Yuval Elovici

Senior Academic

USBee

Air-gap covert-channel via electromagnetic emission from USB

In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (e.g., COTTONMOUTH in the leaked NSA ANT catalog). Such methods require a hardware modification of the USB plug or device, in which a dedicated RF transmitter is embedded. In this paper we present 'USBee,' a software that can utilize an unmodified USB device connected to a computer as a RF transmitter. We demonstrate how a software can intentionally generate controlled electromagnetic emissions from the data bus of a USB connector. We also show that the emitted RF signals can be controlled and modulated with arbitrary binary data. We implement a prototype of USBee, and discuss its design and implementation details including signal generation and modulation. We evaluate the transmitter by building a receiver and demodulator using GNU Radio. Our evaluation shows that USBee can be used for transmitting binary data to a nearby receiver at a bandwidth of 20 to 80 BPS (bytes per second).

Publication language English
Pages 264-268
Publication status Published - 01.01.2016
7906972

Keywords

Air-gap
USB
covert channel
exfiltration
malware

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Safety Research
Computer Networks and Communications
Hardware and Architecture
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Access to Document
10.1109/PST.2016.7906972
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Link to publication in Scopus