e}_1]_2 [TP \text{t}_1 [\nuP \text{t}_1 [\nu \nu [\nuP \text{scaring [t}_2 \text{e}_1]_2 ]]]]]\]

In (205a), the \textit{wh}-theme raises to \[Spec,CP\] through an intermediate A-position – the first \[Spec,TP\] – where EPP is satisfied. QR of the experiencer leaves a variable in an intermediate A-position – the second \[Spec,TP\], where the \[loc\] feature is interpreted. Recall that we assume that two specifiers of the same head are in a mutual c-command relation. Hence, the higher \textit{t}_1 c-commands \textit{e}_1, in conformity with (203). In (205b), the \textit{wh}-experiencer raises to \[Spec,CP\] through an intermediate A-position – the second \[Spec,TP\] – again, where the \[loc\] feature is interpreted. QR of the theme leaves a variable in the first \[Spec,TP\], where EPP is satisfied. Again, \textit{t}_1 c-commands \textit{e}_1. We correctly derive the ambiguity of both sentences.\(^{68}\)

Observe now that \textit{without} LF-movement of the experiencer to the (second) subject position, (204a) is incorrectly predicted to lack a pair-list reading:

(206) \[CP \text{Which puppet}_2 [TP \text{every kid}_1 [TP \text{t}_1 [TP \text{t}_2 \text{e}_1]_2 \text{is} [\nuP \text{[t}_2 \text{e}_1]_2 [\nu \nu [\nuP \text{scaring t}_1 ]]]]]\]

Here, the QR-trace \textit{t}_1 does \textit{not} c-command the \textit{wh}-trace. Chierchia's analysis would predict a WCO violation here – contrary to fact. Of course, Chierchia handles these cases by assuming an unaccusative derivation à-la Belletti & Rizzi. Thus, Chierchia's analysis of functional readings, which is independently motivated, can account for the psych effect only by recourse to some "special" syntax of psych verbs: Either the unaccusative analysis, or the present analysis (LF-quirkiness). Yet we have plenty of evidence that the former is untenable for eventive class II verbs, which \textit{do} allow a pair-list reading in subject questions (204a). This means that the "special" syntax involved must be the one presently advocated. Thus, we have an argument from functional readings in favor of LF-quirkiness of object experiencers.

\(^{68}\) The relevant configuration at \[Spec,TP\] holds also with class III verbs, hence the ambiguity noted in the previous footnote. I leave out the details.
8.4  Forward Binding

In section 3.6 we noted that in contrast with the strictly ungrammatical cases of se/si reflexives, binding of full reflexives in class II is judged less severe. In fact, the status of these examples is not entirely sharp, although their marginality appears to be universal:

(207) a. *? Gianni preoccupa se stesso.
   Gianni worries himself.  
   (Italian; B&R 1988: ex. 14b)

   b.  * Marie intrigeerde zichzelf.
        Mary intrigues herself
   (Dutch: Grimshaw 1990:184, fn. 4, by M. Everaert)

   c.  ?? Pekka inho/sure -tta-a itsean.
        Pekka disgust/sad-CAUS-3sg. self.PART
        ‘Pekka disgusts/saddens himself’
   (Finnish; McGinnis 2000a, fn. 13, by L. Pylkkänen)

   d.  ? Politicians depress/worry each other.  
   (Grimshaw 1990: 158, ex. 14b)

   e. *? They frighten themselves.  
   (Bouchard 1992, ex. 6a)

   f.  * The men concern each other.  
   (Johnson 1992, ex. 8a)

The relevant factor, it seems, is stativity; the more stative the psych verb is, the worse forward binding becomes. Although the generalization was rarely stated in these terms (but see Stroik 1996), this intuition is shared by most linguists who studied this phenomenon.69

It is important to realize that unlike the psych effects in section 3, but like the passive test in section 4.1, forward binding is not sensitive to agentivity per se. Thus, it is possible in eventive non-agentive contexts, but not in stative ones:

(208) a.  John and Mary accidentally startled each other in the dark.

   b.  * John and Mary rather concerned each other in their youth.

The same point can be illustrated in Hebrew, with the verb hitrid, which is ambiguous between ‘harass’ and ‘bother’. Notice that the first reading is agentive, the second one is stative (in Hebrew, not in English):

69 According to Roberts (1991, ex. 31), forward binding is marginal only with reflexives, not with reciprocals:

i.  ?? John amuses/disgusts/horrifies/irritates himself.

ii.  We amuse/disgust/horrify/irritate each other.

Roberts argues that reciprocal binding is not subject to condition A, but rather to some locality condition on QR of the bare quantifier each. If these judgments are solid, then the text’s analysis should be similarly restricted to reflexive binding.
(209) Gil hitrid et Rina.

   Gil hitrid acc. Rina
   'Gil harassed Rina' / ‘Gil bothered Rina’

A convenient way to single out the stative reading is to add the modifier dey ‘rather’ (see Iwata 1995). As one can see below, this modifier is incompatible with an agentive adverb:

(210) a. Gil dey hitrid et Rina (*be-xavana).

   Gil rather hitrid acc. Rina (*deliberately)
   ‘Gil rather bothered Rina’

b. Gil (*dey) hitrid et Rina be-xavana.

   Gil (*rather) hitrid acc. Rina deliberately
   ‘Gil (*rather) harassed Rina deliberately’

Indeed, anaphor binding precludes the stative modifier, as in (208b):

(211) Gil ve-Rina (*dey) hitridu exad et ha-šeni.

   Gil and-Rina (*rather) hitridu one acc. the-second
   ‘Gil and Rina harassed each other’ / *Gil and Rina rather bothered each other’

That forward binding in psych constructions is sensitive to the stativity of the psych predicate is further supported by considering psych adjectives. Being unambiguously stative, they give rise to sharper binding violations than ordinary class II verbs. The facts were first noted by Postal (1971, p.47):

(212) a. * I am disgusting to myself.

b. * I am loathsome to myself.

c. * I looked funny to myself.

The overall pattern classifies forward binding together with passivization as a "stative psych effect", rather than a general psych effect of the sort displayed in clitic doubling, resumptive pronouns, si/se-reflexives etc. Here as well, I will argue that unaccusativity is the underlying source. But first, let us consider existing proposals.

As far as I am aware, the phenomenon has received very little attention. As mentioned above, Belletti & Rizzi (1988) assimilate it to si-reflexives, both effects falling under the Chain Condition. This is problematic (as Grimshaw (1990) observed) because of the different
status of the examples. Moreover, we can now put forth a stronger objection against a unified
treatment: Whereas si-reflexives are ruled out with all non-agentive psych verbs, including
eventive ones, full reflexives are licensed in eventive contexts. Clearly, a unified approach is
inappropriate here.

The main existing alternative is the one offered by Grimshaw (1990) herself (inspired
Grimshaw's proposal can be summarized as follows:

(213) Grimshaw's Account
a. Under the non-agentive reading, the theme subject does not denote an individual
   but rather properties of individual – a distinct semantic type.
b. Anaphors always denote individuals.
c. Binding requires type-matching between the binder and the bindee.
d. Hence, forward binding is excluded in non-agentive class II verbs.

An immediate correction to this account is empirical – the relevant restriction on the effect is
eventiveness, not agentivity. So let us substitute "eventive" for "agentive" in (213) and
consider whether the revised version is adequate.

The intuition behind (213a) is that examples like John annoys me or Mary depresses me
can often be paraphrased as John's behavior annoys me, Mary's condition depresses me.
Although clear enough, it is less clear that this intuitive distinction corresponds to a formal
distinction between properties and individuals. Notice that sentences like (214a) admit a
variety of context-dependent interpretations (214b,c):

(214) a.  John disgusts Mary.
    b.  John's gaudiness disgusts Mary.
    c.  John's fingers disgust Mary.
    d.  John's gaudiness displayed itself to everyone.
    e.  John's fingers pointed at each other.

While gaudiness is a property, fingers are not. Yet both can bind anaphors (214d,e),
suggesting that the notion of "property", if relevant at all to binding theory, departs from
commonsense. Obviously, one could argue that fingers is a property in (214c) but an
individual in (214e); and one could argue that the anaphor is a property in (214d) but an
individual in (207). But that would leave us with no non-circular way of establishing whether
any given DP qualifies as an individual or as a property.70

70 Most likely, the notion of individual relevant to binding theory is abstract enough to cover what Grimshaw
calls properties; thus the shift from John to John's gaudiness is a shift in reference, not in type. It is
independently known that reference shift can feed binding, yet this interaction is grammatically constrained:
Bouchard (1995) explains the data in (207) by the Novelty Condition of Wasow (1972), which requires the reference of an anaphoric element to be no more determinate than the reference of its antecedent. According to Bouchard, the theme subject of a non-agentive psych verb denotes a “Concept” — defined as an entity viewed externally, while the experiencer object is a “Substantive” — an entity viewed internally, as a participant in an event. Reference as a Concept is said to be “more limitative” than reference as a Substantive, hence the latter cannot be bound by the former.

Again, I would argue that the operative categories in this account — “Concept” and “Substantive” — are no more solid than “individual” and “property” in Grimshaw’s account. One does not have pre-theoretical intuitions about these notions; for example, I fail to see why reference as a Concept is less determinate than reference as a Substantive (we know that this assumption gives the right result, but we do not know why). Moreover, it would seem that indirect reference (through reference shift) is less determinate than direct reference. The Novelty Condition would incorrectly rule out examples like (ii) in fn. 70, where the antecedent is shifted but the anaphor is not.

Let us turn now to a solution made possible within the present system. We assume the correctness of (96b), namely, stative class II verbs are unaccusative. Given the LF quirkiness hypothesis, a sentence like (215a) will be assigned the LF in (215b):

(215) a. * John & Mary concern each other.
   b. \[TP [PP \varnothing, [DP each other,1]]_1 [TP [John & Mary,1] T^0 [VP t_1 [V \text{concern} t_1]]]]

The T/SM \textit{John} & \textit{Mary} moves overtly from the VP-complement position to the first [Spec,TP], and the experiencer \textit{each other} moves covertly from [Spec,VP] to the second [Spec,TP]. Recall that we assume that two specifiers of the same head mutually c-command each other. This allows the R-expression in the first [Spec,TP] to bind the anaphor in the second [Spec,TP] at LF, in conformity with Condition A, but crucially, the latter also binds the former, in violation of condition C. For both conditions to be satisfied, the anaphor must reconstruct to its base position. Crucially, though, the R-expression must not reconstruct,

\begin{itemize}
  \item i. Norman Mailer reads himself before going to sleep.
  \item ii. The mushroom omelet dirtied himself with ketchup.
  \item iii. * The mushroom omelet was eating himself/itself with chosticks. \hfill (Abusch 1989, ex. 9, 5, 6)
\end{itemize}

Notice that in (i) the anaphor is shifted (author-to-book), mismatching the subject; in (ii) the subject is shifted (food-to-customer, in a restaurant context), matching the anaphor; and in (iii) the subject is shifted (food-to-customer), mismatching the anaphor. Contrary to Grimshaw’s proposal, Abusch argues that mismatch (in reference of antecedent and anaphor) as such does not exclude binding; and the cases that \textit{are} excluded (like (iii)) do not violate Condition A, but rather yield anomalous interpretations.
since its base position is lower than the anaphor's. In short, if neither the R-expression nor the anaphor is reconstructed, and both are interpreted in their high positions, condition C is violated. If the R-expression reconstructs, the structure violates both conditions A and C. The only grammatical output results from reconstruction of the anaphor and no reconstruction of the R-expression.

Suppose, however, that such an option is unavailable when the two elements are coindexed and occupy the specifiers of the same head. In other words, suppose the following is a true constraint on reconstruction:

(216) There is no "partial" reconstruction of coindexed co-specifiers.

The rationale behind (216) is very simple. We view reconstruction as nothing but an instruction to the LF component to interpret the lower copy in a chain (Chomsky 1995, Fox 2000). This procedure involves at least two steps: i) Identifying the higher link in the chain; ii) "Striking out" the semantic content of the higher link. Consider step (i). How are chain links to be identified? The identity of a chain link consists of two features – its structural position and its index. In the normal case, no two chain links in a given LF will be identical on both features. However, in the rare case exemplified by (215b), the coindexed co-specifiers of T are indistinguishable both structurally and indexically. The result is that step (i) above treats them as one unit, and consequently, step (ii) applies to both of them. Thus, if one specifier reconstructs, the other one must do so too. In the context of (215b), this implies that the only LF representation that satisfies both conditions A and C is underivable.71

Recall that in Romance, the status of binding with full reflexives was not as severe as that of si-reflexives; indeed, this was a problem for Belletti & Rizzi (1988):

(217) a. * Gianni si preoccupa.
   Gianni himself worries

   b. *? Gianni preoccupa se stesso.
   Gianni worries himself.

   (B&R 1988: ex. 10b, 14b)

There is a natural account for this distinction in our analysis. The violation in (217a) is essentially morphological: Si is used to absorb oblique case, an absolute impossibility in

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71 This analysis is reminiscent of the “lethal ambiguity” scenario described by McGinnis (2004). In that scenario, a DP fails to be linked to its trace, if the trace is a co-specifier of another coindexed DP; the failure stems from nondistinctness (in index and “address”). Nonetheless, McGinnis (p. 73-5) attributes to psych verbs a derivation without the “leapfrogging” step that could give rise to lethal ambiguity, hence it is unclear whether she can explain the failure of forward binding with stative class II verbs (and why eventive verbs are different).
Romance (see section 3.6). The violation in (217b), on the other hand, results from an unaccusative derivation, which in turn depends on the stativity of specific psych verbs. Stativity, however, is a gradient notion, not an all-or-none property (see also Tenny 1998): Some psych verbs are exclusively stative (concern), others are neutral between stative and eventive readings (frighten), while others strongly favor the eventive reading (startle). Thus, the acceptability of forward binding with psych verbs will be inversely proportionate to their intrinsic stativity, and the distribution of judgments found in (207) is to be expected. In fact, a similar variation is found with verbal psych passives, which are also acceptable only under eventive readings (see section 4.1). This converging similarity is a positive result of the present analysis.

As opposed to stative class II verbs, eventive ones involve a causer argument, which is generated externally:

(218) a. John & Mary startled each other.
   b. \[TP [PP \varnothing_T [DP each other_t]]_1 [TP [John & Mary]_1 T^0 [vP t_1 [\nu [VP startled t_1]]]]\]

Again, the anaphor must reconstruct in order for the R-expression to escape a Condition C violation. In contrast to (215b), however, reconstruction of the R-expression in (218b) will not interfere with condition A, as its base position is higher than the anaphor's. Thus, both specifiers of T can reconstruct, in accordance with condition (216), and the binding conditions will be satisfied at the base positions. The structural difference between (215b) and (218b) explains why forward binding is possible with eventive but not with stative class II verbs.\(^{72}\)

This analysis makes a novel prediction. Suppose it is the experiencer argument that raises overtly to [Spec,TP], rather than the causer or T/SM argument. This option, to recall, is manifested in languages with surface quirky subjects. What are the predictions with respect to anaphor binding? Let us consider the relevant LF structures:

(219) a. \[TP [PP \varnothing_T [DP Exp]]_1 T^0 [vP t_1 [\nu [VStative [Anaphor_{T/SM}]]]]\]
   b. \[TP [PP \varnothing_T [DP Exp]]_1 T^0 [vP [Anaphor_{Causer}]]_1 [\nu [VP VEventive t_1]]\]

Here, only one (non-trivial) chain is formed, since the theme (causer or T/SM) does not raise covertly to [Spec,TP]; LF quirkiness is a specific property of experiencers. In the unaccusative (stative) case (219a), the experiencer asymmetrically binds the anaphor either from its surface position or from its base position; reconstruction is not forced by any binding.

\(^{72}\) Of course, this contrast also corroborates Pesetsky's (1995, p. 52-3) distinction between transitive and unaccusative class II verbs.
condition. In the eventive case (219b), the experiencer asymmetrically binds the causer from its surface position but not from its base position; reconstruction is blocked. Both options, then, should license forward binding.

Greek, which has dative and accusative experiencer subjects, confirms this prediction:

(220) a. Tis Marias tis aresi o eaftos tis.
    the Mary.DAT cl.DAT likes the self.NOM her
    'Mary likes herself' (Lit. 'To Mary appeals herself')

    b. Tin Maria tin provlimatizi/enoxli/anisihi o eaftos tis.
    the Mary.ACC cl.ACC puzzles/bothers/worries the self.NOM her
    'Maria is puzzled/bothered/worried with/at/by herself'

    (Anagnostopoulou 1999, ex. 15a, 22a)

Crucially, the counterparts of (207) in Greek, with a nominative theme in the subject position binding the object experiencer, are still bad (E. Anagnostopoulou, p.c.).

(221) a. * I Maria tu aresi tu eaftu tis.
    the Mary.NOM cl.DAT likes the self.DAT her
    'Mary appeals to herself'

    b. ?* I Maria ton anisixi/enoxli/provlimatizi ton eafto tis.
    the Mary.NOM cl.ACC worries/bothers/puzzles the self.ACC her
    'Mary worries herself'

A similar contrast is found in Kannada, a language where dative subjects are ubiquitous. A dative experiencer can bind a nominative theme, but not be bound by it (notice than in both examples, the anaphor precedes the antecedent, so word-order is irrelevant):

(222) a. tanu somanige tumba ishta.
    self.NOM Soma.DAT much liking
    ‘Soma is very fond of himself’
b. * tanage somanu tumba ishta.
   self.DAT Soma.NOM much liking
   ‘Soma is very fond of himself’

(Sridher 1979, ex. 21a,20)

The contrast between (220)-(221), and between (222a-b), proves that the proper treatment of forward binding with psych verbs should be structural rather than semantic. Notice that in each pair, the two examples are semantically equivalent, and furthermore, have identical surface structures. One must appeal to some "hidden" structure in order to make sense of this contrast. Our analysis associates (220)/(222a) with the structures in (219) and (221)/(222b) with structure (215b), explaining this pattern. By contrast, Grimshaw's account (213), which relies on the symmetrical notion "type mismatch", fails to distinguish the good cases from the bad ones, as the anaphor and its antecedent always belong to different semantic types. Thus, Grimshaw would predict all these examples to be bad.74

9 LF Quirkiness is LF Locative Inversion

It is time to address the why-question, carefully skirted so far: Why are object experiencers quirky, why do they raise to the subject position? The idea I would like to pursue follows the basic insight which was layed out at the outset of this monograph: Experiencers are mental locations. Ample crosslinguistic evidence suggests that this is not a mere metaphor, but rather a strong claim about their syntax. In particular, object experiencers are locative PPs. As such, they display a variety of properties commonly associated with locative PPs in contexts as diverse as clitic doubling, resumptive pronouns, island phenomena and reflexivization. The claim I now make is that the property hitherto called LF-quirkiness – namely, the fact that object experiencer raise to subject position at LF – reduces to yet another construction which singles out locative PPs: The locative inversion construction. If tenable, this unification will demonstrate the remarkable efficacy of the basic thesis of this monograph.

74 The claim that object experiencers are LF-subjects does not entail that they must have scope over other scopal elements. Consider the examples below:

i. Something annoys everyone.
   ii. The weather didn’t upset everyone.

(i) is ambiguous in the familiar way; after LF-raising of the experiencer everyone to the (second) subject position, the theme something may still undergo QR to obtain wide scope. The fact that (ii) is unambiguous, with narrow scope for the experiencer, may seem problematic. Notice, however, that this falls under a systematic (and poorly understood) generalization, namely, negation always "freezes" the scope of lower quantifiers, experiencers or not (e.g., the non-ambiguity of The weather didn’t delay everyone). Possibly, obligatory reconstruction “undoes” the effect of LF-raising, as proposed for other cases by Bobaljik (2002).
9.1 **Locative Inversion and Experiencers**

In locative inversion, a locative PP and a subject DP switch positions:

(223) a. My friend Rose was sitting among the guests.
   b. Among the guests was sitting my friend Rose.

[Bresnan 1994, ex. 2]

There are strong reasons to believe that the preverbal PP in (223b) is a subject at some level of representation, though not necessarily at surface structure (Stowell 1981, Levin 1986, Coopmans 1989, Bresnan & Kanerva 1989, Hoekstra & Mulder 1990, Bresnan 1994, Levin & Rappaport 1995, Collins 1997). Moreover, these studies show that the preverbal PP is a *derived* subject. I will not reproduce the arguments here, but simply assume that their conclusion is correct: In many languages, locative PPs raise overtly to [Spec,TP].

The analogy to psych constructions proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that the word order alternation discussed above in languages with quirky experiencers is a straightforward extension of the alternation in (223):

(224) a. Ton Petro ton endhiaferun ta mathimatika.
   the Peter.ACC cl.ACC interest the mathematics.NOM
   ‘Mathematics interests Peter’
   
   b. Ta mathimatika ton endhiaferun ton Petro.

   [Greek: Anagnostopoulou 1999: ex. 16]

That is, the “experiencer-inversion” in (224a) is but an instantiation of the locative inversion rule seen in (223b). Secondly, in languages without overt quirky experiencers, a parallel inversion nonetheless applies at LF, where the “locative” experiencer raises to the second [Spec,TP], as depicted below for statives and eventives:

(225) a. \[TP[PP_\text{loc}, [DP Mary]_1]_1 [TP [global warming]_2 T^0 [VP t_1 [V concerns t_2 ]]]\]
   b. \[TP[PP_\text{loc}, [DP Mary]_1]_1 [TP [the noise]_2 T^0 [VP t_2 [V startled t_1 ]]]\]

What is the common denominator of locative inversion and experiencer inversion? As suggested above, this is the \([\text{loc}]\) feature residing on the head of the locative/experiencer PP. Proper interpretation of this feature (i.e., assigning a value to its spatial referents) requires a local relation with T. This relation, I argued, can be established either overtly or covertly.
This is how the locative analysis of experiencers, coupled with the operation of locative inversion, explains the LF-subjecthood of experiencers.

The question what drives locative inversion has received some attention in recent work. Collins (1997: 28) ties the phenomenon to the EPP, analyzing locative inversion as a kind of pied-piping, where the attracted feature is really the D-feature of the prepositional object (in analogy to \textit{wh}-pied-piping, e.g., \textit{With whom did you speak?}). Alternatively, one could widen the set of features that may satisfy the EPP feature of T, to include not only D but any categorial feature. Notice that the latter option seriously overgenerates, failing to exclude locative inversion with any arbitrary XP in [Spec,TP]. The former option also overgenerates in that it does not distinguish PPs which are eligible for locative inversion from those which are not (e.g., instrumentals, benefactives).

In contrast, linking locative inversion to a [loc] feature on the inverted PP is restrictive enough to exclude the process with non-locative PPs and at the same time inclusive enough to generalize to experiencer objects – on the crucial assumption that these are concealed locatives.

Still, I believe that there is something to the intuition that the EPP itself is related to locative inversion. At this point, unfortunately, I cannot offer much beyond speculation. Following traditional wisdom, it is natural to take the EPP as the technical execution of the (interface-driven) topic-comment predication relation. This relation is conceived as the introduction of relatively less familiar information into a more familiar scene. Notice that this common rendering, using the term “scene”, already hints at the locative nature inherent in the topic-comment relation: The topic is a “location”, in a fairly abstract sense, in which the comment is situated. Plausibly, this is an instance of the general cognitive split between figure and ground. Under this view, it is not an accident that in many languages the expletive pronoun is derived from a locative; and it is equally unsurprising that locative PPs, but not, say, instrumentals, are inverted into a position associated with the unmarked topic.

It is important to realize, though, that the EPP has been traditionally associated with two distinct types of requirements. The first one is semantic, corresponding to the considerations just mentioned. The second one is phonological, expressing a parametric property of T (and by analogy, any other functional head); the property that allows null subjects in Italian, requires single subjects in English and allows multiple subjects in Japanese. The relation between these two types of requirements is indirect at best; the choice to lump them together under one label – the EPP – is unfortunate. For this reason, I will continue to assume that T is associated with both a semantic "criterion" (in the sense of Rizzi 2004) and a phonological one, the latter subject to various parametric conditions (e.g., (167)). How to correlate these requirements is an issue I must set aside (see Landau 2005 for pertinent discussion).
9.2 Why Does Experiencer Raising Not Look Like Locative Inversion?

The appeal of the idea that object experiencers raise to subject position as part of the generalized phenomenon of locative inversion is clear enough. First, it explains the clausal scope of experiencers, even when overtly occupying object positions. Second, it fits tightly with a mass of independent evidence showing that object experiencers pattern with locative arguments in many other respects.

However, the vast literature on locative inversion has unearthed many peculiar restrictions on the construction, that are not shared by psych constructions. For our proposal to be convincing, these differences must be traceable to independent reasons. In this section I show that once we properly identify the specific features of English locative inversion, we will be in a position to understand why it is subject to more restrictions than standard psych constructions, despite their nearly identical LF representations.

A first potential worry concerns the fact that after all, experiencers denote locations only in an extended, metaphorical sense of the word. Why should they be considered locatives for the purposes of locative inversion? The issue, however, is empirical: Locative inversion also applies to “extended” locatives. For example, the verbs occur/happen are found in locative inversions where the preverbal phrase is a temporal PP; and the verbs come/go can take comitative with-PPs in locative inversion (Levin & Rappaport 1995: 301, fn. 1).

(226) a. During the first two decades of the 20th century occurred the most significant breakthroughs of modern physics.
   b. With the inspector came a strange-looking man, wearing a grey coat and holding a large briefcase in his left hand.

Thus, the mere fact that experiencers are “extended” locations should not exclude them from locative inversion, which does apply to other extended locatives. It seems that the precise delineation of the class of inverted locatives cannot be established in advance of empirical study.

Locative inversion has universal as well as language-specific aspects. One universal is stated in (227a), and one particular in (227b).

(228) a. Locative inversion induces presentational focus on the postverbal DP.
   b. In English, the inverted locative is a topicalized subject.

The discourse function (228a) explains certain semantic restrictions.
Discourse-related restrictions on English locative inversion

a. The verb must be "informationally light".
b. Clausal negation is disallowed.

Consider (229a) first. It has been frequently argued that locative inversion is only possible with passive or unaccusative verbs (Levin 1986, Coopmans 1989, Bresnan & Kanerva 1989, Hoekstra & Mulder 1990, Bresnan 1994). If true, this would constitute an obstacle to assimilating the unergative (eventive) structure (225b) to locative inversion.

However, drawing on an extensive corpus study, Levin & Rappaport (1995) convincingly dispel this misconception. Although unaccusative verbs are very frequent in locative inversions, many unergatives are possible as well. To give just a very small sample, locative inversion can host activity verbs (230a), verbs of emission (230b), verbs of bodily motion (230c) and even adjectival passives (230d).  

(230) a. On the third floor worked two young women called Maryanne Thomson and Ava Brent, who ran the audio library and print room.
b. On the folds of his spotless white clothing, above his left breast, glittered an enormous jewel.
c. ...and in this lacy leafage fluttered a number of grey birds with black and white stripes and long tails.
d. He wears a silver ring he bought in Egypt – it cost all of forty cents, he told me – and on it are engraved three pyramids.

[Levin & Rappaport 1995, Ch.6, ex. 19b, 21c, 26, 61b]

Levin & Rappaport argue that the key to an understanding of the restrictions on verb classes in locative inversion is to be found in the discourse function of the construction. The basic idea is that the verb must be “informationally light” in the context, in the sense that it should convey hardly anything beyond the existence/appearance on the scene of the postverbal NP. The evidence for this comes from disambiguation effects that locative inversion has on some verbs (essentially, “bleaching” their meaning), as well as the exclusion of other verb classes, like certain change of state verbs. The latter point will play a prominent role in the next section, so it is worth discussion.

75 Culicover & Levine (2001) argue that the unaccusativity condition does hold of genuine locative inversion; apparent inversions with unergative verbs in fact involve Heavy NP-shift of the subject to a right-adjoined position. Nothing in what follows will be affected by this claim, if correct. The two properties that are crucial for us are shared by both types of inversion: The fronted PP must be a locative, and the verb must not denote a change of state (see (234) below).
While the examples in (230) demonstrate that unaccusativity is not a necessary condition on verbs occurring in locative inversion, the examples in (231) demonstrate that it is neither sufficient.

(231) a. * On the top floor of the skyscraper broke many windows.
   b. * On the streets of Chicago melted a lot of snow.
   c. * On backyard clothlines dried the weekly washing.

[Levin & Rappaport 1995, Ch.6, ex. 18]

Levin & Rappaport explain the exclusion of these verbs from locative inversion as follows: "Externally caused verbs of change of state are not informationally light: By predicating an externally caused, and therefore unpredictable, change of state of their argument, these verbs themselves contribute discourse-new information and hence are not eligible for the construction" (p. 233). Levin & Rappaport further contrast externally caused change of state (ECCS) verbs with internally caused change of state verbs (ICCS). The latter category does appear in locative inversion.

(232) a. In the garden may bloom the Christmas plant...
   b. Next door, to the east, decays Ablett Village...

[Levin & Rappaport 1995, Ch.6, ex. 36]

To explain the felicity of (232), Levin & Rappaport actually appeal to two independent considerations. First, they say that unlike ECCS verbs, which predicate an unpredictable change of state of their argument, ICCS verbs describe predictable processes. In their words: "... flowers bloom and old wood decays in the natural course of events, but it is only incidental that glass breaks or that a door opens" (p. 235). Then, however, Levin & Rappaport note that even ICCS verbs are only found in locative inversion on their stative sense, not on their change of state sense, as illustrated below for grow, which is ambiguous between 'live rootedly' and 'increase in size or maturity'.

(233) a. In our garden grew a very hardy and pest-resistant variety of corn.
   b. *In Massachusetts grows corn very slowly.

This suggests that the correct characterization of the relevant restriction on verb class is simply (234), which does not distinguish between ECCS and ICCS verbs.

(234) Change of state verbs are excluded from locative inversion.
Contra Levin & Rappaport's first suggestion, I claim that (234) is not reducible to (229a). In particular, the "predictability" test cannot properly characterize the distribution of ECCS and ICCS verbs in locative inversion. Rather, any change of state verb – whether of the ECCS type (231) or the ICCS type (233b) – will fail to invert with a locative PP. Whenever such a verb affords a secondary, existence/coming-into-existence reading, locative inversion will be fine. Indeed, Levin & Rappaport observe that parallel to (233a), ECCS verbs like *break and open are found in locative inversion only in that secondary sense.

(235) a. Then broke the war, on those aweful days in August, and the face of the world changed – I suppose forever.
    b. Underneath him opened a cavity with sides two hundred feet high.

(Levin & Rappaport 1995, Ch.6, ex. 33, 34)

Further evidence that (234) is unrelated to the discourse condition of "informational lightness" is provided by (236).

(236) a. * In Iran widened the rift between the fundamentalists and the reformists.
    b. Over our heads glowed an unfamiliar object.

Despite the nearly idiomatic predictability in *widened the rift, (236a) is ungrammatical. And despite the fact that unfamiliar objects have no predictable properties, (236b) is grammatical. The contrast reflects the presence vs. absence of change of state.

To summarize this point, (234) appears to be a genuine condition on locative inversion, as yet irreducible to other factors. That the effects of (234) are independent of the discourse function of the construction is crucial, since they show up in "experiencer"-inversion, which has no discourse function, as I will show in the next section.76

Consider next a plausible consequence of (228a), namely the ban on clausal negation in locative inversion.

(237) *Across the street didn’t stroll gentlemen in tuxedoes.

Negating the main event implies that the postverbal NP is not introduced on the scene – in direct conflict with the discourse function of locative inversion. Notice that presentational there-constructions are subject to the same restriction (*There didn’t arise a riot).77

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76 Notice that we take no stand on the independent role of (229a) in a full account of locative inversion. The point in the text is that (234) does not follow from, hence cannot support (229a), and by extension, (228a).

77 At times it has been suggested (anonymous reviewer and Coopmans 1989) that locative inversion is also incompatible with modals. However, there are clearly perfect counterexamples, like (232a) above and (i)-(ii).

i. I expect that on this wall will be hung a picture of Leonardo Pabbs. (Bresnan 1994, ex. 97a)
Consider next the English-particular feature of locative inversion stated in (228b). It has been widely observed that the fronted locative in English exhibits a mixed behavior, typical of both subjects and syntactic topics (Stowell 1981, Bresnan & Kanerva 1992, den Dikken & Naess 1993, Bresnan 1994). Like standard subjects, the locative undergoes raising to subject or object and triggers \textit{that}-trace effects.\textsuperscript{78}

(238) a. [In these villages], are likely \(t_i\) to be found the best examples of this cuisine.
   b. [On this wall], I expect \(t_i\) to be hung a portrait of our founder.
   c. It’s in these villages that we all believe (*that) \(t_i\) can be found the best examples of this cuisine.

Nonetheless, unlike standard subjects and like topics, the fronted locative cannot combine predicatively with a participial (reduced) relative, does not invert with auxiliaries in questions and cannot be controlled.

(239) a. She stood on the corner *(on which was) standing another woman.
   b. * Did in the corner stand your friend?
   c. * [On the top of the page], was stated the methodology of the research
      [without PRO, being stated its purpose].

That the fronted locative is actually a subject moved to a topic position is further corroborated by its inability to stay in the subject position; compare (238b) and (240).

(240) *I expect on this wall to be hung a portrait of our founder.

Moreover, clausal domains lacking a topic position, like \textit{for}-infinitives, resist locative inversion.

(241) *For in Boston to live many radical activists would not surprise me.

The fronted locative creates a topic island, blocking extraction not only of material internal to the focused theme (which could be attributed to its being postposed and “frozen”) but of anything in its clause.

(242) a. *? What kind of mushrooms do you think on these trails can be found specimens of?
   b. *? When do you think under this bridge was found Mary’s ring?

\textsuperscript{78} Examples (238a-c), (239a), (240) and (242a) are due to Bresnan (1994).
Thus, there is ample evidence for an analysis like (243) for English locative inversion.

(243) \[\text{CP \{In the corner\}, TP \text{t stood a woman}}\]

The fact that the inverted locative in English must vacate the subject position is generally attributed to its categorial status as a PP. Overt occupants of the subject position must be nominal, possibly a universal constraint. Bresnan (1994) shows that in Chichewa, where inverted locatives are genuine NPs, they do occupy the canonical subject position. Indeed, locative inversion in Chichewa does not display the English peculiarities associated with the extra topicalization step.\(^79\)

Returning to covert experiencer raising, we note that it crucially lacks the characteristics in (228). Being covert, it cannot convey any discourse information. By assumption, all the discourse-relevant aspects of a sentence must be overtly marked, either by displacement (e.g., topicalization), special discourse markers, stress or intonation. LF movement thus can never be recruited for such functions. Second, since experiencer raising to [Spec,TP] is not reflected at PF, there is no reason to move the experiencer further to a topic position. The ban on non-nominal elements in subject positions is morphological in nature; this is most clearly seen in the contrast between (238b) and (240), where a trace of the locative PP but not its phonetic exponent is tolerated as an ECM subject. Thus, the extra topicalization step, forced in (English) overt locative inversion, is superflous in covert experiencer raising; hence, it is prevented by economy.

It follows from the above considerations that many of the peculiar features of English locative inversion will simply be absent from class II/III psych constructions. The presentational focus semantics will be absent, and with it the negation restriction. The syntactic topicalization movement will be absent, and with it the interactions with auxiliary inversion, infinitives and extraction. The aspectual restriction (234), however, is independent of either (228a) or (228b). Hence, we expect to find its correlate in psych constructions – and indeed we do, as I discuss in the next section.

At this point it may be suspected that not much is left from the original reduction of experiencer raising to locative inversion. In particular, what substance is there to this reduction if the basic (some would say, defining) feature of locative inversion – its special discourse function – is missing in experiencer raising?

I believe that the reduction is warranted despite the disanalogies. The key point to keep in mind is that locative inversion itself is not reducible to its discourse function. That is, if the grammatical mechanisms underlying locative inversion reflected nothing but the need to tease

\(^{79}\) Unlike locative PPs, the expletive there in English is categorially underspecified, hence freely occurs in the canonical subject position. I ignore the special case of copular sentences, whose subjects need not be nominal (e.g., Is under the bed a good place to hide?).
apart the “topic” part from the “focus” part – then we would have expected the operation to extend much beyond its actual scope. This is so because inversion is licensed only by locative PPs, not by any other PP.

(244) a. * With that axe worked Tom, his father and his grandfather.
    b. * For Tom worked his father and grandfather.

Notice that ruling out (244) by reference to the condition that inversion express *presentational* focus will not do. The very term “presentational focus” conceals that which must be explained; namely, why is it that the inverted PP must denote a location, in which the focused constituent is situated? It is easy to imagine that *any* type of topic-focus array would license inversion, yet this does not happen; only locative topics do so.

For this reason, incorporating the lexical feature [loc] into the analysis of locative inversion, as proposed in section 7.2, seems necessary. It is the presence of that feature – on both spatial and mental locations – that motivates the association with T, the spatio-temporal anchor of the clause. And it is syntactic movement that achieves this association. If overt, the operation has the additional discourse effect of conveying presentational focus. If covert, there is no such effect, although the [loc] feature is interpreted much the same way.

A final apparent asymmetry is the following: While both locative inversion and overt (quirky) experiencer raising are optional, it seems that covert experiencer raising is obligatory. Recall that we have shown that the failure of forward binding with class II verbs (section 8.4) results from LF-raising of the experiencer. Had that raising been optional, binding should have been possible in the base position. Short of an alternative explanation for those facts, then, we are committed to the idea that *all* experiencers end up as LF-subjects. However, given that experiencer raising is linked to the [loc] feature, which is shared by all locative arguments, we seem to be driven into one of the two conclusions: (i) Some occurrences of the [loc] feature need not associate with T locally (c-command is sufficient); (ii) locative inversion *is* obligatory – non-subject locative PPs covertly raise to [Spec,TP].

Option (i) preserves the intuitive idea that locative inversion is optional, at the expense of introducing an unexplained distinction between the ways in which the feature [loc] is

80 Actually, the first part of this statement is not entirely accurate. As mentioned in the discussion of (160)-(161), not all psych verbs in Icelandic and Faroese are “dual”; some allow only the quirky experiencer to be the surface subject. The syntax of these verbs, then, represents the pattern of all psych verbs at LF.

How to force experiencer raising is a problem recognized in previous accounts as well. Hermon (1985: 250) speculates that experiencer raising is not an instance of free, optional Move-α operation, but rather of a local rule, akin to case-marking and clitic spell-out. Slowell (1986) imposes selectional conditions on the realization of argument structure, to the effect that non-agent animate 0-roles must be internal at DS but external at LF, triggering experiencer raising. Park (1992), inspired by Grimshaw’s (1990) two-tier analysis, claims that the thematic hierarchy Exp>>Th must be structurally represented; since DS and SS represent the aspectual hierarchy, where Th(=Cause)>>Exp, the experiencer must raise above the theme at LF to reflect its thematic prominence.
interpreted on object experiencers and on non-subject locatives. Option (ii) is faithful to the semantic parallelism between the two constructions at the expense of positing “obligatory” locative inversion.

Ideally, the choice should be empirical, since the conceptual tradeoff between the two options is pretty balanced. In particular, evidence for or against non-subject locatives having clausal scope – like object experiencers – could settle the matter. Unfortunately, the type of evidence adduced in section 8 for the LF-quirkiness of object experiencers cannot be reproduced for locatives, for independent reasons. Since locative PPs cannot be surface subjects in English, and PRO is a surface subject – PRO cannot be locative. Thus, adjunct control by a locative is inapplicable. There are no predicates that select both a locative and an infinitive; thus, locative control in Super-Equi constructions is unattested. Finally, since the verbs participating in locative inversion are all eventive (denoting appearance or coming into existence), they will not display any failure of forward binding, an effect restricted to stative class II verbs (e.g., *John & Mary rushed into each other*).

Given this state of affairs, nothing seems to be at stake in choosing between the two options above. For consistency, I will assume option (ii), namely, all [loc]-marked elements raise to [Spec,TP] by LF, experiencers and locatives alike. We keep in mind, though, the tentative nature of this thesis. Further investigation may reveal irreducible contrasts between locatives and experiencers that may require withdrawal from this thesis. Nevertheless, given the mounting evidence in favor of the fundamental equivalence between locatives and experiencers, the burden of proof would lie with any claim to the contrary.

9.3 Solving the Agentivity Puzzle

9.3.1 Previous Accounts

There is an outstanding fact about psych verbs of class II, which we have repeatedly exploited but not accounted for so far: All the core psych properties (see (157.I)) obtain only in non-agentive contexts. Again and again we have seen that once a class II verb is used agentively, it behaves like any normal transitive verb. This peculiar fact was sporadically noted (Belletti & Rizzi 1988, Grimshaw 1990, Bouchard 1995, Arad 1998, 2000) but the scope of its systematicity, I believe, has not received due recognition. A major goal of the first part of this monograph was to demonstrate the agentivity effect across as many phenomena as possible. Accounting for this effect is an important challenge for any theory of psych verbs.

Let us briefly review how previous analyses meet this challenge. For Belletti & Rizzi (1988) (and also Arad 1998), all the special psych-properties followed from the unaccusative nature of class II verbs. Belletti & Rizzi assumed, as is standard, that agents are universally mapped to the external argument position. Therefore, agentive psych verbs will *not* be
unaccusative and will not display any special properties. However, while it is true that agentive verbs are normally not unaccusative, there is considerable evidence that neither are non-agentive eventive class II verbs; this has been shown by Pesetsky (1995), and the discussion of languages with verbal class II passives (section 4.1) further establishes this conclusion. Hence, unaccusativity cannot distinguish agentive from non-agentive class II verbs in the general case.

Grimshaw (1990) also attributes the special psych properties to the absence of an external argument in class II verbs (although for her, they do project a deep subject). In non-agentive class II verbs, there is a mismatch between the thematic hierarchy (Experiencer>>Theme) and the aspectual hierarchy (Theme(=Causer)>>Experiencer). An external argument is defined as maximally prominent on both hierarchies, hence none exists in class II verbs. By contrast, an agent argument is ranked higher than the experiencer on both hierarchies, hence will be the external argument. A disturbing lacuna in Grimshaw's analysis (noted by her) is the lack of a satisfactory account for classes I (love-verbs) and III (appeal-to-verbs). The verbs in both classes are stative, hence no obvious event decomposition can identify the aspectually prominent argument. The fact that class I projects the experiencer externally, while class III internally, remains unexplained.

Furthermore, while Grimshaw's analysis accounts for several psych properties (e.g., nominalization and reflexivization), it is hard to see how it would extend to the many other phenomena discussed above. Consider, for example, the fact that relativization of the object experiencer must leave a resumptive pronoun in Greek and Hebrew – but only in non-agentive contexts (sections 3.3, 3.5). Why should the absence of an external argument correlate with obligatory resumption of the object? Similarly, why should the absence of an external argument should block the Genitive of Negation in Russian class II verbs (section 3.2)? The special psych properties are all linked to (and explained by) the nature of the object experiencer, rather than the external argument, or lack thereof.

Arad (2000), who focuses explicitly on the agentivity effect, proposes that class II roots can be embedded under two different light verbs: A stative-causative v and an agentive v. It is only the former head which is associated with "abnormal" properties, assigning an external role (the Causer) but no structural case. In sections 3.6-3.7 I have criticized the problematic notion of "transitivity" implicated in this analysis. More generally, while neatly correlating aspect and case (an intuition to which I return below), Arad's analysis does not supersede the descriptive level: Nothing in it accounts for why natural languages employ functional heads with the specific clustering of properties we observe and no others. The present analysis does not take any position on the issues raised by Distributed Morphology. Thus, everything we say is compatible with Arad's execution (see also McGinnis 2000, 2001). Our goal is rather to gain a deeper understanding of the principles underlying such executions.
Where Agentivity, Aspect and Locative Inversion Meet

Within the present analysis, all the special psych properties are linked to the presence of a (possibly null) preposition, which governs the object experiencer. By this logic, absence of these properties must indicate absence of the preposition. Our analysis, then, should have the consequence that the psych-preposition is excluded from agentive contexts (where no psych properties are manifested). The challenge is to provide principled reasons for this exclusion.

The key to the agentivity puzzle lies, I think, in a fact mostly overlooked in studies of psych verbs. The meaning shift from a non-agentive to an agentive reading of a class II verb is accompanied by an aspectual shift. This correlation is stated in (245):

(245) a. Agentive class II verbs are change-of-state verbs (i.e., accomplishments).
   b. Non-agentive class II verbs are states or achievements.

The aspectual properties of psych verbs are a neglected topic. The few studies that address this topic, unfortunately, reach contradictory conclusions. Grimshaw (1990) argued that class II verbs are uniformly eventive (i.e., non-states), however Pesetsky (1995) has shown that not all class II verbs are alike: Some, like scare and startle, favor an eventive reading, others, like frighten and embarrass, are aspectually neutral, whereas a few verbs, like concern and depress, are strictly stative. This description has been implicitly adopted throughout the present study. Pylkkänen (2000) holds that ObjExp verbs come in two varieties – stative-causative, and eventive-causative (the latter being accomplishments).

The question of interest is the following: Ignoring the (relatively few) stative class II verbs – what is the aspectual nature of the eventive ones? van Voorst (1992), running through the standard aspectual tests, concludes that class II verbs are achievements. 81 Discussing the verb frighten, he writes: "The transition from not being frightened to being frightened is the beginning of the event, not the end… This is very much like other achievements, such as see" (p.84). Furthermore, van Voorst claims that "the agentivity of subjects [of class II] is aspectually irrelevant" (p.84). I agree with the first claim, and disagree with the second. That is, while it is true that eventive non-agentive class II verbs are not accomplishments, agentive ones are.

Consider two familiar tests: Temporal modification and (non)ambiguity with almost. A non-agentive class II verb resists the in X minutes modifier, whereas an agentive one accepts it. Notice that (246a) is very marginally acceptable only under the "begin"-reading, not the "end"-reading: That is, a marginal reading exists whereby the jokes began to embarrass Mary after less than 5 minutes have passed, but it cannot mean that the process leading to Mary's

81 Actually, van Voorst's conclusion is much more radical, stating that all psych verbs are achievements. This is clearly an overstatement for classes I and III verbs (some of which are individual level predicates), and also for class II verbs like concern, preoccupy, depress, fascinate.
being embarrassed culminated after less than 5 minutes. The latter reading, however, is easily available in (246b):

(246) a. * In less than 5 minutes, these jokes embarrassed Mary.
   b. In less than 5 minutes, John embarrassed Mary.

Likewise, the adverb almost creates an ambiguity in an agentive context but not in a non-agentive one:

(247) a. John almost frightened Mary (but at the last moment, he decided not to).
   b. The movie almost frightened Mary (#but at the last moment, they cancelled it).

The reading shared by both variants is the one in which the event of becoming frightened almost took place. The additional reading, in which the causing event almost took place, exists in (247a) but not in (247b), as the continuations in parentheses demonstrate.

I take those facts (which are systematic) to support the claims in (245): Agentive class II verbs involve a change of state, whereas non-agentive ones do not. Exactly how this contrast should be represented is a separate question. The two familiar approaches to such matters are the lexicalist approach, which posits aspectual contrasts among various guises of the same lexical verb, and the constructional approach, which assumes that aspectual information is encoded in the syntax in the form of functional heads. As the choice between those options is not crucial for the present purposes, I leave it open.

The pieces of our account are now all in place. Raising of experiencer objects in class II verbs to the subject position is an instance of (possibly covert) locative inversion (cf. (225)). Locative inversion resists change-of-state verbs (cf. (234)), a discourse-independent property – hence, applicable to covert locative inversion. But agentive class II verbs are change-of-state verbs (cf. (245a)). Hence, experiencer objects of agentive class II verbs cannot raise to the subject position. Recall, however, that we posited a [loc] feature on the preposition that governs the experiencer object. To be properly interpreted, that feature was raised to [Spec,TP], pied-piping the experiencer object. Failure to raise the experiencer would therefore result in an uninterpretable structure. Therefore, Full Interpretation requires that the preposition must not be present in the structure. We thus derive the result that object experiencers of agentive class II verbs are bare nominals, receiving structural accusative case.82

A semantic problem may arise at this point. We have assumed that the preposition $\emptyset_\psi$, like any locative preposition, is semantically contentful. Hence, its presence or absence

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82 In principle, one could save the oblique derivation in agentive contexts simply by allowing a variant of the preposition without the lethal [loc] feature. On the plausible assumption that the constitution of lexical items is fixed and immune to manipulation, this option does not exist.
should have interpretive effects. In particular, the following question presents itself: If $\emptyset_\psi$ is necessary for a psych interpretation in non-agentive contexts, why is it not necessary for the interpretation of agentive contexts?

The answer to this question, I believe, is also related to the generalizations in (245). In the agentive context, it is the experiencer who undergoes the change of state. It is well-known that the canonical realization of affected arguments, that undergo change of state, is the direct object (Dowty 1991, Tenny 1992). Hence it is unsurprising that $\emptyset_\psi$ can be dropped in an agentive context, leaving a bare DP experiencer. Notice that the term “experiencer” itself is not constitutive in any sense, since it is equally appropriate to replace it with “patient” in agentive contexts. By contrast, the experiencer in non-agentive (class II) contexts does not undergo a change of state in the aspectually relevant sense. Rather, it is either a locus where a mental state resides (statives) or appears (achievements). In these “locative” contexts, $\emptyset_\psi$ is a crucial interpretive ingredient.

10 Conclusion

The fundamental thesis running through this entire monograph has been that experiencers are locatives. Importantly, this was taken as a claim about the syntax of experiencers, and was tested as such. Although we briefly mentioned (in section 2.1) various reasons why this parallelism is conceptually plausible, the empirical arguments presented along the way in no way depended on this plausibility. Put differently, even if there were no obvious conceptual reasons to view experiencers as locations, that would not have compromised the force of our conclusion that the grammar does treat them as such.

It seems to me that this point highlights a methodological distinction of some significance. Quite a few analyses of psych verbs were guided, from the outset, by various semantic intuitions, crucially using them to motivate particular syntactic structures. The intuition that class II verbs are semantically causative has led several authors to postulate an articulate causative structure (Franco 1990, Park 1992, Iwata 1995, Pesetsky 1995); the intuition that they are both stative and causative has led others to postulate special argument structure (Grimshaw 1990, Anagnostopoulou 1999); the intuition that they involve mental states has led others to grammatically reify mental states in some manner (Bouchard 1992, 1995, Arad 1998, Reinhart 2000, 2001, 2002). While little doubt exists that all these intuitions call for explanation, it is far from obvious that they provide the best probe into the grammar of psych constructions.

The methodology of this study has been quite different. Starting with no pre-theoretical semantic guidelines, we focused on the syntax of psych verbs, as revealed in various

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83 A similar thematic “fusion” is attested in examples like John moved, where John can be said to be both an agent and a theme.
languages. It turned out, again and again, that object experiencers behave like oblique arguments, whether their governing preposition is overt or not. Converging evidence comes from very disparate phenomena, including clitic doubling, extraction, resistance to case absorption, resumptive pronouns, reflexivization, causative and passive constructions. Whereas each of these effects is discussed and explained by some existing proposal, I am not aware of any analysis that reduces all of them to a single factor, as the present study does. In particular, the complex typology of psych passives follows straightforwardly from the idea that only the strategies of pseudo- or quirky passivization can accommodate the hidden preposition in class II verbs.

Part two of this monograph pushed the locative analysis of object experiencers a step forward, arguing that they are subject to an extended version of locative inversion. Exploiting recent theoretical proposals regarding multiple specifiers, we claimed that "inversion" of the object experiencer can occur at LF, creating a second subject position. This explained some well-known scopal properties of object experiencers: Their subject-like behavior in adjunct control, their failure to be anaphorically bound by subjects (in stative contexts) and the emergence of additional readings in \textit{wh}-quantifier contexts. Again, comparing alternative theories, it is instructive to see that the class of proposals that deal with the "oblique"-effects and the class of proposals that deal with the scopal effects are almost disjoint. The challenge of explaining both sets of properties has rarely been met. Thus, none of those proposals explains why it is just those arguments that fail to be embedded under causatives in Romance, that show such peculiar control properties; or why is it that exactly those arguments that trigger obligatory resumption in Hebrew relative clauses give rise to pair-list readings in subject questions. The present account links the two sets of properties in a principled way. It is because object experiencers are locatives, that they display oblique behavior and "subject"-properties associated with inverted locatives. That this correlation is not an accident is no longer a mystery.

Finally, this study reaffirms the indispensable relevance of crosslinguistic work to theoretical syntax. In particular, it demonstrates how the overt nature of some languages can teach us about the covert nature of others. This reasoning informed both parts of this monograph. First, we have observed that object experiencers in certain languages are overtly oblique. The hypothesis was advanced that rather than exemplifying an arcane option, these languages reflect the universal state of affairs, obscured by null morphology in more familiar languages. Second, we have observed that non-nominative experiencers are overtly quirky in certain languages, occurring in subject position. Again, taking this to be the universal rather than the exceptional case, we hypothesized that \textit{all} object experiencers are quirky, only some languages realize this quirkiness covertly. A general implication, much in the spirit of the Principles and the Parameters framework, is that major crosslinguistic contrasts reduce to the overt/covert distinction – whether in morphology or in syntax. While important questions
about the nature of experiencers remain open, I hope that this study advances our understanding of the problem and the theoretical challenges that face future research in this domain.

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