

An Algorithm for the Coalitional Manipulation Problem under Maximin

Michael Zuckerman, Omer Lev and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

(Simulations by Amitai Levy)

BISFAI, June 2011

Introduction

□ Elections

- Voters submit linear orders of the candidates
- A *voting rule* determines the winner based on the votes

□ Manipulation

- A voter casts a vote that is not his true preference, to make himself better off

□ Gibbard – Satterthwaite theorem

- Every reasonable voting rule is manipulable

Unweighted Coalitional Optimization (UCO) problem

- Given
 - A voting rule r
 - The Profile of Non-Manipulators PNM
 - Candidate p preferred by the manipulators
- We are asked to find the minimum k such that there exists a set of manipulators M with $|M| = k$, and a Profile of Manipulators PM such that p is the winner of $PNM \cup PM$ under r .

Our setting, Maximin

- $C = \{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$ – the set of candidates
- $S, |S| = N$ – the set of N non-manipulators
- $T, |T| = n$ – the set of n manipulators, on which we fix an order
- $N_i(c, c') = |\{k \mid c \succ_k c', \succ_k \in S \cup \{1, \dots, i\}\}|$ – the number of voters from S and from the i first manipulators, which prefer c over c'
- $S_i(c) = \min_{c' \neq c} N_i(c, c')$ – the Maximin score of c from S and the first i manipulators
- Maximin winner = $\operatorname{argmax}_c \{S_n(c)\}$
- Denote $\operatorname{MIN}_i(c) = \{c' \in C \mid S_i(c) = N_i(c, c')\}$

CCUM Complexity

- CCUM under Maximin is NP-complete for any fixed number of manipulators (≥ 2)
(Xia et al. IJCAI 2009)
- It follows that the UCO is not approximable by constant better than $3/2$, unless $P = NP$
 - Otherwise, if $\text{opt} = 2$, then the output of the algorithm would be < 3 , i.e., 2
 - Hence, it would solve the CCUM for $n = 2$, a contradiction

The heuristic / approximation algorithm


- The current manipulator i
 - Ranks p first
 - Builds a digraph $G^{i-1} = (V, E^{i-1})$, where
 - $V = C \setminus \{p\}$;
 - $(x, y) \in E^{i-1}$ iff $(y \in \text{MIN}_{i-1}(x) \text{ and } p \notin \text{MIN}_{i-1}(x))$
 - Iterates over the candidates who have not yet been ranked
 - If there is a candidate with out-degree 0, then it adds such a candidate with the lowest score
 - Otherwise, adds a vertex with the lowest score
 - Removes all the outgoing edges of vertices who had outgoing edge to newly added vertex

Additions to the algorithm

- The candidates with out-degree 0 are kept in stacks in order to guarantee a DFS-like order among the candidates with the same scores
- If there is no candidate (vertex) with out-degree 0, then it first searches for a cycle, with 2 adjacent vertices having the lowest scores
 - If it finds such a pair of vertices, it adds the front vertex

Example

- $C = \{a, b, c, d, e, p\}$
- $|S| = 6$
- $|T| = 2$
- The non-manipulators' votes:
 - $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ p \succ e$
 - $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ p \succ e$
 - $b \succ c \succ a \succ p \succ e \succ d$
 - $b \succ c \succ p \succ e \succ d \succ a$
 - $e \succ d \succ p \succ c \succ a \succ b$
 - $e \succ d \succ p \succ c \succ a \succ b$



$$S_0(p) = N_0(p, b) = 2$$
$$S_0(e) = N_0(e, p) = 2$$

Example (2)

■ The non-manipulators' votes:

■ $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ p \succ e$

■ $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ p \succ e$

■ $b \succ c \succ a \succ p \succ e \succ d$


■ $b \succ c \succ p \succ e \succ d \succ a$

■ $e \succ d \succ p \succ c \succ a \succ b$

■ $e \succ d \succ p \succ c \succ a \succ b$

■ The manipulators' votes:

$p \succ e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$



$$S_0(p) = N_0(p, b) = 2$$

$$S_0(e) = N_0(e, p) = 2$$

Example (3)

- The non-manipulators' votes:

- $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ p \succ e$

- $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ p \succ e$

- $b \succ c \succ a \succ p \succ e \succ d$

- $b \succ c \succ p \succ e \succ d \succ a$


- $e \succ d \succ p \succ c \succ a \succ b$

- $e \succ d \succ p \succ c \succ a \succ b$

- The manipulators' votes:

- $p \succ e \succ d \succ b \succ c \succ a$

- $p \succ e \succ d \succ c \succ a \succ b$



$$S_1(p) = N_1(p, b) = 3$$

$$S_1(e) = N_1(e, p) = 2$$

Example (4)

- The non-manipulators' votes:

- $a > b > c > d > p > e$

- $a > b > c > d > p > e$

- $b > c > a > p > e > d$

- $b > c > p > e > d > a$


- $e > d > p > c > a > b$

- $e > d > p > c > a > b$

- The manipulators' votes:

$p > e > d > b > c > a$

$p > e > d > c > a > b$



$$S_2(p) = N_2(p, b) = 4$$


$$\max_{x \neq p} S_2(x) = 3$$

p is the winner!

Instances without 2-cycles

- Denote $ms_i = \max_{c \neq p} S_i(c)$
 - The maximum score of p 's opponents after i stages
- Lemma: If there are no 2-cycles in the graphs built by the algorithm, then for all i , $0 \leq i \leq n-3$ it holds that $ms_{i+3} \leq ms_i + 1$
- Theorem: If there are no 2-cycles, then the algorithm gives a $5/3$ -approximation of the optimum

Proof of Theorem



The ratio n/opt is the biggest when $opt = 3$, $n = \lceil 3/2 * 3 \rceil = 5$

Eliminating the 2-cycles

- Lemma: If at a certain stage i there are no 2-cycles, then for all $j > i$, there will be no 2-cycles at stage j
- We prove that the algorithm performs optimally while there are 2-cycles
 - Intuitively, if there is a 2-cycle, then one of its vertices has the highest score, and it will always be placed in the end – until the cycle is eliminated
- Once the 2-cycles have been eliminated, our algorithm performs a $5/3$ -approximation on the number of stages left
- Generally we have $5/3$ -approximation of the optimal solution

Conclusions

- A new heuristic / approximation algorithm for CCUM / UCO under Maximin
- Gives a $5/3$ -approximation to the optimum
- The lower bound on the approximation ratio of the algorithm (and any algorithm) is $1\frac{1}{2}$
- Simulation results – comparison between this algorithm and the simple greedy algorithm in Zuckerman et al. 2009
- Future work
 - Prove the approx. ratio for a similar algorithm without our technical additions

Thank You

Questions?