Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in Three Protracted Conflicts: Structures, Resources and Ideology

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Guided by organizational and social movement theories, this study compares the structures, resource bases, ideologies, and strategies of nongovernmental organizations engaged in peace and conflict resolution (P/CROs) in three regions with extended violent conflicts: Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine. Qualitative content analysis techniques are used to analyze 27 detailed case reports. We analyze the funding patterns and structural attributes of the P/CROs in our sample, with particular attention to how they obtain fiscal resources and membership in spite of the risks they may experience. We then explore the degree of formalization among P/CROs over time and, finally, we examine the ideological frames that P/CROs use and how these frames relate to their tactics. Throughout the analysis we pay attention to how the political context of each region influences P/CRO behavior.

KEY WORDS: peace and conflict resolution; social movement organizations; comparative analysis.

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SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF NGOs

Scholars agree that social conflict, variously based on ethnic, religious, economic, and territorial differences, is endemic to human life (Miall, 1992; Saaty and Alexander, 1989; Oberschall, 1973). It may range from mild disputes among individuals, organizations, and groups to pernicious international warfare and genocide. Social conflict may be necessary for the stability of a democratic society, and it is a vehicle for oppressed groups to stimulate social change and to ensure long-term social stability (Grosser and Mundros, 1985; Schaller, 1970). However, when social conflict turns violent, it harms the parties to the conflict and may do irreparable damage to the social institutions it hopes to change. To quote Kriesberg (1992, p. 2):

In social life, conflicts are inherent; they occur within and among organizations, communities, social classes, and countries. But they are too often managed in ways that harm the conflicting parties—peace within or among countries refers not to the absence of conflict but to the process of handling conflicts so they do not escalate into large-scale violence.

The need for effective conflict resolution strategies has increased since the end of the Cold War, with the eruption of numerous regional conflicts around the globe and the erosion of international stability overall. Furthermore, scholars suggest that the number of regional and international conflicts is likely to increase along with rapid population growth, expanding environmental degradation, increasing income discrepancies between Northern and Southern countries, and the proliferation of conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons (Miall, 1992). In a report to the United Nations, Michael Lund identifies nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as critical actors in any substantive program of conflict prevention and resolution. He states (1996, pp. 7, 193):

Able to play many roles that governments are unable or unwilling to perform, NGOs are becoming (explicitly or tacitly) more significant partners for governments and international organizations in preventing conflict. . . . NGO participation must become a matter of deliberate multilateral policy (7, 193).

NGOs by definition exist outside the public governmental and private market sectors. They exist within what has been variously referred to as the third, voluntary, or nonprofit sector (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). According to a recent report by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence (1997), three broad categories of NGOs can be identified in the peace and conflict arena: (a) human rights and advocacy groups; (b) humanitarian and service organizations; and (c) mediation or “track two” groups that pave the way for formal peace. The report states that such NGOs, which will be referred to here as peace and conflict resolution organizations (PCROs), have the capacity to “monitor conflicts and provide early warnings and insight into a particular conflict; convene the adversarial parties (providing a neutral forum); pave the way for mediation and undertake mediation; carry out education and training for conflict resolution, building indigenous capacity for coping with ongoing conflict; help to strengthen institutions for conflict resolution; and foster the development of the rule of law . . .” (Chapter 5, p. 4).

Despite the proliferation of PCROs, there are few comparative studies that examine their characteristics and patterns of operation. For instance, studies of “peace” organizations, arising out of the field of social movements, are mostly limited to antimilitary movements in relatively peaceful and stable Western democracies (Cooper, 1996; Klandermans, 1991; Meyer, 1993). The lack of theoretical and empirical work on PCROs seriously hinders our ability to understand what roles these increasingly important organizations can play in conflicts around the globe. By studying PCROs embedded in three highly conflicted parts of the world—Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa—this study offers an initial step toward remedying these theoretical and empirical gaps.

The larger study from which this paper draws its data has two foci—to obtain information about the general characteristics of PCROs and to gain an understanding of their contribution to the peace process in each region. This paper addresses the first aim of the study. It provides an initial picture of what the PCROs look like across the three regions and focuses specifically on answering the following broad questions: What are the salient organizational characteristics of PCROs active in these three countries/regions? Are there significant cross-regional differences in the organizational structures, funding patterns, ideologies, goals, and tactics adopted by PCROs? Are there certain characteristics inherent to all PCROs regardless of their country-specific environment?

THEORY

PCROs can be characterized as hybrid organizations. On the one hand they share several characteristics of other NGOs. They are nongovernmental, non-profit-distributing, self-governing (i.e., not controlled by outside entities), and at least in part maintained by voluntary participation (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). As such, they can be examined from the perspective of organizational theories. On the other hand, they also acquire attributes of social movement organizations (SMOs). They make moral claims that are in opposition to those held by dominant political elites, and they most actively challenge and seek to change the forces that fuel and maintain the conflict and prevent peace. Such challenging claims and activities place these organizations at greater risk of antagonism (from the state, the public, and other organizations making counterclaims) than would be expected of other NGOs. In addition, PCROs commonly identify themselves as part of a larger network or movement of peace and reconciliation organizations; this is an important feature of SMOs (Zald and McCarthy, 1980, p. 2). As hybrid organizations, PCROs continually change their structures and activities in response to political, economic, and social changes in their environments. At some points in their life cycle, especially at their founding stage, they may resemble SMOs. At
other points, especially as they become more institutionalized, they tend to resemble other NGOs (Katzenstein, 1998; Minkoff, 1995). Therefore, to understand the organizational characteristics of PCROs from a comparative perspective, we, like a few other scholars, meld together ideas and concepts from both organizational and social movement theories (see also Bordt, 1997; Clemens, 1996).

Organizational theories useful for understanding the characteristics of PCROs focus on the relations between the organization and its environment, especially strategies to mobilize resources and legitimacy, and the consequences they have on organizational structure and activities (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). PCROs, like other NGOs, depend on their environment for resources, and such dependence will influence their autonomy to pursue their social movement mission and choice of tactics. We would expect PCROs to attempt to mobilize resources, especially funding, that enhance and protect their autonomy, particularly vis-à-vis the political actors they try to influence. Similarly, PCROs need to garner legitimacy in order to survive. Like other organizations they do so by adopting dominant institutional norms about acceptable organizational forms, and they select a repertoire of tactics that enjoys broad legitimacy (Bordt, 1997; Minkoff, 1999). Therefore, we would expect the PCROs to develop formal and professional organizational structures and engage in activities that have broad institutional legitimacy.

Theories on social movement organizations emphasize three important forces that shape the characteristics and activities of these organizations and are relevant to our study (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996). First, political opportunity structure pays close attention to the role that state structure and elite alignments play in an organization’s ability to mobilize resources and access political decision-making processes. At this macro-level of analysis, the nation-state, its institutions, and its traditions are conceived as the locus of investigation (Eisenberg, 1973; Kneusel et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1994). It should explain the cross-national differences in the PCROs. Therefore, we propose that PCROs will vary in their characteristics by region, and that these differences can be attributable, in part, to differences in their regions’ unique political structures.

Second, mobilizing structure refers to “those agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action which include particular ‘tactical repertoires,’ particular ‘social movement organizational’ forms, and ‘modular social movement repertoires’” (McCarthy, 1996, p. 141). Scholars have suggested that there is a limited repertoire of organizational forms available for collective action (Clemens, 1996; Tilly, 1978). This repertoire is limited by institutional rules that determine what modes of operation are legitimate as well as by the practical needs of an organization to mobilize resources, survive, and develop a structure familiar to its members and staff. Hence, the ability of PCROs to survive and carry out their activities will depend on organizational forms available to them, their location in networks from which they can mobilize members and resources, and available repertoire of tactics they can draw upon (Gansson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Oberschall, 1978; Tilly, 1978). Therefore, we expect PCROs generally to move from informal to formal structures over time, especially as their dependence on external resources increases. We also expect them to increasingly draw their human resources from networks endowed with high human and social capital.

Third, framing focuses on the ways in which organization leaders socially construct grievances by using values and symbols present in the dominant belief system of their society. The focus on these “framing processes” draws attention to the role of ideology in mobilizing memberships and directing action—not only influencing the number of members mobilized, but the structure and strategy an organization adopts (Benford, 1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Morris and Mueller, 1992; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988).

Because frames arise from the cultural repertoire within a society, we expect PCRO frames to vary across countries and reflect their particular country contexts, culture, and, of course, the nature of the particular conflict. Framing, however, has implications for both the degree to which a group formalizes its structure over time as well as the tactics it adopts to pursue its goals. For example, recent studies of feminist, environmental, and peace movements indicate that the ideological predisposition of SMOs in these movements often leads them to reject hierarchy and remain committed to decentralized structures in the face of pressures to formalize (Acker, 1995; Dalton, 1994; Ferey, 1987; Hyde, 1993). In addition, scholars suggest that ideology strongly influences the types of tactics a group will adopt from among the repertoire available given their financial and membership resource bases (Dalton, 1994; Tilly, 1978). Therefore, we expect that PCROs vary in their tactics and that these variations are associated with PCROs’ framing of their conflicts.

It is important to emphasize that there is considerable overlap and complementarity between the organizational and social movement theories we use in this study. This is deliberate and to be expected, because each has borrowed and benefited from the insights of the other to understand organizations in general, and social movement organizations in particular.

METHODOLOGY

The Settings

The conflicts in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa provide excellent sites, as well as a formidable challenge, for a cross-country comparison of NGOs. These three conflicts, despite their common protracted and violent natures, are different in several ways. The conflict in South Africa centered on ending an oppressive minority regime; in Northern Ireland, it centered around the question to
which sovereign state the region belongs (and how the two conflicting communities may coexist); and in Israel/Palestine it centered around the mutually exclusive claims of two peoples over the same territory.

Although the conflicts differ in their histories, duration, and points of contention, they do share two important features: First, significant political breakthroughs toward peace and conflict resolution emerged during the early 1990s. In South Africa, the democratic elections in 1994 marked the end of the Apartheid regime. In the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the historic Oslo accord (1993) marked a new phase of mutual recognition between the two peoples. In Northern Ireland, the first cease-fires agreement between the major paramilitary organizations was declared in 1993. Second, in all cases, the period preceding these breakthroughs was accompanied by a significant growth in third sector activity in virtually all fields of practice. Of particular importance and relevance in this context were the emergence and development of a number of citizens—grassroots groups and organizations seeking to advance the cause of peace and end the bloodshed during the 1980s, at the height of the violence.

Sampling

The operational definition of PCRO used to identify a sampling population in each region was as follows: “Peace/conflict resolution organizations refer to nongovernmental, citizen-initiated organizations advocating peace, reconciliation, and coexistence in these three countries/regions—on the basis of mutual recognition and/or the use of dispute-resolution strategies as a means of addressing their respective conflicts.”

The “purposive” sampling strategy adopted for the study was conducted in three phases, with all data being collected during a 2-year time period (1996–1997). During Phase I each country team compiled a list of the “universe” of organizations within each region that met the definition criteria described above (including both currently active and defunct organizations). Phase II required each team to sample 30 organizations from their initial lists and administer a preliminary survey to each of them to ascertain basic information on their characteristics and to assess willingness to participate in an in-depth case study. In Phase III, each country sample was narrowed to approximately 10 organizations for further investigation.

Data Collection

A comprehensive semistructured questionnaire guide was used to gather detailed data on each organization in the final sample. The questionnaire focused on three distinct time periods: the formative years, the critical years (peak of the conflict, as determined by each research team), and the present (or for defunct PCROs, the period of organizational demise). Extensive data were obtained on such topics as the founding of the organization, structural developments and changes over time, the attainment of resources, leadership and membership, and ideologies and activities. In addition, respondents were asked to assess the impact of several key events (including massacres, terrorist activities, agreements) on their organizations. Data from interviews with leaders and members as well as secondary sources—such as organizational documents or journals and books referring to such organizations—were used to develop detailed and lengthy case reports on each organization. The case studies, therefore, provided rich and nuanced portrayals of each PCRO (see Appendix A for the list of the organizations).

Data Analysis

A comparative case study design guided the analysis of qualitative data. A system of descriptive codes was first developed based on both the theoretical literatures as well as on the data themselves. Software for qualitative data analysis, ATLAS/ti, was used to efficiently facilitate the coding, as well as the search, retrieval, and examination of text. Based on the detailed analysis and coding of case reports, each organization was classified along a series of dimensions for be amenable to a meaningful international comparison. A decision was made at that time to present those data in a local context only. This included the exclusively Palestinian organizations only; the joint Israeli/Palestinian organizations are included in the international comparison.

The ATLAS/ti qualitative data analysis package is a Windows-based computer program recently developed by Thomas Mahr from Berlin. This relatively new software package proved very useful for organizing all the case reports and improving the speed with which case reports could be searched for dominant themes or compared on specific variables. In our view, this package rates very highly when compared to other packages such as NUD*IST.
each of the main topic areas of interest: structure, ideology, funding, and so on. All classifications were then sent to the research teams in each region for review as a reliability check. A database of these classifications was then compiled in order to examine specific organizational features in a reduced fashion, facilitating comparisons across national samples as well as comparisons between types of organizations.

FINDINGS

Hostile Environment and Risk

As would be expected of organizations existing within highly conflicted societies, PC/CRs in this sample have faced considerable risk from their environments. Although two thirds of the sample reported at least some, if not necessarily high, risk to leaders, members, and staff as a result of their affiliation with a PC/CR, the level of antagonism and the degree of risk experienced by PC/CRs varied by region. For example, South African organizations reported the highest degree of risk by far, the most severe and frequent antagonism being at the hands of the apartheid-state. The types of threats experienced by South African PC/CRs included the murder of members, severe verbal and physical abuse during public events, state detention and imprisonment of members without trial, state bans on the organization or its publications, membership infiltration and spying by either the state or a countermovement, and significant social ostracizing of members in their social or professional circles.

The antagonism experienced by Northern Irish and Israeli PC/CRs was sporadic and less severe, but these groups still reported significant risks to members. Northern Irish PC/CRs experienced antagonism primarily from paramilitary groups, whereas Israeli PC/CRs were threatened primarily by organizations making counterclaims. The types of threats experienced in these two regions included death threats, verbal and physical abuse during protests, police detention of members, work disruptions, and smear campaigns. Even the nine groups in the sample that reported a low degree of risk noted minor verbal abuse from the public, severe criticisms from countermovements and other peace organizations on their left or right, and a heightened fear of violence among members in the areas or offices within which they worked.

Despite the significant risks experienced, most PC/CRs in the sample successfully developed and survived over time. Almost one third of the sample (eight organizations) has been in existence for 20 years or more, and the sample as a whole has a median age of 14 years. Only four groups have dissolved, but even they managed to exist for 3–12 years before declining.10

10 The reader should be reminded, however, that the high survival rate may reflect sampling biases.

Table 1. Major Funding Sources of PC/CRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Major Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine (n = 9)</td>
<td>6 International</td>
<td>Foundations (Ford, Tides, The Rich Foundation, People-to-People)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European churches (EZE, ICCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Mixed (National and International)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign governments (Canadian Embassy, U.S. Embassy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private donors (local and International)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (n = 5)</td>
<td>7 U.K. and/or European</td>
<td>U.K. government (Community Relations Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Europea Unión and U.K. government (Dept. of Education for N. Ireland, International Fund for Ireland, Belfast Action Teams, Northern Ireland Volunteer Trust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Mixed U.K. and Irish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious Organization (British Quaker and Peace Service Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (n = 10)</td>
<td>9 International</td>
<td>Foundations (Ford, Reware Trust, Kellogg, Mott)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>European Churches (EZE, ICCO, Swiss church, Church of Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign governments (USAID, Royal Danish Embassy, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Canadian government, Norwegian government)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mobilizing Resources: Funding and Legitimacy

Just over a third of the sample (11 organizations) reported struggling financially during their first few years of existence; this meant depending solely on activists' donations of time and money. It was more common for organizational activities to begin and organizations to form only when significant funding was secured from various sources. These sources included private donations, foundation grants, grants from religious institutions and, in many cases, foreign countries. As expected, a common feature of these resources is the generally high degree of autonomy they afforded the organizations. Indeed, Table 1 provides evidence showing just how much PC/CRs in each country came to rely upon funding from international sources. The table, which represents funding data from the last few years of each PC/CR's existence, shows the number of PC/CRs that drew over 50% of their funding from foreign sources versus the number that obtained local or national funding. The table also lists the names of the most significant international funders, which include European churches, American foundations, and various foreign governments. The reliance on international funding is particularly telling because such funds, with the exception of Northern Ireland, came with minimal constraints on how they could be used.

Although external funding was critical in all three regions, differences across regions are apparent. The most important difference across regions is in the degree and type of international funding available to and used by PC/CRs. Reliance on foreign funding was most dramatic in South Africa, for instance, where nine
out of 10 organizations benefited heavily from the desire of foreign governments and international agencies to support NGOs challenging the illegitimate apartheid government. The centrality of this international funding to South African P/CRos is reflected in the research team’s final report: “It is clear that without overseas funding peace/conflict resolution organizations simply would not have found sufficient resources to exist or survive.” Foreign foundations, foreign governments, and foreign religious groups were all equally important sources of funding for the South African sample.

Israeli organizations also relied heavily on international funding, but they drew more from foreign private donors and foundations than from foreign governments or religious institutions. This difference between South African and Israeli P/CRos is understandable, given differences in their political structures. It is no surprise, for example, given the closed and repressive South African system, that foreign governments channeled funding directly to P/CRos demanding change. In contrast, foreign governments, such as the U.S., were more likely to direct their support to the open and democratic Israeli government and to make that support contingent upon negotiation and policy changes within this system, rather than to support P/CRos directly. In Israel, therefore, foreign foundations and private donations from Jews in the Diaspora that shared a similar vision for peace as P/CRos played the most significant role in their support. Indeed, the high level of foreign private donations reflects the long history of significant support by European and American Jews for Jewish organizations in Israel that resonate with their own liberal Western values for human rights and democracy.

In contrast to both Israel and South Africa, the “international” funding of Northern Irish P/CRos came predominantly from the U.K. government. It has actively sought to support activities that promote cross-community interaction and healing between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland since the establishment of the Ministry for Community Relations in 1969. All but two organizations (one Quaker organization solely funded by the British Quaker Peace and Service and another funded by local and foreign foundations) received government funds either directly from the U.K. government through the Community Relations Council or indirectly from U.K. and European Union funds channeled through the Northern Irish Department of Education, the Northern Irish Voluntary Trust, or the Belfast Action Teams program. Support from foreign foundations and other countries was noticeably minimal relative to the other regions. This lack of international involvement most likely reflects the prevailing view of the U.K. system as open and democratic. The U.S., for instance, has traditionally refrained from interfering in what it has considered U.K. affairs. One of the consequences of reliance on funds from the U.K. government is that the P/CRos in Northern Ireland were somewhat more constrained in selecting the range of activities they could undertake. In particular, they were strongly encouraged to promote intercommunity dialogue. Indeed, a few organizations that resisted this direction experienced greater difficulty obtaining government funding.

### Table II. Structural Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Paid Staff</th>
<th>Formal Leadership</th>
<th>Formal Committees</th>
<th>Formal Status</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 professional,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 membership only,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 membership/professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5 professional,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 membership/professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5 professional,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 membership/professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of sample</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(n = 27)</td>
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</table>

The structural characteristics of P/CRos were also an important strategy to garner legitimacy and enhanced their capacity to mobilize resources. Table II shows that the P/CRos in our sample are highly formalized and professionalized. The table reveals that a high percentage of the organizations within the sample have formal organizational structures: 81% have formal leaders, 85% have formal executive or management committees, and 81% have formal/legal status as a nonprofit or voluntary association. By adopting formal structures and formally registering as nonprofits, these organizations sought to have the legal protection granted to other NGOs in their respective countries. In other words, as expected, the P/CRos selected organizational forms that are dominant in the cultural repertoire of their respective countries, forms that enjoy considerable legitimacy. Moreover, these forms that enhance the efficiency of the organizations in negotiating with and mobilizing resources from their environment. Having formal leaders and professional staff provides the P/CRos with the skills and capacity to have access to, as well as effectively communicate and negotiate with other organizations that control important resources. As we discuss below, however, most of these organizations did not begin with such formal structures in place. Rather, over time, they went through a process of formalization as part of their mobilizing strategies.

### Mobilizing Structures: Networks, Formalization, and Professionalization

The importance of existing activist and NGO networks to P/CRo mobilization is first reflected in eight P/CRos that grew directly out of already established religious institutions, universities, or other NGOs. These institutions not only provided P/CRos with initial funding and organizational resources, but also conferred upon them a certain degree of legitimacy and sometimes necessary protection. This process is best illustrated by the comment of a member of a South African organization, which began life within a university:

The Project was founded in this way mainly because it was perceived by the apartheid state as an ivory tower research institution (which it never was, being from
The other critical resource that networks have provided to PICROs is the human resource of leaders, staff, and members. Only a couple of organizations (both in Northern Ireland) were begun by people with little political or NGO experience. The majority of PICROs had highly educated founders and leaders who had substantial experience in and connections with existing activist and NGO networks—from the women’s movement, trade unions, left political parties, universities, religion institutions, and other NGOs. These connections not only offered pathways to funding, but a ready base of support from which to draw members. Indeed, when asked about staff and member recruitment, 16 organizations cited personal networks and word of mouth as the most common method of recruiting members, while the remaining 11 organizations cited networks as equally important as various forms of media such as newspaper advertising and television coverage of activities.

This tendency to draw members and staff from personal and professional networks is reflected in the fairly homogeneous demographics of these groups. Several PICROs report drawing on individuals of various ages, ethnicity, and classes to comprise their memberships—but middle age, middle class, and highly educated individuals clearly predominate within the sample as a whole. When countries are examined separately, however, it is clear that Northern Irish PICROs display a greater degree of cross-membership than the other two countries. This heterogeneity reflects the cross-community focus of these organizations and their attempts to attract representation from both the Protestant and Catholic communities. The Israeli PICROs in contrast, are predominantly composed of Jews from middle and upper class Ashkenazi/European origin. The South African PICROs primarily consist of White middle-class English-speaking staff and membership (although reports note increasing Black representation during the 1990s). A final indicator of leader’s and members’ level of connection to networks is the high rate across all organizations of staff and member affiliations with other NGOs and PICROs.

A look at the structures of these organizations in the formative years shows that many organizations existed for several years without such structures in place. However, most PICROs display clear signs of formalization subsequent to their founding; this is a finding consistent with our expectations. The formalization process manifested itself in several ways. The first indicator is that 24 out of 27 organizations, a few of which had initially intended to remain all volunteer, came to be managed by staff. Comparing the number of paid staff reported to exist within each PICRO during the first few years of its existence with the most recent numbers (within the last few years or at the time of decline for defunct organizations), we find it clear that there were significant increases over time in the numbers of paid staff within each region (Table III). The high percentage of organizations with paid staff is in part a reflection of the presence in the sample of 11 professional organizations that have never had formal memberships. Even among the 16 membership organizations, however, 13 have come to be managed by paid staff. This table also reveals, as expected, that formalization in structures coincided with significant increases in funding over time among PICROs in all three regions.

The degree of formalization among our sample of PICROs is just one sign of their formalization over time. Members’ comments show that most PICROs significantly formalized other aspects of their structures since their founding. These include, for instance, the establishment of official offices or an increase in the number of offices; the establishment of regional branches or autonomous programs; the establishment of formal leadership (in the forms of executive directors, boards, executive committees, and subcommittees); the centralization of decision-making procedures; the development of formal rules procedures and constitutions; and the legal incorporation as a company or registered nonprofit.

Those interviewed cited various reasons for why these particular changes occurred. Some organizations identify clear stimuli such as a sudden rise in membership or an increase in funding, both of which required the hiring of administrative staff and, many times, incorporation or registration as a nonprofit. A member of a Northern Irish group, for instance, indicated how financial management issues necessitated formalization in structures: “Well we had a structure, we had our meetings but it was more informal. There’s an element of professionalization within the organization now, which we had to do in terms of getting our finances right.” More specifically, an Israeli report on a group that received a large European grant indicates that procedures were formalized and their organization was formally registered in order to handle the institutional rules that accompanied funding. It states, “All these incoming funds further accelerated the institutionalization process, since according to Israeli law, only fully registered organizations are allowed to receive foreign financial aid.”

Other organizations discuss a general increase over time in the level of organizational activity, which soon exhausted volunteers and required the mobilization of funding in order to hire staff. This process is reflected well in the following
statement by a member of a Northern Irish organization, which organized “peace trains” between Dublin and Belfast to protest against paramilitary bombing of trains:

I think one of the reasons the Northern Committee went down the road of a Constitution and funding was because I think everybody realized, after the first train, that the volume of work involved in organizing and planning couldn’t be sustained by a voluntary committee. I mean, people were working from their own homes, in the evenings, at night, during the day and I mean it just was too much to be sustained on any long-term basis.

The highly professional and formal nature of these groups is testament to the success of formal and professional organizations as mobilizing structures. Admittedly, the high level of formalization also reflects the fact that our sample represents mostly PC/ROs that have survived over time. Nonetheless, it is significant that the majority of our organizations started out small, and in response to resource and institutional pressures became more formalized. Also of note is that the level of formalization among PC/ROs does not vary significantly by region, illustrating the immense pressure organizations experience to adopt familiar and successful structural forms. Nevertheless, professionalization and formalization among PC/ROs was not inevitable, as six organizations have chosen to adopt alternative organizational structures and have attempted to maintain them over time.

Three Israeli organizations never obtained office space, hired paid staff, recognized formal leaders, or established formal decision-making procedures, depending solely on volunteer efforts at the time of our data collection. Three other organizations, all in Northern Ireland, were only minimally formalized in that they had small, unchanging budgets, minimal office space, and just one or two paid staff. The ideology of these six organizations, each of which had a collective culture and a single-issue focus, provides at least a partial explanation for why they did not grow in size and formalize. This is expressed well in two participant comments.

The first is from an Israeli case report on a group of women whose only aim was to stage small protests against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories:

Not only was the movement of one aim and one strategy all along the way, it also refined on principle grounds from developing an organizational structure. Thus, unlike most other Israeli organizations which were active in these years, WIB has never had offices, office holders, formal membership status, budgets and alike.

The second excerpt illustrates how one Northern Irish group was so committed to its single focus that it planned its own dissolution upon accomplishing its goal of ending paramilitary bombings of railway lines:

Even at the time when the constitution was drawn up, I remember there was a line put in at the end that, “when this organisation ceases to exist,” it wasn’t “if,” the organisation ceases to exist, any funds held in hand will be dispersed to like-minded organisations.

In addition to sharing ideological commitments to a single focus and egalitarian structures, these six PC/ROs shared similar resource constraints. All three Israeli organizations never systematically looked for or received core funding, and two of the Northern Irish groups were committed to keeping their budgets small. The third Northern Irish group was simply unable to obtain additional funds; their political image prevented them from obtaining charitable status. It is clear, therefore, that both resource limitations and ideological preferences bound the structural forms organizations adopt.

### Framing and the influence of political context

Organizations’ raison d’etre, goals, and objectives were examined in order to explore members’ ideologies and to reveal PC/ROs’ frames. When asked about their raison d’etre, most organizations in the sample identified several causes for the conflict as well as various solutions to help resolve it. Even so, the organizations do cluster according to their “primary” focus or understanding about the conflict, and, as expected, given variation in the nature of the conflict in each region, we do see clustering in ideology by region (Table IV).

Drawing upon the work of other scholars to categorize SMO frames (Lofland, 1996; McAdam, 1996; Snow and Benford, 1988), we were able to place PC/ROs along a continuum from a “person blame” (that identifies personal attitudes and beliefs as the cause of the problem) to a “system blame” (that identifies government policy or political and economic structures as the problem). Although all our person-oriented groups proposed only reformatory change of attitudes, a distinction was found within the system-oriented groups in which the proposed solution was either reformatory policy change within the current system or transformative change of political, social, and economic structures. We also found that several PC/ROs exhibited a mixed orientation, which equally emphasized personal attitudes and system failings as the focus of the problem and its solution.

In Northern Ireland, we find that reform of individual attitudes and beliefs figured prominently in the frames of all but one of the eight organizations sampled. This attitude focus was evidenced in interviewees’ discussions of the cause of the problem being “lack of trust between people,” “people’s perceptions,” “sectarianism within yourself,” and “extremism.” Solutions discussed included developing a “culture of tolerance and respect for the opposing viewpoint,” “maintaining

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Person Reforming</th>
<th>Transforming</th>
<th>Mixed (Person and System)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dialogue," and moving beyond "negative stereotypes." A few groups also mentioned government responsibility or historical socioeconomic inequality as part of the problem, but they still gave significant weight to personal attitudes.

In contrast to Northern Ireland, the Israeli sample clusters primarily around a system orientation in that it focuses on government failure to develop good policy and to negotiate peace with the Palestinians as the cause of the problem, and policy reform as the solution. Although some groups also placed blame on individual attitudes and beliefs, all emphasized the need for territorial concessions and the right of self-determination for Palestinians, including the right to establish a separate Palestinian state. Only one group in the Israeli sample had a primary focus on personal attitudes and another on system transformation.

It is of little surprise, given the state of apartheid in South Africa (prior to its abolition in 1994), that all South African P/CRos advocated transformative system change. Case reports cited "apartheid," "inequality," "lack of democracy," and "political violence" as the primary cause of the problems, and a combination of both political and economic "justice" as the only viable solution. Beyond identifying apartheid as the problem, the dismantling of apartheid as the solution, and advancing a notion of peace that includes political and economic equity, five groups additionally emphasized personal attitude change.

The political context within each region is useful in explaining the clustering we see across regions in P/CRos' frames. For instance, the highly closed and repressive South African system, which denied formal and informal political access to the majority of its population and violently repressed all challenging groups, was understandably viewed as illegitimate by the majority of its population. Our sample of P/CRos, therefore, most of which arose during the 1980s in an environment of growing national and international pressure for the dismantling of apartheid, understandably viewed the reform of policies as inadequate, and instead advocated transformation of the entire structure of the system. It was agreed that the regime was illegitimate and had to go. The recognition by P/CRos of the centrality of economic reform in addition to political transformation is also understandable given that years of repressive laws had generated a scale of socioeconomic inequality unparalleled in Israel and Northern Ireland.

In Northern Ireland, the fact that all P/CRos in our sample originated after the onset of the "troubles" in the late 1960s and many arose later in the mid-80s when the Irish and British states, both open democracies, were increasingly viewed as neutral mediators, helps explain their person-oriented focus. For instance, an exhaustive survey of literature on the Northern Irish conflict by John Whyte (1990) explains that endogenous interpretations—those that focus on divisive identities and attitudes as the cause of the conflict—predominate analyses from the past few decades. Up until the 1960s, however, most explanations of the conflict in exogenous terms: they either blamed the British, the Irish, or the capitalists. He explains that with the troubles, "the conflict so obviously was between two opposed communities with the British government trying more or less ineffectively to assuage it, that an internal-conflict approach became at once more plausible" (p. 195). Fitzduff (1995) adds that this change in perspective was further strengthened with the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Downing Street Declaration in 1993, because both signaled the willingness of the British government to withdraw sovereignty if and when a majority wished.

The Israeli system is different still. It is open and democratic but its policies of occupation after the 1967 War—including the establishment of settlements, the retention of territories, and the violation of Palestinians' civil and human rights—have been increasingly viewed as aggressive and repressive. It was a natural reaction of most P/CRos, therefore, all of which arose after the 1967 War and many in direct response to the Lebanon War and the Intifada, to advocate policy reform rather than transformation of the system. Although the legitimacy of the Israeli government's policies and actions could be questioned, there was no need for P/CRos to demand transformation of the system because its democratic structures provided equal formal access to all citizens and provided extraparliamentary groups with an informal forum through which to press for change.

Tactics: The Effects of Political Context, Framing and Resources

Examination of the day-to-day activities of this sample of P/CRos indicates that they have adopted an eclectic approach to the use of tactics. This is first evidenced by the fact that only one group in the sample can be considered to employ a single tactic: an Israeli group of women who focused solely on staging vigils to protest the Occupation. Every other P/CRE in the sample creatively combines two or more types of tactics to pursue their goals, frequently combining both institutional and extrastitutional forms. Gason (1998, p. 66), explaining the distinction between these two forms, states:"extrastitutional refers to everything other than the use of the electoral system, the judicial system, and the peaceful petitioning of public officials (lobbying, testifying at public hearings, presentations, letters, petitions)." Table V gives an initial snapshot of the six major types of tactics frequently used by P/CRos and documents the number of organizations in the sample that, at some point in time, have used any one of the specific tactics listed.

We expected that both the political context within which P/CRos exist and their frames would influence their choice of tactics. However, as shown in Table V, there are only small variations in the tactics employed across regions. Within each region, P/CRos protested, engaged in advocacy efforts, provided services, and organized networking activities. Nonetheless, some differences are worth noting. Israeli P/CRos appear to be more prone to engage in protest activities than both Northern Irish and South African P/CRos, and Northern Irish P/CRos engage in minimal lobbying compared with the other two regions. Political context,
Table V. Number of P/CROs Using Particular Tactic by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Public Edu</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Networking</th>
<th>Protest</th>
<th>Lobbying</th>
<th>Research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine (n = 9)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland (n = 8)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (n = 10)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of sample (n = 27)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

framing, and resource factors must all be considered to understand this cross-region variation.

First, although protest had become a legally sanctioned and publicly accepted form of political expression in Israel during the 1970s, limiting laws and a repressive state response to protest in South Africa made this form of activity less desirable for P/CROs there. Specifically, during the 1960s the Apartheid Government enacted, among other repressive laws, the “Sabotage Act,” which outlawed freedom of assembly and demonstration. Although some organizations clearly ignored this law, it still provided a disincentive to protest for fear of state reprisal. The lack of protest among the mostly White South African P/CROs in our sample also represents the division of labor that developed within the anti-apartheid movement more broadly. Where protest was associated with the radical flank such as the ANC, White groups tended to work more within the system, where they had access to political decision makers. Although almost half of the Israeli sample and almost all South African P/CROs have engaged in some type of lobbying of government officials, only two Northern Irish organizations have done so. This difference is understandable given the political structure of the region where a “democratic deficit” has existed under British direct rule. This environment has limited the level of influence and access citizens have to those responsible for making policy; therefore, lobbying is seen as less feasible and effective. In contrast, in both Israel and South Africa—where P/CROs have had access to the political system through voting and personal and professional networks and have had clear aims to influence the government to adopt particular positions (end apartheid and end the occupation)—lobbying has been a natural choice for several groups.

Second, the minimal use of protest by P/CROs in Northern Ireland is more likely a reflection of their person-focus and networking goals, despite the fact that protest became an acceptable form of action when the Catholics began pushing for change in the 1960s. Members of virtually every P/CRO, for instance, expressed concern about being viewed negatively by one side of the community, and several refrained from protest actions on these grounds.

Third, the difference in the extent of protest in the three regions also reflects the higher number of Israeli groups with formal memberships that could be mobilized for protest (eight) as compared with the number of membership groups in Northern Ireland (three) and South Africa (five).

The lack of appreciable variations in tactical repertoires, despite political, cultural, and framing variations, may reflect a common organizational strategy to engage in multiple activities in order to appeal to different constituencies, increase the capacity to mobilize resources and legitimacy, and to enhance effectiveness. Both resource mobilization and institutional theories predict such a strategy. However, it may also be a consequence of the international diffusion of social movement ideas and tactics. Some of our sample provides evidence of international diffusion. The idea of one group of Israeli soldiers refusing to serve in the Occupied territories, for example, appears to have been inspired by actions of Americans during the Vietnam War: “This kind of moral decision was part of the sixties protest repertoire (against Vietnam war and other occasions). Although it was not a very common action [in Israel], it was known and appreciated by some.” Similarly, the founder of the adult college in Northern Ireland mentioned that the inspiration for the college and the philosophy behind it came from the example of folk high schools in Scandinavia and the Highlander model in the United States, which emphasized education as a means to stimulate social action among low-income populations. Flowing outwardly, the report on the group of Israeli women that dressed in black and held silent vigils against the Occupation notes that this symbolic and novel form of protest was adopted by groups in parts of Europe as well as Northern and Southern America who also dressed in black, but simply broadened the message from women against the occupation to women against war.

**DISCUSSION**

These preliminary findings point to some consistent features of P/CROs that transcend regional differences. First and foremost, consistent with theoretical expectations, the majority of the organizations have developed a formal and professional structure over time. They have done so in order to survive in hostile environments, and most importantly, to mobilize external resources effectively. In addition, such structures enable them to mobilize legitimacy—a vital resource. Nonetheless, organizational ideology is an important intervening factor that may hasten or retard such a process. In particular, P/CROs with a single focus and an ideological commitment to a grassroots structure show less interest or capacity to mobilize resources and thus avoid formalization.

Second, P/CROs have become dependent on funding from resources that are mostly external to their members and constituencies. Doing so has required them to develop a structure that can manage to negotiate such complex transactions. The reliance on international funding (in the case of Northern Ireland, the U.K. government) reflects in part the hostile environment that P/CROs encounter. In such an environment it is exceedingly difficult to mobilize local financial resources, with the obvious exception of members. Moreover, reliance on local resources may be a
threat to the autonomy of these organizations. Therefore, the survival and success of these organizations depends on their ability to obtain resources from external organizations and associations sympathetic to their cause. However, in doing so, P/CRos face the danger of being viewed as nonindigenous organizations, and potentially as foreign agents.

A third important attribute is their reliance on multiple tactics to achieve their aim. The choice of tactics seems to be driven by pragmatic rather than ideological reasons. The high percentage of P/CRos providing some kind of service may also reflect a survival strategy (Minkoff, 1995). This possibility is suggested in the Israeli case, in which since the late 1980s, Israeli peace groups have more readily integrated service into their work. It adds that this may be due to the growing realization among peace activists that service giving is highly beneficial in keeping the organization going and in raising funds for other activities as well.

Surprisingly, an anticipated coupling between P/CRo frames and concomitant tactics was not borne out by the data. Instead we saw an eclectic approach to action, which is likely a reflection of the complex and dynamic interplay between the internal factors of ideology, funding levels, and membership resources of P/CRos and their external volatile environments. As research on SMOs indicates, using a repertoire of tactics may ultimately be the most effective strategy, so that SMOs are likely to change tactics over time in reaction to shifting conditions (Acker, 1995; Cable, 1984; Dalton, 1994; Lofland, 1996; McAdam, 1983; Minkoff, 1995; Zald and Garner, 1987).

Despite these organizational characteristics that transcend regional differences, it is important not to underestimate the effect of regional differences. As powerful contextual factors, they impact on the culture and substance of the activities of the P/CRos. Whereas in Northern Ireland the conflict is framed as a consequence of personal attitudes and beliefs, in South Africa the conflict is clearly blamed on the apartheid regime. Not surprisingly, P/CRos in Northern Ireland are unlikely to engage in lobbying as a strategy: Regional differences also influence the degree of risk the P/CRos have to confront. In South Africa, for example, the degree of state repression against P/CRos has significantly affected how groups carry out their work.

At the organizational level, the P/CRos also depend on the existence of an active NGO network in their own country. Such a network provides them with needed organizational skills and expertise. Finally, regional differences also influence the membership of the P/CRos. For example, only in Northern Irish P/CRos is there a strong representation of the conflicting groups.

CONCLUSION

P/CRos are an important, yet understudied, segment of the NGO sector. With the proliferation of regional territorial, ethnic, and religious conflicts, they become a significant vehicle for citizens to mobilize against violent conflict. Their contribution to civil society, whose development is vital in societies riddled by protracted conflict, is uncontested. Therefore, it is important to develop theoretically grounded research that will enable us to understand how such organizations rise, develop, and survive, and what contributions they can make. This study is a modest beginning. Conceptualizing P/CRos as hybrid organizations that have both characteristics of NGOs and SMOs enables us to draw on existing theoretical concepts and propositions and on empirical research that can enrich our understanding of these organizations. Moreover, there are two important benefits in such an approach. First, only recently has there been a dialogue between researchers of organizations and of social movements. There is a growing recognition that both fields use parallel conceptual tools, and yet each could benefit from closer interaction and exchange of theoretical and empirical work. The study of P/CRos offers such an opportunity. Second, P/CRos are not the only hybrid organizations combining features from NGOs and SMOs. There are many other organizations within the NGO sector that may have similar attributes. These include social and political advocacy groups, civil liberties and social justice associations, grassroots organizations, and innovative service organizations. We believe that research on these organizations will also benefit from the intersection of organizational and social movement theories.

APPENDIX A: LIST OF P/CROS STUDIED AT THE FINAL PHASE

South Africa
- Black Sash
- Kooinonia—SA
- Quaker Peace Centre
- Justice and Peace Commission
- End Conspicution Campaign (ECC)
- Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR)
- Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA)
- South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR)
- Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (IMSSA)
- Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)

Israel
- Yesh Gvul
- Peace Now
- Oz ve’Shalom
- Rapprochement
- Women in Black
- Council for Peace and Security
- Bat Shalom (Jerusalem Link)
- Physicians for Human Rights
- Alternative Information Centre (AIC)
Northern Ireland
Peace Train
Quaker House
Women Together
Ulster Peoples College (UPC)
Clougher Valley Rural Development Centre
Families against Intimidation and Terror (FAITT)
Springfield Inter-Community Development Project
Committee for the Administration of Justice (CAJ)

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Gidron et al.

4 Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations


